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How does policy bargaining at the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) affect
the duration of senate proceedings? This study offers a new theory of dynamic policy
bargaining with incomplete information. A new simulation procedure is developed to
derive hypotheses. New data on FCC proceedings since 1972 is collected and linked
to the extended GESTA legislation database. The event history analysis shows that
bargaining duration increases with preference uncertainty. The empirical impact of policy
preference heterogeneity and other bargaining-related factors on the overall duration of
FCC proceedings is not strong and systematic enough to clearly stand out from other
causes.1
The FCC is selected as a case for two reasons. First, the FCC is the “most powerful
independent constitutional court of the world” (Scho¨nberger 2011, 45, own transl.) with
a particularly large set of competencies and political impact (Alivizatos 1995; Franc¸ois
2011; Fromont 1999; Ha¨berle 2001; Kneip 2009; 2013; Kommers 1994; Limbach 2001). It
may declare federal laws unconstitutional and indirectly influence legislators by antici-
pated vetoes (Landfried 1984, 51ff).2 Some scholars even see the FCC as a prototype of
specialized constitutional jurisdiction (Kneip 2009). Its independence from highest fed-
eral courts of ordinary jurisdiction, its self-conception as a constitutional body, and its
enormous plentitude of competencies in international comparison constitute its unique
type (Wahl 2006). Jestaedt even elevates the FCC to a “third archetype of constitutional
courts” at eye level to the older basic models of U.S. Supreme Court and Austrian Verfas-
sungsgerichtshof (Jestaedt 2011, 96, own transl.). In light of the FCC’s political relevance
and independence, impacts of policy motivation on bargaining duration are more likely
and more relevant to the political system than in any other constitutional court.
Second, the FCC is an “export hit” (Jestaedt 2011, 150, own transl.). It has served
as a role model for many constitutional courts in the world since 1970s, including Spain,
Portugal, South Korea, South Africa, and many new democracies in Central and Eastern
1 The layout of this thesis is set with LATEX. Graphics are created with R 2.15.3 (Development Core
Team 2008) and the R package plotrix (Lemon 2006).
2 See Stone (1992) and Vanberg (1998) for detailed analyses on the autolimitative effect of anticipated
vetoes.
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Europe.3 Even though these courts might not share the full range of competencies, em-
pirical findings on the FCC will be relevant for judicial politics research on a large set of
comparable constitutional courts worldwide.
Empirical political science research on the FCC still is at a very early stage compared
to the intense research on U.S. Supreme Court (Herrmann 2010; Ho¨nnige and Gschwend
2010; van Ooyen and Mo¨llers 2006a; von Beyme 2001). There are numerous edited volumes
on the FCC, including interdisciplinary historical, judicial, social science, and philosoph-
ical perspectives (e.g. Badura and Dreier 2001a;b; Rogowski and Gawron 2002b; Stolleis
2011; van Ooyen and Mo¨llers 2006b; Vorla¨nder 2006b). Most scholars of European con-
stitutional courts have focused on their interdependence with the legislature and the
government (Ho¨nnige 2007; Stone Sweet 2000; Vanberg 2001; von Beyme 1998). Whereas
the U.S. literature predominantly opts for the rational choice institutionalism approach,
studies on the FCC are mostly embedded in interpretative institutionalism (Ho¨nnige and
Gschwend 2010, 522).
There still is little knowledge about the FCC’s bargaining processes behind closed
doors.4 “We have little knowledge about processes within the Court – analyses from a
political science perspective virtually do not exist” (Herrmann 2010, 411, own transl.).
This is at least partially due to the limited amount of publicly available data on the
FCC’s internal processes (Menzel 2011, 10f) as compared to the large U.S. Supreme
Court database (Spaeth et al. 2013). Some FCC judges might see a moderate influence
of personal and political values on FCC decision-making (Landfried 1984, 45). But the
Court officially denies any influence or motivation by political concerns and many judges
claim to share this view5, whereas journalists and political scientists point to the Court’s
political nature (Prantl 2011; Schmidt 2011). This thesis opts for the latter view and
contributes to a better understanding of internal, policy-motivated bargaining processes
at the FCC from a strategic rational choice perspective.
3 See Benda, Klein and Klein (2012, 4), von Beyme (2006), Ha¨berle (2001), Ho¨nnige and Gschwend
(2010), Jestaedt (2011), Menzel (2011), Rath (2013), Scho¨nberger (2011, 44), Schlaich and Korioth
(2012, 4), So´lyom (2011), Tomuschat (2001), Wahl (2006), and Zu¨rn (2011).
4 “The public does not realize the dispute sometimes lasting for weeks or months behind an eventually
unanimous decision, like in the abortion conflict or in the asylum decisions. They see the finished
product” (FCC judge no. 29, cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 415, own transl.).
5 “[... T]he Court is not a political body. Its sole review standard is the Basic Law” (Federal Constitu-
tional Court 2014).
“The Federal Constitutional Court does not decide politically but solely based on the Basic Law”
(FCC judge and former politician Peter Mu¨ller, cited by Janisch 2012, own transl.).
“Even if judicial opinions are to be weighed, it is not about politics. ‘The Federal Constitutional Court




For three reasons, we should care about the duration of FCC proceedings:
1. The timing of an agreement is an essential part of any negotiation outcome.
“If it did not matter when people agreed, it would not matter whether or not they
agreed at all” (Cross 1965, 72). Delayed FCC decisions might even be too late to
have any effect at all.6 There is no binding rule in what order and how fast to
deal with pending proceedings. The FCC’s yearly list of proceedings to be settled
is internally called the “list of lies” (Rath 2013, 29). If judges bring a case forward
with high priority, this will already be a political decision (Rath 2013, 29).
2. The FCC depends on public support to uphold its political impact and to have its
decisions implemented (Vanberg 2005). Public confidence in the Court positively
correlates with perceived institutional performance in reasonable time (Vorla¨nder
and Brodocz 2006, 267). Journalists share the view that duration of FCC pro-
ceedings matters.7 The duration of proceedings affects the Court’s major source of
political power.
3. The duration of FCC proceedings is a current political and legal challenge.
The European Convention on Human Rights entitles everyone to a hearing “within
a reasonable time” (Art. 6 §1 ECHR, see also Grabenwarter 2008). Both current
and potential future complainants’ rights are affected. An excessive duration of
conflictual FCC proceedings could lower future complainants’ incentives to fight for
their constitutional rights. Judicial delay discourages potential plaintiffs from filing
legal disputes at ordinary courts (Sobbrio, D’Agostino and Sironi 2010) and similar
effects are plausible at constitutional courts.
Several times, the European Court of Justice has accused Germany of an excessive
length of constitutional complaint proceedings at the FCC.8 The FCC’s enormous
6 Siegfried Kauder (CDU), who chaired the parliamentary BND investigation committee on the federal
government’s role in the Iraq war, blamed the FCC for delayed decisions: “Not before five weeks after
the close of the committee, we learned that the government should not have blocked so many files
and that approvals of witness statements have been handled too restrictively” (cited by jub/FOCUS
Online 2010, own transl.). Indeed, the FCC’s second senate came to a decision as late as on June
17, 2009 (BVerfGE 124, 78), more than two years after the case was filed and just one day before the
committee’s final session: “A decision by the Court was not available until the declatory resolution
(Feststellungsbeschluss) of the committee on June 18, 2009” (BT-Drs. 16/13400, p. 47, own transl.).
7 In the coverage on the politically salient child pornography accusations against the German politician
Sebastian Edathy, a leading German news agency reports: “Meanwhile, the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court received the constitutional complaint by the former SPD Member of Bundestag Edathy.
The Court’s spokesman did not give any information on the content nor the possible duration of the
proceeding” (dpa 2014, own transl., emphasis added).
8 Exemplary ECJ decisions are Trippel v. Germany (2003), Voggenreiter v. Germany (2004), Wim-
mer v. Germany (2005), Su¨rmeli v. Germany (2006), Kirsten v. Germany (2007), and Kaemena and
Tho¨nebo¨hm v. Germany (2009).
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caseload leads to a severe bottleneck of pending proceedings (Bundesministerium
der Justiz 1998; Uerpmann 2001). The then leaving FCC judge Ernst-Wolfgang
Bo¨ckenfo¨rde even feared that the increasingly high workload would necessarily lead
to the collapse of the Court from within. Statistically, he argued, judges would need
to complete 47.5 chamber cases in just one day in order to keep up with incoming
cases (Bo¨ckenfo¨rde 1996, 282). Until recently, there has been a complete lack of an
effective remedy in this respect at the national level (see section 6.1; Benda, Klein
and Klein 2012, 512f; Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 55).
The duration of FCC proceedings matters from political, public, and legal perspectives.
Hence, it is important to know how political or policy-motivated incentives and bargaining
constellations at the FCC affect delay of proceedings. Until now, there is but mere
conjectures and anecdotal evidence. Benda, Klein and Klein (2012, 166) suppose that the
delay of FCC decisions after an oral argument indicates substantial controversy in the
senate. Kommers and Miller (2012, 38) blaim the Court for regular delay out of strategic
incentives so that initiating parties would ultimately withdraw their case.9 Lamprecht
(2011, 44ff) and (Wesel 2004, 89f) both claim that the first senate delayed the party
prohibition proceeding against the KPD out of political concerns.10 The proceeding of
the famous “Lu¨th” decision in 1958, which raised the basic rights of the Grundgesetz to
an objective scale of values, took more than six years: “Why did it take so long? Maybe
because it was so important or because the senate was overstrained with such complaints.
We do not know for sure” (Wesel 2004, 132, own transl.). This thesis seeks to disentangle
potential causes and to provide a sound theory of how policy bargaining-related factors
affect the duration of FCC proceedings.
Chapter 2 introduces the FCC’s basic structure and procedures that are relevant for
further analysis. FCC judges have an enormous leeway to decide in a largely institution-
free environment. Chapter 3 discusses previous approaches to explain delay of policy
bargaining processes. No compelling and logically consistent theory of how policy pref-
9 Their numbers are misleading, though. A minor proportion of the 168 organ disputes and 163 abstract
judicial reviews that were closed until 2011 have actually been withdrawn. At least 58% of these organ
disputes and 67% of these abstract judicial reviews have resulted in a regular decision on the merits
by the Court (FCC 2014a). These numbers do not yet contain some initial proceedings that were
regularly decided in the course of conjoint proceedings.
10 They tell the following story: The prohibition of the SRP had just been decided within one year,
whereas the KPD proceeding took almost 5 years. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer got impatient and
in July 1956 his party’s convenient parliamentary majority changed the Federal Constitutional Court
Act (FCCA) so that the competence of party prohibitions would be assigned to the second senate on
August 31, 1956. The first senate sped up the proceeding and the prohibition of the KPD was finally
decided on August 17.
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1. Introduction
erences affect bargaining duration has been provided yet. Chapter 4 extends Banks and
Duggan (2006)’s bargaining model by the assumption of preference uncertainty. This
new model of dynamic policy bargaining with incomplete information allows to explain
variance in bargaining delay and can be applied to numerous policy bargaining settings.
Chapter 5 presents a new, computing-time efficient simulation procedure to solve these
games. Hypotheses on the dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete information
are derived via computer simulation. They reveal a much more distinguished picture of
factors of bargaining delay than previous accounts suggest. Chapter 6 presents a research
design to test these hypotheses on all 694 FCC senate proceedings with reference to fed-
eral legislation since 1972. The analysis makes use of new data sources and links FCC
proceeding data to the extended GESTA legislation dataset. Chapter 7 finally presents
the results from event history analysis. Preference uncertainty increases bargaining dura-
tion. The empirical impact of other policy bargaining-related factors on duration is not
strong and systematic enough to clearly stand out from other causes.
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2. The German Federal Constitutional
Court
This chapter provides a brief introduction into the FCC’s position in German politics, its
formal structure, and procedural rules.11 The description of the institutional setting lays
the ground for the formal theory of FCC decision-making to be developed in chapter 4.
The main conclusions of the present chapter are: (a) FCC judges have far-reaching com-
petencies to change legislative policy and (b) they negotiate in a largely institution-free
surrounding.
2.1. History
Since its beginning in 1951, the FCC has gained an established and very powerful position
in German politics.12 Following the experience from Weimar Republic and World War II,
its precise institutional structure and powers were disputed in the Parliamentary Council
(Niclauß 2006) and continued to be a contested issue in the Adenauer era (Lembcke 2006).
Wesel (2004) identifies two severe crises of the Court: The first took place in 1952/53,
when the Adenauer government tried to politically manipulate the Court in a dispute on
German rearmament. The second crisis occurred in 1994/95, when the Court faced harsh
political and public resistance after a series of high-conflict, unpopular decisions that
culminated in the open refusal of the Kruzifix decision by the Bavarian government.13 In
the long run, neither crisis has seriously harmed the Court.
FCC judges are regularly accused of political bias, e.g. in a series of decisions against the
social-liberal government coalition in the 1970s (Grigoleit 2006; Wesel 200414). Politicians
still threaten to cut the Court’s competences these days in response to unfavored decisions
11 Unless otherwise indicated, the information in this chapter is taken from Schlaich and Korioth (2012)
and Benda, Klein and Klein (2012). Kommers and Miller (2012, chap. 1) present an excellent English
language introduction into the Court. The latter source serves as a valuable orientation for translating
technical terms from the German judiciary into English.
12 See Wesel (2004), Lamprecht (2011), Menzel (2011), and Scho¨nberger (2011) for more comprehensive
historical overviews.
13 See also Schaal (2006).
14 See Menzel (2011, 14f) for a pointed critique on Wesel’s overly simplifying historical account.
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(vek/SPIEGEL Online 2014). Yet, none of these offenses has succeeded in reducing
the Court’s political influence and its public standing (Menzel and Mu¨ller-Terpitz 2011).
Apart from temporary uncertainty in the mid-1990s, the FCC has remained a widely
recognized, uncontested and powerful actor in German politics throughout the whole
period under study.
2.2. Jurisdiction
The Court’s main tasks are to settle disputes between constitutional organs or federal en-
tities, and to control court decisions, executive, and legislative acts in terms of their con-
stitutionality (Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 5f). A direct comparison to the U.S. Supreme
Court helps to get a better understanding of the German particularities in constitutional
jurisdiction. The FCC differs from its American counterpart in many ways:
• The FCC is not an appellate court. It is a specialized court that deals with consti-
tutional questions only (Rogowski and Gawron 2002a; Schlaich and Korioth 2012,
197ff).
• Ordinary courts are bound to the Basic Law. But the FCC is the only court in the
German federal system that is empowered to annul legislative acts. Its members
can even judge on the constitutionality of laws without a concrete dispute at hand.
• The FCC has no certiorari power (Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 183). It is generally
obliged to decide on every submitted case, so that it has very limited power over its
docket (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 154). Kommers and Miller (2012, 35) rightly
point to the gate-keeping power of chambers. But with regard to their limited
jurisdiction on obvious or totally hopeless constitutional complaints (see section
2.3), this barrier is not very strong.
• The FCC is obliged to decide on highly politicized cases. Despite a moderate norm
of judicial restraint15, there is no political question doctrine that allows judges to
ignore politically delicate cases (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 12ff).
The Court’s agenda is externally determined. FCC judges can neither deny to deal with
inconvenient cases, nor can they hold consultations without external initiation (Benda,
Klein and Klein 2012, 97). But once a case is docketed, they possess far-reaching compe-
tencies.
15 “Judicial restraint implies that justices should defer to elected officials as much as possible within the
bounds established by the Constitution” (Bailey and Maltzman 2011, 9). See von Beyme (2010, 419ff)
for a more elaborated account on judicial restraint at the FCC.
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2.3. Structure and Composition
The following paragraphs summarize the Court’s structure, decision-making rules, and
the role and selection of FCC judges.
Plenary The plenary is a board of all 16 members of the Court. It is mainly responsible
for organizational tasks (e.g. budget plans, the assignment of competencies, etc.)
and for resolving conflicting legal opinions between the senates. Its resolutions are
binding but the final decision on a case is always made by a senate or chamber.
Senates The FCC is a “twin court” and consists of two eight-member senates with dis-
tinct jurisdiction. Both senates are of equal rank and act as “the Federal Consti-
tutional Court”. They can not revise each other’s decisions (Schlaich and Korioth
2012, 26). In the beginning, the first senate (“Grundrechtssenat”) exclusively dealt
with basic right disputes and the second senate (“Staatsrechtssenat”) resolved con-
stitutional conflicts between state organs only. The caseload had been heavily bi-
ased towards the first senate due to the high number of constitutional complaints.
Therefore, the second senate was allocated partial jurisdiction on constitutional
complaints in 1956.16 While different emphases on basic rights and state law still
prevail, the strict separation between senates has been relaxed.
Decision-making in the senate Most decisions formally require a simple majority of at
least six attendant judges. Each judge has one vote, so the (vice) president’s position
counts just as much as any of their colleagues’. If less than six judges attend (e.g.
due to illness), the whole consultation procedure has to be reopened. Judges from
the other senate can be chosen by the lot if this is necessary to reach the quorum
of six in very urgent cases.17 In the event of a tie (4:4 or 3:3), the objected act will
not be declared unconstitutional (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 62).
Chambers Each year, both senates appoint several chambers. These sub-committees
consist of three permanent judges from the respective senate. Their main purpose
is to release the senate from minor cases. By unanimity rule, a chamber can decline
the admissibility of a concrete judicial review or deny to accept a constitutional
complaint for review.
In 1986, chambers replaced the functionally similar “preliminary examination com-
mittees” (Vorpru¨fungsausschu¨sse). Unlike their predecessors, a chamber may even
16 See Federal Law Gazette (BGBl 1956 I, 662), Rath (2013, 15), Limbach (2001, 20f), and Benda, Klein
and Klein (2012, 74f).
17 This provision was introduced in 1986 (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 153).
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grant a constitutional complaint – but only in obvious cases that do not directly
target a legal norm. Cases of general importance or constitutional questions yet
unanswered by a senate must be referred to the whole senate (Benda, Klein and
Klein 2012, 78ff, 185, 196)
Judges FCC judges18 are elected for a personal term of 12 years with an age limit of
68. They may not be reelected (Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 28). When judges start
their term at the Court, they must be at least of age 40, formally qualified to hold
the position of a judge, and eligible to the German Bundestag. Three members of
each senate must have been federal judges before (Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 28).
FCC judgeship is a full-time job. With the exception of being professor, no other job
is compatible with this office (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 64f). This job-related
provision and the exclusion of judges’ reelection prospects strengthen a judge’s po-
litical independence, once he is elected.19 Each judge is supported by his own de-
partment. Legal assistants play an important role in preparing decisions (Wieland
2002). But only judges themselves take part in the confidential consultations of a
senate (Kranenpohl 2010, 88ff).
Selection of judges A 12-member election committee of the Bundestag and the plenary
of the Bundesrat each elect half of the judges for a specific senate at the FCC. The
same bodies also select the president and vice president of the Court, who each chair
a senate with administrative and respresentative duties.
Since the election requires a two-third majority, politicians need to compromise
across party lines. In practice, positions are evenly split between the christian
democrats (CDU/CSU) and social democrats (SPD). They sometimes grant a seat
to their smaller coalition partner. The proposal is typically accepted by unanimity.
A very small number of party leaders effectively selects the judges so that most
judges are party-affiliated, party members, or even prominent politicians. “Neutral”
candidates without obvious party-affiliation make up a minority of the Court (Geck
1986, 31ff). Meetings of the election committee are secret and there is little public
debate about potential candidates (Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 30).
18 I refer to members of the FCC as “judges”, whereas members of the U.S. Supreme Court are called
“justices”.
19 The present study does not focus on gender as a decisive feature in the judicial policy-making process.
Throughout this thesis, the generic masculine refers to judges, complainants etc. irrespective of their
gender or biological sex.
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2.4. Forms of Action
The legislator has defined a variety of forms of action at the FCC. They involve disputes
between state organs, abstract and concrete judicial review, individual and municipal
constitutional complaints, the prohibition of political parties, review of election results,
and many more.20 The present study is limited to FCC proceedings that object to federal
laws. The most important and frequent forms of action of this kind are:
Abstract judicial review The federal government, a state government, or one-fourth of
the members of the Bundestag can file a proceeding of abstract judicial review (“ab-
strakte Normenkontrolle”) in order to question the constitutionality of a legal norm.
The quorum used to be one-third of the members of the Bundestag until it was low-
ered by the “Grand Coalition” in 2008 (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 278). The
procedure does not require any reference to a concrete case at issue.
Concrete judicial review An ordinary court can file a concrete judicial review (“konkrete
Normenkontrolle”) if it considers a legal norm that is relevant for a decision on a
pending “concrete” case to be unconstitutional. The FCC’s jurisdiction is limited
to evaluating the constitutionality of such a legal norm.21 As long as constitutional
rights or principles are not violated, the application of legal norms to concrete cases
remains up to ordinary courts.
Constitutional Complaint Any individual natural person or legal entity can file a con-
stitutional complaint (“Verfassungsbeschwerde”). They may directly object to a
legal norm that personally, currently, and directly affects them. Or they may turn
against an ordinary court’s decision and indirectly object to a norm (Schlaich and
Korioth 2012, 90f). Municipalities can file a constitutional complaint but object to
federal or state laws only (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 269). Unlike other forms
of action, constitutional complaints require a positive vote by at least three judges
of the senate to be accepted for review.22 The FCC is to accept any complaint that
is related to grave hardship on the complainant or of general significance (Kommers
and Miller 2012, 12).
20 See Benda, Klein and Klein (2012), Kommers and Miller (2012, 10), and Rinken (2002, 62ff) for more
detailed descriptions.
21 The FCC may also decide on whether state law conflicts with federal law or other norms (Schlaich and
Korioth 2012, 311). Such proceedings of judicial review are not relevant in this study.
22 See FCCA, § 93d (3) and Schlaich and Korioth (2012, 180).
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2.5. The Course of a Proceeding
The study focuses on the duration of FCC proceedings. We will therefore have a look
at the course that a request typically takes, once it has reached the Court (Kranenpohl
2010, 82f). Figure 2.1 provides the general outline. It is a simplified presentation and
does not account for special cases like conjoint proceedings, plenary decisions, transfers
across senates, or senate decisions exluded from the official collection of decisions. The
typical course of proceedings is discussed in the following.
1. Administration Incoming requests are first sighted by the administration. Obvi-
ously hopeless or inadmissible constitutional complaints that do not even fulfill for-
mal requirements enter the general register (“Allgemeines Register”). The decision
is made by a Pra¨sidialrat who does not hold the position of a judge. Complainants
receive a written note. Only if they insist on a decision by a judge, the complaint is
transferred to the official docket of the Court (“Verfahrensregister”). The request
will be closed otherwise (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 87f; Schlaich and Korioth
2012, 182).
Each year, about 4500 requests are ultimately closed in the general register. The
remaining 6000 complaints are officially docketed. They include more than 1000
cases from complainants who insisted on a decision by a judge and another 1000
presumably hopeless requests whose complainants are known for notorious insistance
on judicial decisions anyway (Schluckebier 2012).
2. Rapporteur Once a case is docketed, the Pra¨sidialrat proposes a rapporteur
(“Berichterstatter”) to whom the respective senate’s chair will assign the proceeding.
The FCC’s opinion assignment procedure is much less discretionary than the U.S.
Supreme Court’s procedure (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 357ff). The yearly schedule of
responsibilities (“Gescha¨ftsverteilung”) clearly defines individual judges’ responsi-
bilities for certain fields of law. It largely determines the chair’s decision and leaves
little room for interpretation in most cases.
The rapporteur and his or her department then prepare a comprehensive Votum.
Such a written document includes all case-relevant facts, legal norms, opinions,
arguments, and a first proposal on how to decide the proceeding (Kommers and
Miller 2012, 27). If the proceeding is a constitutional complaint or a concrete judicial
review, the rapporteur will decide whether to submit the case to the chamber (step 3)
or whether to directly target the senate (step 4, cf. Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 185).
All other forms of action directly go to the senate.
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Figure 2.1.: The Course of a Proceeding at the FCC: Senate decisions are the focus
of this study. When these cases enter the Court, they are typically classified
by the administration, prepared by a rapporteur, possibly discussed in a
chamber, discussed and decided in a senate, and published in the FCC’s
collection of decisions.
3. (Chamber consultation) If the case enters a chamber, the Votum circulates
between the chamber’s judges. The consultation process is usually limited to the
exchange of written notes. If all three judges unanimously agree to decline or grant a
complaint, the proceeding will be closed.23 About 97% of all docketed constitutional
complaints are dealt with this way (Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 185). The proceeding
will be forwarded to the senate, otherwise. Only the most important chamber
decisions are published in the FCC’s collection of decisions.
4. Senate consultation Senate consultations take place in regular face-to-face meet-
23 See section 2.3 for more information. These mostly trivial or obvious cases will not be considered in
my study.
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ings. Conferences are scheduled every Tuesday and often also take Wednesdays and
Thursdays – except for the weeks in August and September, when the Court is not
in session (Kommers and Miller 2012, 28). Consultation meetings are confidential
and restricted to participating judges. Legal assistants in charge of the Votum’s
preparation are not allowed to participate.
The group of justices that will finally make the decision is determined at the begin-
ning of the senate consultation. Judges consider both the formal admissibility and
the merits of a case. Separate proceedings on the same object can be linked to a
joint decision. If a decision depends on another court’s ruling, the proceeding can
be deferred (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 128f).
The consultation of a proceeding is divided into two phases:
a) In the decision consultation (“Entscheidungsberatung”), the rapporteur in-
troduces the case and his or her favored solution as announced in the Votum.
The judges then negotiate about a common solution. This process might take
several sessions and can include an oral argument. The senate eventually agrees
on a common outcome that is supported by a majority of participating judges.
Oral arguments are conducted in very few proceedings.24 They are optional
in most procedures and take a lot of time to prepare (Kranenpohl 2010, 100).
They may also serve to inform the public about a proceeding in cases of major
political importance (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 129ff; Kommers and Miller
2012, 26f).
Based on the consultation outcome, the rapporteur prepares a decision draft
(“Entscheidungsentwurf”). Even if he or she was in the minority, the rappor-
teur would be responsible for writing the majority opinion. Only in rare cases,
the opinion has been assigned to other judges (Kommers and Miller 2012, 28).
The decision draft will then lay the ground for the second phase of consultation.
b) In the reading consultation (“Leseberatung”), the senate revises the decision
draft and passes the final decision. This process goes far beyond editorial
formalities. Judges sometimes dispute about single connotations so that the
reading consultation can be very intense and lengthy.25
24 From 1990 to 2013, there were 73 oral arguments held in the first senate and 101 in the second senate
– a total Court’s average of 7.25 oral arguments per year (FCC 2014a, annual statistics 2013).
25 Two FCC judges report:
“We have intensely discussed every sentence and sometimes single words. More often than
not, the [reading] consultation of the decision draft took more time than the [decision] con-
sultation of the Votum” (No. 11, cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 99, own transl. and comments).
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Besides this very general outline, hardly any procedural rules restrict negotiations
in the senate. The mere existence of a formal list of speakers in discussions varies
in time and between the senates (Kranenpohl 2010, 96f).
Judges share a strong norm of consensus, though. Senate negotiations are fights
about majorities that regularly result in compromise (Lepsius 2011, 241). In a
“separate opinion” (Sondervotum), judges may express their disagreement with a
decision (dissenting opinion) or with its reasoning (concurring opinion; cf. Schlaich
and Korioth 2012, 35).26 They are typically published only on issues that are
either scientifically fundamental or very conflictual in society (Limbach 2001, 34).
A senate will only rely on majority decisions and separate opinions if there is no
way to achieve consensus (Kranenpohl 2010, 181ff).
With the U.S. Supreme Court in mind, one might expect the rapporteur to possess
an enormous agenda-setting impact on the final outcome (Kranenpohl 2010, 133ff).
They enjoy wide discretion in setting priorities and scheduling when to introduce
which case. So unfavored cases can be considerably delayed (Kranenpohl 2010, 91).
They are experts of the case and might have an information advantage. But on
the other hand, all case-relevant information and legal opinions must be included
in the Votum. The rapporteur’s colleagues are usually well prepared in conference
meetings (Kranenpohl 2010, 94). Since rapporteurs are typically appointed to a field
where they do not have a particular expertise, the professional checks and balances
within the senate further limit the bargaining advantage (Kranenpohl 2010, 148ff).
The first proposal is frequently changed in the senate and the Votum does not
confine the final decision at all (Kranenpohl 2010, 93, 155ff). Judges can hardly
predict a negotiation’s outcome at the beginning.27 So the rapporteur might have
“The most dramatic situation, when a decision is finally found, is the reading consultation”
(No. 29, cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 98, own transl.).
26 Separate opinions were legally introduced in 1971 and have been applied for the whole period under
study (4th Amendment of the FCCA Act of Dec 21, 1970; BGBl I, 1765). For more detailed information,
see Lamprecht (1992).
27 Four FCC judges report:
“When the door closes at 10 o’clock, seven hounds jump at the one game [the rapporteur]”
(No. 30, cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 96, own transl.).
“When I enter the Senate with a Votum, I do not know the outcome. I really don’t know!”
(No. 4, cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 95, own transl.).
“We all enter a common boat and after a long journey we reach shores that we didn’t even
know of, when we started” (No. 18, cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 95, own transl.).
“Of course, you have some idea about where there might be resistance. But there are many
surprises. [...] Resistance often comes from where you do not expect it”
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a moderate bargaining advantage due to the largely self-determined timing of cases
and a more extense preparation. But given the strong culture of mutual control and
well-prepared, intense negotiations, this advantage is rather limited and “probably
overestimated from outside” (Judge no. 28, cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 143, own
transl.).
Senate consultations end with a final vote on the decision including both merits and
reasoning.
5. Publication of the decicion The Court’s decision will then be announced and
published in the Court’s official collection of FCC decisions (BVerfGE ). The collec-
tion includes all senate decisions that are not explicitly exluded from publication
(Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 167).28 Since judges can change their vote any-
time until the final decision is published (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 155), the
publication of a decision literally ends the proceeding.
Published decisions are written in a very comprehensive way and they roughly share
a common layout (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 158ff):
a) Leading sentences (“Leitsa¨tze”) are a concise summary of the decision’s main
legal propositions. They are optional and not formally binding.
b) The rubrum is the head of the decision and includes detailed information
such as the case’s file number, its form of action, complainants or petition-
ers and sometimes defendants, attorneys of record, objected norms or actions,
potentially violated constitutional rights and federal norms, the senate, patric-
ipating judges, the date of oral argument, and the date of the final decision on
the merits.
c) The Tenor is the binding ruling of the case.
d) The reasoning is split into several parts. It often adheres to the following
structure: Part A includes a short summary of the facts of the case, a report on
relevant legal norms and sometimes even these norms’ legal history, the actual
circumstances of the case, legal comments of participants in the proceeding, and
sometimes further comments on available evidence and the case’s procedural
(No. 27, cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 155, own transl.).
28 I expect only minor decisions to be excluded from publication. Ordinary courts, politics, and the
public will only adhere to a decision if it is commonly known and accessible. The FCC’s legitimacy
and political power depend on public support and transparency. FCC judges have a high incentive to
make decisions publically available. I am not aware of any complaints about non-published decisions
of general interest.
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history. Part B refers to the admissibility (“Zula¨ssigkeit”) of the request. Part
C refers to the reasoning on the merits (“Begru¨ndetheit”) and is frequently
split into a more general interpretation of the constitution (“Maßsta¨beteil”)
and a specific application to the case at issue (“Subsumtionsteil”, cf. Lepsius
2011, 168ff). Part D might include further information on deadlines for the
legislator to implement the Court’s decision, and the like.
e) Separate opinions and the names of their authors are attached if applicable.
f) The document closes with signatures of all participating judges.
The rapporteur of the proceeding is not publically indicated. Whereas judges may
insist on having their separate opinion made public, the disclosure of proportion of
votes formally needs to be confirmed by a majority of judges (Lietzmann 2006, 271).
Following an informal norm, it is usually published at the request of the minority
side (Kranenpohl 2010, 477).
2.6. Leeway of Decision
The Court has a large leeway of decision. The Basic Law provides a mere framework of
abstract principles with plenty of room for concrete interpretation (Limbach 2001, 29).
The large set of legally feasible decision alternatives enables FCC judges to make use of
this flexibility. The great variety of potential outcomes goes far beyond simply granting
vs. denying a request. When reviewing a legal norm, the FCC can:29
• declare it null and void (“Nichtigkeitserkla¨rung”) so that the norm is ineffective
from its point of introduction with retrospective effect.
• declare it null and void with regard to specific circumstances (“, soweit...”).
• declare it incompatible with the Basic Law (“Unvereinbarkeitserkla¨rung”) so that
the norm may no longer be applied – as soon as the decision is published or after a
deadline has passed.
• specify a binding interpretation in conformity with the Basic Law (“verfassungskon-
forme Auslegung”) of the norm. This option does not affect the plain text of a norm
but it does set the meaning that is generally binding for any application of this norm.
29 The following typology summarizes the most common decision alternatives. These categories are
neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. See Benda, Klein and Klein (2012, 298f), Rath (2013, 30f),
Rinken (2002, 69ff), and Schlaich and Korioth (2012, 271ff) for more detailed descriptions.
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• pass an admonitory decision (“Appellentscheidung”) that keeps the objected norm
temporarily in effect but calls upon the legislator to pass a new regulation, possibly
setting a deadline. The Court can even provide directives with regard to that new
regulation’s content at an arbitrary level of precision (Ossenbu¨hl 2001, 42).
• simply reject a constitutional complaint or a judicial review as without merit (“un-
begru¨ndet”) without making a generally binding statement on the norm’s constitu-
tionality.
• positively affirm the the norm’s conformity with the Basic Law.
• add obiter dicta as quasi-judgments beyond the boundaries of the given case.
All of these options can relate to an entire law, single paragraphs, minor parts, or even
single words of a norm. If a precise deadline is set, it can be short or generous. The
Court’s requirements on a norm can be formulated at any level of precision. Exceedingly
detailed decisions have occasionally led to criticism of the Court acting as a “backup
legislator” (Ossenbu¨hl 2001, 45). E.g., consider the 2012 decision on the 19th Amendment
of the Federal Electoral Law, where the FCC set an upper limit of approximately 15
U¨berhangmandate: “The Senate is aware of the fact that the number of 15 overhang seats
can not be completely justified as an act of judicial norm specification” (BVerfGE 131,
316, own transl.). Further examples of very detailed requirements include Party Finance
VI (BVerfGE 85, 264), the interim regulation in Common Marital Names (BVerfGE 84,
9), and Abortion II (BVerfGE 88, 203; cf. Ossenbu¨hl 2001, 45f).
Whenever a legal norm is objected, the FCC has a great variety of potential outcomes to
choose from. The set of potential outcomes goes far beyond simply granting or rejecting a
complaint. If only executive acts or ordinary court rulings are objected, the FCC’s leeway
of decision might be more restricted. Since the present study investigates proceedings
with reference to federal legislation, the set of potential outcomes is virtually unlimited
in all cases of interest.
In summary, the FCC is one of the major actors in the German political system with
far-reaching competencies of judicial review. Its strong position has remained largely
unaffected in the period under study. The Court can not set its own agenda. But once a
request has been filed, the judges possess large discretion on when and how to deal with
it. The internal proceeding roughly divides into administrative filtering, case preparation
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by the rapporteur, and senate consultations. Negotiations in the senate are confidential,
intense, consensus-oriented, at eye level between a small group of permanent judges, and
largely free of formal procedures. Whenever a legal norm is objected, the Court has a
great variety of decision alternatives to choose from. This study seeks to shed some light





3. Explanations of Policy Bargaining
Duration
The present study aims at explaining how judicial policy bargaining affects the duration
of proceedings at the FCC. Political scientists commonly apply spatial models in order to
explain processes and outcomes of legislative policy-making. Consultations at the FCC
can be compared to these legislative settings. Once a case is filed to a senate, judges
negotiate on the outcome behind closed doors in a largely institution-free setting (see
chapter 2). They can select from a large range of potential policy outcomes. There is a
majority rule and decisions to replace the legal status quo are collectively binding. Much
can be learned from previous models of multi-player policy bargaining in political science.
In this chapter, we will have a look at existing explanations of policy bargaining du-
ration. I will start off with a recap of George Tsebelis’ veto player theory that links
political preferences and the number of veto players to ‘policy stability’ (section 3.1). I
will then present empirical studies and explanations of policy-related bargaining duration
that mostly build on veto player theory (section 3.2). Finally, I will argue that a sound
spatial model of dynamic policy bargaining under uncertainty yet needs to be developed
in order to explain bargaining delay (section 3.3).
3.1. Veto Players and Policy Stability
Tsebelis (1995; 2002)’ veto player theory is a widely acknowledged explanation of how and
why the number of veto players and their preferences affect policy stability. Veto players
are “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary to change the status quo”
(Tsebelis 2002, 19). The status quo, potential policy outcomes, and veto players’ ideal
points are located in an n-dimensional policy space. Veto players’ indifference curves
are circular and their utility of particular policies decreases with Euclidean distance.
All players are assumed to be completely informed about the game and other players’
preferences.
Tsebelis’ model is static in that it does neither allow for changing preferences over
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time, nor for a sequence of multiple proposals and votes. The agenda setter can propose
a new policy to replace the status quo. His “take it or leave it” proposal will only come
into effect if all veto players agree. Tsebelis implicitly assumes sincere voting. So agenda
setters always propose their most preferred yet feasible outcome and veto players only
consider their sincere preferences about the two alternatives currently up for vote. The
winset denotes the set of policies that can defeat a given status quo. The core unites all
points with an empty winset. In general, the size of the core increases with the number
of veto players, the majority threshold, and ideological distances between players. The
size of the winset decreases accordingly (Tsebelis 2002, 24ff, 54).
Tsebelis aims to analyze “policy stability” across systems rather than to explain the pro-
cess or precise outcomes of political decision-making (Tsebelis 2002, 1ff). Despite its un-
doubted contribution to contemporary political research, veto player theory comes along
with an important shortcoming: the concept of its dependent variable ‘policy stability’
remains vague and ambiguous. This is surprising in light of the very precise elaboration
of the rest of the model. Throughout the book, Tsebelis paraphrases his understanding
of ‘policy stability’ in numerous ways:
1. Is policy stability the absence of “potential for policy change” (Tsebelis 1995, 292,
emphasis added) or the “impossibility for significant departures from the status quo”
(Tsebelis 2002, 2, emphasis added)? Then stable systems would allow for no or just
marginal changes to the status quo. Most notably, the model would not make any
claim about the speed of negotiations.
2. Is it the “difficulty of effecting significant change” (Tsebelis 2002, 21, 37; Tsebelis
2010, 4, emphasis added)? Major changes might thus be possible but players would
need to work harder or longer to achieve such a change. The veto player model
does not account for such a measure of difficulty: Any potential outcome within the
winset can immediately be enacted without any particular efforts, whereas there is
no way to ever reach a policy outcome beyond the winset.
3. Is it related to a system’s “capacity to make changes quickly” or “a faster or slower
pace of the institutional process” (Tsebelis 2002, 7f, emphasis added)? The veto
player model would then completely miss a convincing link to its dependent variable.
As a static framework, it fails to explain dynamic phenomena such as the duration
of decision-making. Such an approach would be “highly suspect, since delay without
time is a contradiction in terms” (Helland 2005, 8).
4. Is policy stability defined (Tsebelis 2002, 8) rather than merely indicated (Tsebelis
2002, 21) by the size of the winset? The wording is at least confusing in that it
24
3.2. Empirical Studies on Bargaining Delay
links a static set of potential agreements to the notion of “stability” that is usually
associated with a dynamic meaning.
We do not know the precise definition of ‘policy stability’ that Tsebelis had in mind.
Technically, the veto player model is static and does not account for dynamics over time.
So either its conclusions are correct but unrelated to bargaining duration – or there is a
time dimension in the concept of ‘policy stability’ and the model lacks logical consistency.
Either way does not turn the veto player model into a valid explanation of duration in
policy negotiations.
In the next section, we will see that most empirical scholars of dynamic policy bargaining
simply ignore this caveat.
3.2. Empirical Studies on Bargaining Delay
What empirical conclusions on policy bargaining-induced delay have scholars drawn so
far? The present section reviews results from the fields of judicial politics, government
formation, legislative decision-making, and the duration of wars. In all of these fields,
scholars have attempted to explain the duration of bargaining processes over policies in
a broad sense. Studies of economic bargaining processes typically assume non-spatial
preferences. Their results would be hard to transfer to the FCC, where most conflicts go
beyond the distribution of a fixed ressource. I am not aware of any other research area
that has linked policy-related preferences to bargaining duration. The section starts with
judicial politics, where institutional settings most comparable to the FCC are likely to be
found.
Judicial Politics
The duration of judicial proceedings has been investigated by a large number of scholars.
They typically focus on non-political factors such as caseflow management, formal pro-
cedures, informal norms, administrative capacities, and pretrial congestion. Results are
mostly based on aggregate statistics and limited to the analysis of civil or criminal law
proceedings at ordinary courts (AAPSS 1960; Church 1982; Church et al. 1978; Clark and
Merryman 1976; Djankov et al. 2003; Heise 2000; Steelman 1997; Trotter and Cooper 1982;
Weatherburn 1993). Proceedings at ordinary courts are faster in districts where judges
depend on competitive elections (Goelzhauser 2012). Institutional settings, bargaining
costs, asymmetric information and subjective expectations on the trial outcome affect the
time to settlement in various kinds of ordinary legal disputes (Cremers 2007; Farmer and
Pecorino 1994; Fenn and Rickman 1999; Kessler 1996; Spier 1992; Spurr 1997).
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Such a settlement or compromise between parties of a proceeding usually is not a
feasible option in FCC negotiations. Proceedings at the FCC differ from these settings
in four ways: First, most cases do not match the simple plaintiff vs. defendant scheme
known from ordinary courts (Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 43). Second, the parties of
a proceeding generally can not avoid trials by out-of-court settlements (Benda, Klein
and Klein 2012, 152; Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 45). Third, depending on the type of
procedure, complainants can not simply withdraw a case (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012,
149ff).30 Fourth, disputes end up at the FCC precisely because previous institutions like
the parliament or lower courts failed to reach a compromise solution.
There is little research on preference-related bargaining duration related to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Increasing ideological divergence between the president and the Sen-
ate causes strategic delay in the presidential selection of U.S. Supreme Court nominees
(Shipan and Bargen 2014) and in their confirmation process (Shipan and Shannon 2003).
Goelzhauser (2011) speaks of justices “delaying and avoiding” constitutional disputes sev-
eral times. Both his hypotheses and the empirical analysis are limited to the phenomenon
of case avoidance, though. Justices tend to avoid deciding constitutional cases when their
preferences are polarized and when the opinion environment is deeply divided on the issues
at stake. They will do so when the costs of negotiation are too high, their decisions might
be less resistant to political pressure, and an ideological minority of justices could easily
manipulate the outcome by procedural means to split a winning coalition (Goelzhauser
2011, 489). None of these arguments makes up a compelling story of why justices would
delay rather than avoid such undesired cases.
To sum up, the established models and findings on judicial delay can hardly be trans-
ferred to the analysis of policy bargaining processes and their duration at the FCC. They
are either limited to ordinary courts and non-political factors – or they do not explain
the duration of proceedings in a convincing way. Fortunately, the literature on legislative
negotiations will be more revealing.
Government Formation in Multiparty Systems
In parliamentary systems, parties bargain about both policy positions and the distribution
of offices in government coalitions (Laver 1998). So parties’ policy preferences might well
30 The Court can deny the withdrawal of both constitutional complaints (BVerfGE 98, 218[242]; Benda,
Klein and Klein 2012, 188; for a more opposing view cf. Schlaich and Korioth 2012, 41f) and abstract
judicial review cases (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 297; Kommers 1994, 474; Schlaich and Korioth
2012, 41). This is different to concrete judicial review cases that can be withdrawn by the ordinary
court at its own discretion (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 355). But these latter cases do not involve
compromise-seeking parties of the procedure at the constitutional court level anyway.
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have an impact on the duration of coalition negotiations.
Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) analyze the duration of government formation
processes in 13 multi-party democracies. They argue that party leaders strategically
bargain about cabinet formations under incomplete and private information: Coalition
agreements will finally need to be approved by each party’s members. There is at least
some uncertainty about members’ preferences and party leaders have privileged knowl-
edge about their own party’s preferences. They will exploit this private information
strategically and thereby delay negotiations. Diermeier and van Roozendaal show that
uncertainty indeed prolongs the formation of cabinets, whereas ideological polarization
and the number of effective parties have no effect on duration.31 In the light of the rather
indirect measures, these empirical conclusions should not be overrated, though.
Martin and Vanberg (2003) conduct a similar study with different measurements. They
show that ideological diversity significantly prolongs negotiations. The number of parties
effect on duration is statistically significant but it switches from positive to negative over
the course of negotiation (Martin and Vanberg 2003, 330f). The authors offer several
explanations for why preference heterogeneity might delay coalition negotiations: First,
party leaders can better estimate the preferences of ideologically close parties due to in-
creased interaction and overlapping constituencies. Second, following Tsebelis (2002)’
veto player framework, diverse preferences are associated with smaller winsets and there-
fore require a “more detailed policy agreement to ensure that all coalitions partners are
willing to join a coalition” (Martin and Vanberg 2003, 326). Third, party leaders might
seek lengthy negotiations as a signal of hard effort to their constituents before they present
big concessions in terms of policy distance. Fourth, with concave utility functions, im-
perfect information, and fixed costs of delay, a formateur is willing to make larger policy
concessions as distance decreases, thereby facilitating fast agreements if policy distance is
low.32
31 Their vague reference to the incomplete information approach in game theory and the perceived lack
of a model claiming such effects (Diermeier and van Roozendaal 1998, 612, fn. 9) remains a weak
reasoning for the non-effects of ideology and the number of parties. Golder rightly counters: “[T]he
fact that such a model might not (currently) exist is not compelling evidence that bargaining complexity
has no effect on delays” (Golder 2010, 29, fn. 12).
32 Martin and Vanberg (2003, 326, fn. 9) briefly mention this interesting but demanding argument in a
footnote. I do not see how to derive such a definite conclusion without presuming a more specific set
of individual strategies and the rules of the game. It might hold true, for example, if all parties possess
individual, fixed policy boundaries beyond which they will not enter a coalition (compare to the idea
of “policy horizons” by Warwick 2006): Since delay is expensive, the formateur prefers immediate
agreement over continued negotiations. So he will propose a more distant policy position in exchange
for a reduced risk of underestimating the distances to other parties’ horizons. The closer their expected
horizons are to his ideal point, (1) the more generously he will adjust his offer (due to concave utility
functions), (2) the more likely he will reach the true horizons (private information), and (3) the more
likely will be early agreement.
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Golder (2010) shows that both ideological polarization and high numbers of legislative
parties slow down government formation, but only if there is sufficient uncertainty about
other parties’ preferences.33 She argues that both factors increase bargaining complexity
and make it harder for party elites to obtain relevant information in the bargaining pro-
cess. However, she does not provide a compelling explanation of why and how exactly
ideological divergence would increase complexity and delay.34
In summary, empirical evidence suggests that coalition negotiations are delayed by the
level of uncertainty about preferences, the number of parties involved, and ideological
divergence. Future research should focus on improved choices of operationalization and
more precise theoretical foundations. The numerous explanations of the heterogeneity
effect on delay offered by Martin, Vanberg, and Golder all somehow refer to bargaining
in a policy space and the role of preference uncertainty. A more explicit theory is yet to
be presented.
Legislative Decision-Making
In line with Tsebelis’ veto player theory, preference heterogeneity increases gridlock in
legislative decision-making (Binder 1999). But does it also take longer to reach an agree-
ment when preferences are diverse? Ko¨nig and Bra¨uninger (2005, 61ff) find hardly any
association between ideological heterogeneity or divided government and legislative dura-
tion in German politics. Manow and Burkhart (2008), in contrast, find a moderate delay
by divided government. Political preferences do affect the speed of legislative committees
in Chile (Aninat and Londregan 2006). Becker and Saalfeld (2004) expect ideological
diversity and larger numbers of partisan veto players to slow down the legislative process.
But they find little supporting evidence in their empirical analysis of labor and social
Negotiations at the FCC are more about strategically changing a status quo policy than about building
coalitions based on policy horizons. Judges do not face anything like intra-party principals to whom
they must defend unpopular policy compromises. There is no exclusive formateur judge repeatedly
offering “take it or leave it” proposals and the assumption of strategic proposals but non-strategic
voting is rather implausible. Despite the persuasive simplicity of their argument, I will therefore not
pursue this approach in the following chapters.
33 Like Diermeier and van Roozendaal (1998) and Martin and Vanberg (2003), Golder uses a very weak
measure of uncertainty. It would be interesting to see if the results remain robust for alternative
operationalizations like the level of inconsistency or vagueness in party manifestos and speeches, public
statements on preferred coalitions, internal fragmentation of parties, leadership stability, or legislative
experience.
34 “Ideological polarization increases complexity because it makes it more likely that a formateur has to
bargain with at least one party that does not hold similar positions on several different types of policy”
(Golder 2010, 15). Of course, a policy-oriented formateur would prefer to bargain with like-minded
parties and make less concessions. But given the same level of uncertainty and no further assumptions,
why would rational bargaining be more complex with distant parties? Her argument would profit from
a more specific bargaining model.
28
3.2. Empirical Studies on Bargaining Delay
security policy-making in 17 Western European countries.
A lively debate mainly aimed at methodological refinements has taken place between
scholars of legislative duration in European Union decision-making. They consistently
show that polarized member state preferences and participation of the European Parlia-
ment delay the process, whereas the use of qualified majority instead of unanimity voting
speeds up EU legislation (Golub 1999; 2007; 2008; Golub and Steunenberg 2007; Ko¨nig
2007; 2008; Schulz and Ko¨nig 2000; Zorn 2007).35 If preferences diverge not only within
the Council but also between legislative bodies, i.e. between the European Commission,
the Council, and the European Parliament, the process will take even longer (Klu¨ver and
Sagarzazu 2013; Toshkov and Rasmussen 2012).
Most of these studies explicitly refer to Tsebelis’ veto player framework. Negotiations
with polarized preferences take longer because of the “need for extensive bargaining”
(Klu¨ver and Sagarzazu 2013, 392). The larger the core, the more time will pass by until
actors craft a complex package deal or shift their position (Golub 2007, 157f). Schulz and
Ko¨nig (2000) provide the most elaborated version of the line of argument that is broadly
shared in the literature: If there is little consensus to change policy, actors will engage in
“time-consuming negotiations over side-payments and package deals” (2000, 657). Their
model builds on the plain but “relatively uncontroversial” (Schulz and Ko¨nig 2000, 657)
assumption that the size of the core and decision-making speed are inversely related. They
openly confess the theoretical incompletion of their argument: “We rely on this conjecture
from the spatial model of legislative choice, since there are few dynamic models that yield
testable propositions about the duration of political decision-making processes. [...] Since
the focus of our analysis is empirical rather than theoretical, we make do with a conjecture
based on a static model and leave the development of a dynamic model of the duration
of political decision-making processes for future research” (Schulz and Ko¨nig 2000, 656,
fn. 11). To the best of my knowledge, no such model has been provided yet.36
A nice exception to the widely spread use of the static veto player model in dynamic
settings is provided by Tsebelis himself: Tsebelis and Money (1997, 102ff) apply Gross-
man and Perry (1986)’s sequential buyer and seller model of asymmetric information to
intercameral bargaining between the upper and the lower house. Constantly updating
their beliefs about the other house’s preferences, they alternately make policy offers until
a proposal is accepted. Tsebelis and Money expect the number of bicameral negotia-
tion rounds to increase with the level of uncertainty and the time discount factor. The
empirical analysis is aimed at the effect of uncertainty about the other house’s discount
35 See also Dru¨ner (2007), Dru¨ner et al. (2012), and Hansen (2012).
36 The dynamic, incomplete information extension of the spatial model as presented in chapter 4 is
supposed to fill this gap at least partially.
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factor rather than uncertainty about the other house’s policy preferences. Unfortunately,
Grossman and Perry’s model – dealing with one-sided uncertainty in two-player, one-
dimensional ‘division of a pie’ bargaining – can not be directly transferred to multi-player,
n-dimensional policy negotiations between equal judges at the FCC.
To sum up, there is mixed evidence on the effect of political preferences on legislative
duration at the national level. In the European Union, divergent preferences, more actors,
and higher thresholds clearly prolong legislative decision-making. Uncertainty slows down
intercameral bargaining. A dynamic, preference-related explanation of legislative delay
in multi-player setting remains to be provided.
The Duration of Wars
Among a broad literature on the duration of interstate and civil wars, Cunningham (2006)
draws the most explicit link between veto players’ spatial preferences and the duration of
violence. Since “[c]ivil wars can be thought of as violent conflict over policy” (Cunningham
2006, 877), he directly applies Tsebelis’ veto player theory to the study of war duration:
The more parties involved and the more diverse their preferences, the smaller the winset
and the more time it will take to find a peace agreement. This is consistent with other
findings that third party interventions prolong intra- (Regan 2002) and interstate conflicts
(Shirkey 2012). He elaborates four arguments of why conflicts involving multiple veto
players with heterogeneous preferences last longer: First, the range of accepted agreements
is smaller. Second, information asymmetries are more likely. Third, incentives to hold
out37 and, fourth, shifting alliances hinder early settlement.
The first argument is a direct application of Tsebelis’ concept of winsets. Unlike many
other scholars, Cunningham apparently recognizes that the size of a bargaining range
is not sufficient to explain duration. If rational actors were completely informed about
each other’s preferences, there would be immediate agreement. So Cunningham connects
the size of winsets with the idea of private information: The “smaller that range is,
ceteris paribus, the more likely problems such as information asymmetries will lead to
bargaining breakdown” (Cunningham 2006, 879). In contrast to Tsebelis’ assumption of
sincere voting, he presumes strategic behavior in the third and fourth argument. Even
though Cunningham does not foreground these deviations from veto player theory nor
present a more detailed formal account, we will see that these advancements are the key
to a more comprehensive explanation of bargaining delay.
37 Compare to the “war of attrition” framework in section 3.3.
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In summary, the empirical literature is not very promising for our purpose. Studies of
judicial delay focus on administrative factors and ordinary courts. I am not aware of any
study that links political preferences to the duration of proceedings at a constitutional or
any similar court. Studies on coalition negotiations suggest that preference uncertainty,
high numbers of parties, and ideological diversity increase delay. They lack a sound theory,
operationalizations are weak and results are often inconclusive. Legislative bargaining is
delayed by divergent preferences, more actors, and higher majority thresholds. Similarly,
civil wars are prolonged by high numbers of parties involved and by diverse preferences.
The scholarly debate has largely focused on empirical refinements. Explanations of
how and why preference heterogeneity would delay bargaining settlement remain ad-hoc
or limited to vague references to the veto player framework. However, the static veto
player framework does not provide a logically consistent explanation of bargaining delay
(see section 3.1). In the following section, I will show that bargaining dynamics and
incomplete information are essential in order to explain duration in policy negotiations.
3.3. The Role of Dynamics and Uncertainty
Disregarding the static nature of the spatial veto player model, empirical scholars seem to
agree that preference heterogeneity slows down policy bargaining due to smaller winsets
and larger cores. There is a long list of ad-hoc explanations to justify this claim. To name
a few, it might take more time to discover commonly accepted outcomes, side-payments
might be necessary, and information asymmetries might be more severe (cf. section 3.2).
Assuming complete information, like Tsebelis does, one could as well claim the contrary:
If the winset is large, players have high incentives to extensively bargain over the final
agreement out of a larger range of potential outcomes. If the winset is small, the outcome
is pretty much determined and players would not expect to gain much from continued
bargaining. Following this argument, preference heterogeneity would speed up rather than
slow down decision-making.38
The logical inconsistency and arbitrariness of these explanations is surprising, given the
highly sophisticated state-of-the-art in game theory. Decades ago, game theorists moved
beyond the static Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, Jr. 1950) because it did not cover
dynamic bargaining processes (Cross 1965, 69). Ever since, formal models often explicitly
account for the time dimension in bargaining processes. I will discuss the two major
approaches to explain bargaining delay: war of attrition games and sequential games
with multiple offer and voting rounds.
38 I thank Thomas Bra¨uninger for this decisive objection on a very early draft of my model.
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Wars of Attrition
Time-consuming conflicts about the allocation of a ressource can be modelled as a war
of attrition. The framework originates from biology (Bishop and Cannings 1978; Smith
1974; 1982) and was later applied and advanced in economics (Bulow and Klemperer
1999; Fudenberg and Tirole 1986; Hendricks, Weiss and Wilson 1988) and political science
(Alesina and Drazen 1991; Fearon 1998). In a war of attrition game, the desired ressource
will not be allocated before the players reach a collective agreement. In every round, each
player decides whether to continue or concede. Delay is costly and whoever holds out the
longest, receives the benefit.
In principle, policy negotiations could be modelled as wars of attrition. Players would
argue about which end of the policy winset to agree on. Delay will possibly occur if they
are not completely informed about each other’s ability to hold out. For two reasons, this
approach does not seem very promising for our purpose:
1. At the FCC, judges bargain on a nearly daily basis (Bo¨ckenfo¨rde 1996), about
roughly comparable issues, and in a constant composition of only eight players for
a long time. They will soon know each other well. Even if they differed in their
personal endurance for whatever reason, they would probably have a pretty good
idea about each other’s general patience, bluffing techniques, and bargaining habits.
Some of them might turn their privilegged skills into more advantegeous outcomes.
But their attributes will not come as a surprise in the long run, so that rational
counterparts will expect the likely outcome and concede immediately in order to
avoid costly delay.39 The same argument applies to almost any political committee
or institution where stable actors interact in negotiations on a regular basis.
2. A more general concern is the size of the pie in such a game. If the game is dynamic
and strategic players have at least some expectations about more or less likely
future outcomes, why would the pie or winset be defined by sincere indifference
curves? A classic war of attrition game would overly reduce the complex dynamics of
policy negotiations to a simplistic tug-of-war or arm-wrestling with little explanatory
power.
Sequential Offers and Votes
Sequential games of multiple offers and votes formalize dynamic negotiations between
two or more actors. There is a predefined number of periods (finite-horizon games) or
39 Players would at least not gain anything from defending the status quo for another round, since the
conflict takes place within the boundaries of the common winset.
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open-end bargaining until an agreement is reached (infinite-horizon games, cf. Fudenberg
and Levine 1983). Each round, an agenda setter makes a proposal and players decide
whether to accept or reject the proposal. The role of the agenda setter can either be
fixed throughout the game, alternate between players in a specified order, or be assigned
according to a random recognition rule. If the proposal is accepted, the game usually
ends.
Rubinstein (1982) presents a well-known sequential, two-player, alternating-offer, infinite-
horizon bargaining game over the partition of a pie. He assumes both players to be
completely informed about the game and the other player’s preferences. Hence, the first
agenda setter anticipates his opponent’s willingness to compromise. Since delay is costly,
the agenda setter makes just enough concession to reach immediate agreement. There
will never be delay in the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game (Rubinstein 1987,
204, 211ff).
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) extend Rubinstein’s model to a legislative bargaining setting
with multiple players, majority voting, and a random recognition rule. Again, players
bargain about the division of a ressource with complete information and there will be
immediate agreement.40 Banks and Duggan (2000) generalize this division-of-a-pie model
to multidimensional spatial policy bargaining. They implicitly assume that all players
prefer all policy alternatives over the status quo (Banks and Duggan 2000, 85). This
restriction is removed in a more advanced version of their model, where the status quo is
explicitly modeled as one one of multiple policy alternatives (Banks and Duggan 2006).
Sequential games model separate bargaining periods, where anticipated payoffs from
future bargaining affect policy outcomes. If players are completely informed and if they
prefer early agreements over delay, actual delay will usually not be predicted:
“In a bargaining situation with complete information it is hard to understand
why there should be a bargaining process. [...] Both [players] should be able
to anticipate the final agreement and to reach it at once” (Selten 1988, 217).
Many of these dynamic models do not aim at explaining duration in the first place. But
since we seek to explain empirically observed variance in bargaining delay, we need to
move beyond these models.
40 I refer to the “closed rule” version of Baron and Ferejohn’s game only. The possibility of “open
rule” amendments might cause delay (Baron and Ferejohn 1989, 1195). But there is no institutional
equivalent to an open rule as described by Baron and Ferejohn in negotiations at the FCC. Judges do
not have to wait for a formal second reading with another exclusive agenda setter before they seek a
majority on a proposal, once it is made.
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Private information is a major cause of delay in bargaining models (Kennan and Wilson
1990; 1993). Multiple negotiation periods can serve to reveal private information (Selten
1988). Players might have a rough idea about their opponents’ preferences and constantly
update subjective beliefs about their “real types” based on observed behavior (Cramton
1984; Cross 1965; 1977; Fudenberg and Tirole 1983; Rubinstein 1985). Or they might
strategically induce delay as a credible signal of bargaining strength (Admati and Perry
1987; Cramton 1992).
In the 1960s, Coddington (1968) already presented a dynamic, incomplete information
bargaining model between two impatient actors. Both players have subjective expecta-
tions about the other player’s response to their actions. Alternately making demands,
they observe their opponent’s reaction, adjust their expectations accordingly and make
new demands based on updated expectations. Except for the limited number of actors
and the preference representations, this model is already close to what we need in this
study.
To the best of my knowledge, no model so far combines spatial policy negotiations
between multiple players with sequential, infinite-horizon bargaining periods, alternating
offers and private information about preferences. Most dynamic bargaining models are
tailored at economic disputes or distributional politics (e.g. Baron and Ferejohn 1989;
Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey 2012). A convinving policy bargaining model would need
to be both spatial and sequential (e.g. Baron 1991; Baron and Herron 2003). Multiple
players would need to be modeled. Cameron (2000)’s sequential veto bargaining model
between a legislative proposer (Congress) and a gate-keeping veto player (President) might
be applied to interactions between parliament and the constitutional court (Cameron and
McCarty 2004, 409). But presuming an exclusive agenda setter and take-it-or-leave-it
proposals, it does not apply to multi-player settings with equal bargaining rights.
Banks and Duggan (2006) present a multi-player, dynamic, infinite-horizon policy bar-
gaining model with alternating offers and spatial policy preferences. Unfortunately, they
assume complete information and players typically agree immediately. The model fails to
explain bargaining duration. Despite this downside, Banks and Duggan provide the most
suitable approach to be applied to dynamic policy negotiations with multiple players. In-
complete information seems to be the key to make their theory explain policy bargaining
delay. So I will extend their model to a game with preference uncertainty in the following
chapter.
In this chapter, I have shown that Tsebelis (2002)’ static veto player theory fails to
consistently explain bargaining dynamics and duration. Empirical studies show that
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higher numbers of actors, preference heterogeneity, and higher majority thresholds often
tend to increase delay in policy bargaining. Scholars typically refer to ad-hoc explanations
or to the veto player framework. No convincing theory of how policy preferences affect
bargaining duration is yet available. From a game theory perspective, sequential models
and incomplete information are the keys to predict bargaining duration. In the following
chapter, I will extend Banks and Duggan (2006)’s dynamic policy bargaining model to
include private information about players’ preferences. To the best of my knowledge, this
will currently be the most explicit model of how and why spatial policy preferences affect
bargaining delay in multi-player settings.
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with Incomplete Information
As discussed in chapter 3, no formal model so far provides a convincing explanation of
the duration of dynamic, multi-player policy negotiations. Incomplete information is the
key to predict delay in policy negotiations. My approach is to combine a dynamic version
of the spatial policy-making model with the assumption of incomplete information.
In the present chapter, I define a dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete
information. While the general setup of the model is transferable to other empirical
settings, the motivation and baseline for the following chapters is their applicability to
FCC proceedings. Therefore, the model’s general setup is based on the FCC’s institutional
setting as depicted in chapter 2. It is limited to the core phase of senate consultations (see
figure 2.1). This is where the big conflicts take place and where legal norms can be declared
unconstitutional. The model does not account for case preparation by the administration
and the rapporteur. Nor does it refer to chamber consultations, where minor issues are
decided and anticipated outcomes of subsequent senate negotiations would be important.
I do not explicitly distinguish between decision consultations and reading consultations
in the senate. Judges continue to bargain about the outcome in both phases. The first
may best refer to the first periods of the bargaining game with large moves, while the
latter might best refer to small-step policy refinements in late periods of the bargaining
process.
Senate negotiations are modeled as a dynamic bargaining game about policy. This
is in line with the institutional setting of the FCC. Judges are independent actors and
they decide by majority rule (section 2.3). Their agenda, i.e. the set of relevant issues
and the status quo, is externally determined and judges are obliged to make a decision
(section 2.2). The Court is very independent and powerful (section 2.1), so I will not
account for third actors involved in the decision-making process. The large variety of
potential outcomes (section 2.6) is represented by continuous sets of policy alternatives.
Senate consulations are largely institution-free and the rapporteur does not have exclusive
agenda-setting power (section 2.5). Policy negotiations are modeled as infinite-horizon




In the following sections, I formulate and justify the model’s assumptions (section 4.1).
The previously mentioned dynamic policy bargaining model by Banks and Duggan (2006)
is presented (section 4.2). Finally, I extend their model by the assumption of incomplete
information about other actors’ preferences (section 4.3).
4.1. Model Assumptions
The main assumptions of the dynamic, multi-player, policy bargaining model under in-
complete information are closely related to the standard spatial policy model of committee
voting (Hinich and Munger 1997; Tsebelis 2002), previous findings on judicial politics in
general, and the FCC in particular. The assumptions are:
Policy Space FCC negotiations take place in an Euclidean policy space, where all policy
alternatives including the status quo policy, potential outcomes, and judges’ ideal
policies can be mapped into an n-dimensional policy space.41
The policy space is complete, i.e. it encompasses all relevant policy alternatives of
the proceeding. I assume that there are no side-payments beyond the specific case.
Indeed, there is a strong norm of no arrangements between judges before official
consultation (Kranenpohl 2010, 173, 480ff) and log-rolling is clearly frowned upon
(Rath 2013, 38).42
Policy dimensions represent separable features that structure the case’s policy al-
ternatives in a meaningful way. Depending on the nature of the case, this can be
a conventional political dimension like “conservative vs. progressive” or “welfare
state vs. market orientation”. Or it can be a judicial dimension of constitutional
theory like a preference on more vs. less judicial restraint or a dimension dividing
those who regard basic rights as defensive rights against state intervention vs. those
who regard them as an objective scale of values with implications for all fields of
law (cf. Limbach 2001, 27). These judicially divergent views are either inherently
political or at least prone to policy preferences (cf. the paragraph on legal factors
on p. 41). The only content-related assumption on these dimensions is that they
are somehow policy-related. All relevant issues are assumed to be separable and the
spatial arrangement of dimensions is orthogonal.
41 The assumptions on policy space and policy preferences are in line with the standard spatial model
(Hinich and Munger 1997).
42 See Brenner and Whitmeyer (2009, 103ff) for similar findings on the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Dimensions are assumed to be continuous sets of policy alternatives. First, this
implies a reasonable order of alternatives for each dimension, i.e. policy alternatives
can be more or less progressive, expensive, EU-oriented, emancipated, restrictive,
and so forth. Second, this implies a common understanding of “distance” between
two policy alternative among judges. Third, this implies a virtually unlimited set
of alternatives.
The U.S. Supreme Court is often assumed to either grant or reject a case (e.g. Bailey
and Maltzman 2011). In contrast, the FCC is not an appellate court that regularly
gives thumbs up or down for lower courts’ rulings. FCC judges have a large set of
potential outcomes to choose from (cf. section 2.6). Hence, the conventional spatial
policy model is more adequate than a case-space framework, where pending cases
are allocated in a case-space based on case features and judges bargain about where
to draw the line between grantable and deniable cases (Lax 2011; Lax and Cameron
2007).
In chapter 5, I will assume a two-dimensional policy space. This requirement is
neither necessary for the theoretical model nor for empirical analyses. But the
deduction of hypotheses via simulations would be much more costly and demanding
for more than two dimensions. Previous studies in U.S. judicial politics differ with
regard to the presumed number of dimensions. There is no consens on the best
number of dimensions to represent judicial preferences at European constitutional
courts either (Ho¨nnige 2007, 66f). However, findings from one-dimensional analyses
with a unique pivotal median player would not be generalizable (Tsebelis 2010,
14). So I opt for two dimensions as the most simple, non-trivial case. Qualitative
evidence supports this presumption and suggests that FCC judges’ preferences are
rather more- than one-dimensional.43
Policy Preferences All judges have exogenous, single-peaked preferences over all case-
relevant policies. These case-specific preferences are stable over time. They can be
represented by quadratic utility functions in a common space of policy alternatives.
Comparing different alternatives, a judge always prefers the policy that is closer to
his or her ideal point. Preferences across different issues are separable and all issues
43 An FCC judge reports:
“You realize in many persons that they are not only one-dimensional. The first is left
but with a neoliberal openness. The second is conservative and particularly bound to the
welfare state. Depending on the topic, there can be very diverse constellations. You do not
always fight at the same front-line” (No. 24, cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 241, own transl.).
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are of equal salience. So indifference curves in a two-dimensional policy space are
circles (Hinich and Munger 1997, chap. 3). Multidimensional utility differences are
based on Euclidean distances.44
Preferences are assumed to vary between judges. Indeed, FCC judges have di-
vergent historical, cultural, and social value systems and preferences (cf. Limbach
1999, 142). These differences are exogenously determined and at least partially ex-
plained by political ideology. People used to speak of the “red [first] senate” that
was dominated by SPD-nominated judges, and the “black [second] senate”, where
CDU/CSU-nominated judges held the majority (Lamprecht 2011, 78; Menzel 2011,
17; Wesel 2004, 59f). Since a two-third majority is required for the election of FCC
judges, successful candidates can be expected to be conservative or progressive but
rather moderate than extreme (Wesel 2004, 216).
I assume that preferences are stable over time. While the empirical operationaliza-
tion of FCC judges’ preferences presumes stability over a judges’ whole tenure (cf.
chap. 6), the theoretical model merely requires preference stability over the partic-
ular course of consultation. This assumption is contrary to research on the U.S.
Supreme Court showing that individual justices’ preferences are dynamic (Epstein
et al. 1998; Epstein, Landes and Posner 2013; Martin and Quinn 2002). These
judge-specific dynamics even led to a change in collective Supreme Court decision-
making in some periods (Baum 1992). For two reasons, I will reject this potential
objection: First, significant preference changes in these studies mostly occured over
a long time period that exceeds the typical duration of a single proceeding. Second,
judicial preferences in the U.S. vary considerably more across issues than across
time (Lauderdale and Clark 2012). So even if there were some preference dynamics
involved, their impact on the course of a particular procceeding would be negligible.
Since preferences are assumed to be completely exogenous, there are no short-term
preference changes due to learning or a discursive exchange of arguments. All judges
are well prepared before they enter the consultation and the Votum includes all case-
relevant perspectives and arguments (see section 2.5). Case-specific preferences can
be expected to be completely defined before judges negotiate a common solution in
the consultation process. Rather than learning about new arguments, facts of the
case, and subjectively preferred outcomes, they learn about each other’s preferences
and collectively feasible outcomes.
44 Multidimensional policy preferences could reasonably be modelled based on “city block” distances
across issues (Humphreys and Laver 2010). For the sake of consistency, I will stick to the prevalent
standard of Euclidean distances in contemporary political science applications of the spatial model.
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Single-Mindedness I assume that judges are single-minded actors who do not seek any
other goals than maximizing policy utility (cf. Brenner and Whitmeyer 2009, 26f).
They might derive utility from other sources like income, leisure time, career op-
portunities, reputation or popularity (Posner 1993). But none of these alternative
goals is assumed to influence individual behavior in FCC negotiations. FCC judges
may not be reelected, their tenure is fixed, and FCC judgeship is the very top of a
judicial career. So this assumption does not seem to be overly restrictive.
This assessment is in line with previous research. Epstein, Landes and Posner (2013)
develop a judicial labor market model where judges are motivated by costs like ef-
fort, criticism or workplace tensions, and by benefits like leisure time, income, good
working relations, esteem, reputation, prestige, influence, self-expression, celebrity,
or future career opportunities. Applying their theory to the Supreme Court, they
argue that further career opportunities and leisure time would not affect Justices’
utilities due to unlikely promotions, a large and high-quality staff, and low caseload.
Instead, they expect Justices’ personal satisfaction with their work to be strongly in-
fluenced by ideological leanings (Epstein, Landes and Posner 2013, 102f). Caseload
might be more important at the FCC, so I will control for workload in the empir-
ical analysis. The general argument can be transferred to the FCC. Since judicial
behavior at the FCC can hardly affect any of the other sources of personal utility,
policy-orientation is expected to be the primary driver.
Strategic Rationality Judges act as strategic rationals who seek to maximize policy util-
ity. They consider institutional rules and their colleagues’ anticipated behaviour in
their own choice of actions. Judges are assumed to optimize their proposals and vot-
ing decisions based on their knowledge of the bargaining situation without bluffing
or cheating. Since they personally interact on a very regular basis, they soon know
each other’s bargaining skills and strategies well and bluffing would be ineffective.45
As highly educated and experienced bargainers, judges are assumed to bring about
the intellectual power that is necessary to determine optimal strategies.
Research on decision-making at the U.S. Supreme Court is often classified into dif-
ferent approaches (Hammond, Bonneau and Sheehan 2005, chap. 3; Maveety 2003):
The legal model explains court decisions by the plain meaning of legal statutes or the
constitution, the legislators’ intent, and precedent decisions (Segal and Spaeth 2002,
44ff). Attitudinalists argue that individual attitudes and values are the primary
driver of judicial behavior (Segal and Spaeth 1993; 2002). Rational choice institu-
45 Compare to the similar line of argument by Cross (1977, 592).
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tionalists regard judges as policy-seeking, strategic actors who consider other judges’
anticipated behavior and the institutional context in their own decision-making (Ep-
stein and Knight 1998; Hammond, Bonneau and Sheehan 2005; Maltzman, Spriggs
II and Wahlbeck 2000).
Judicial politics research on the FCC is less advanced. We know that political at-
titudes and values drive judicial decision-making at the FCC (Ho¨nnige 2006; 2007;
2009). Most FCC judges seem to realize this influence (Landfried 1984, 43). They
strategically consider other political actors in their decision-making (Vanberg 2005).
Senate proceedings are regularly negotiated and typically end in compromise (Lep-
sius 2011, 241). So judges will soon learn to deal with their colleagues’ preferences
in a rational way. No third actor can hold individual judges accountable for non-
dogmatic behavior in confidential meetings. It is hard to imagine how professional
negotiators would not develop rational strategies and high-level bargaining skills in
such an environment. Hence, I opt for the rational choice institutionalist approach
and assume FCC judges to be strategic, policy seeking actors who anticipate the
institutional context and their colleagues’ future behavior.
Absence of Legal Factors Non-political, legal factors do not affect the negotiation pro-
cess.46 This is not to say that FCC judges totally disregard legal standards and
restrictions. I rather assume that the policy-motivated bargaining process takes
place only on dimensions where judges have a certain leeway to decide. Judges
negotiate within the arena of legally feasible outcomes.
Two types of legal principles can be distinguished:
• If a legal principle is commonly accepted among legal scholars, it is unlikely to
be contested among FCC judges. Candidates with extreme views on otherwise
uncontested legal standards would probably not gain the necessary two-thirds
majority in the selection process of FCC judges. With all judges on the same
position, such a legal issue would not constitute a relevant bargaining dimen-
sion. Even if legal doctrines only disallowed extreme positions on such a di-
mension, these positions would not be relevant bargaining alternatives between
judges that have passed the balanced selection process.
• On the other hand, if a legal principle is disputed among legal scholars, a judge’s
position on this issue is likely to be prone to political preferences. E.g., conser-
vative judges tend to stress other basic rights and legal doctrines than social
46 “Where there is a political will, there is a judicial shrubbery” (Wesel 2004, 263, own transl.).
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democrats.47 Nominating parties have a high incentive to select candidates
based on these preferences. Judicial methodology is a rather fuzzy constraint
at the FCC (Kranenpohl 2010, 331ff). A large leeway of interpretation allows
the desired outcome to lead the interpretation of norms (Hesse 2006, 97). As
far as case-relevant legal doctrines are disputed among legal scholars, they are
assumed to be represented by judicial positions on policy-related bargaining
dimensions.
Two approaches from the U.S. Supreme Court literature challenge this view. First,
Iaryczower and Shum (2012) present a model where partially policy-driven justices
receive private information about whether the “meaning of the law” favors the
plaintiff or the defendant. These judges will receive additional utility if they make
the “right” choice. The FCC does not know such a plaintiff vs. defendant setting
in most procedures. It does not target fact-related questions of guilt or innocence.
Decision-making in FCC senate consultations is typically more about weighting
opposing principles of the Basic Law and filling the gap of interpretation. All judges
work with a very comprehensive Votum that includes all case-relevant facts and
arguments. The subjectively perceived “private information” would be a normative
evaluation of these facts based on personal values and preferences rather than some
mysterious intuition on objective truth.
Second, Bailey and Maltzman (2008; 2011) show that legal preferences on doctrines
like precedent, judicial restraint, and freedom of speech affect judicial behavior.
They used statements by elected officials on Supreme Court decisions as bridge
observations in order to isolate purely legal factors on judicial behavior. But the
relevance and scope of freedom of speech will remain an inherently political issue,
even if this dimension is not completely reflected in statements by elected officials.
The norm of judicial restraint is likely to be less salient at the FCC, where there
is no political question doctrine that allows judges to refrain from highly political
disputes (Tomuschat 2001, 268f).
The judicial principle of precedent might be more relevant. There is a strong norm
of stare decisis, i.e. respect for precedent, at the U.S. Supreme Court (Epstein
and Knight 1998, 163ff). FCC judges seem to comply with a similar norm.48 But
several decisions suggest that this commitment to precedent is not very strong (Rath
2013, 25ff). Judges can deviate from previous decisions (Benda, Klein and Klein
47 See Benesh and Czarnezki (2009) for empirical evidence on the U.S. Supreme Court.
48 FCC president Andreas Voßkuhle claims: “We have to adhere to not only the wording of the Basic




2012, 587). They did so in their jurisdiction on abortion and religious matters
(Graf 2011; Limbach 2001, 53). The Court itself relativized the binding character
of its precedent.49 The former FCC president Jutta Limbach even called upon the
legislator to give rejected rules a second try.50 In a survey, FCC judges reveal
diverging views on the Court’s ability to correct its preceding decisions (Landfried
1984, 171f). So the widely recognized norm of precedent does not set absolute
boundaries to FCC decisions. It is prone to political preferences and can be defied
by a majority of judges. If judges have a preference on whether to respect precedent
in a particular decision, it will be reflected by their case-specific policy preferences.
Incomplete Information Judges perfectly know their own preferences but they have lim-
ited information about their colleagues’ preferences.
All judges intensely study the comprehensive Votum before the first consultation
meeting (cf. section 2.5). They are well informed about all relevant dimensions of
the case, the legal state-of-affairs, and potential outcomes. Based on their general
views and value systems, they consciously form their opinion on the ideal outcome.
In terms of game theory, players have perfect information about the policy space,
the status quo location, the common discount factor, and their own utility function.
However, their knowledge about other judges’ preferences is limited. Models of
judicial politics typically assume perfect information about other judges’ preferences.
But scholars recognize the relevance of subjective uncertainty: “[..] it would be
desirable to construct a model involving how strategic justices make decisions under
uncertainty” (Hammond, Bonneau and Sheehan 2005, 252).51 Hence, I distinguish
two types of preferences:
1. Prior preferences refer to a judge’s general views, attitudes, and value systems.
Since FCC judges personally interact on an almost daily basis in a very small
group, prior preferences are likely to be common knowledge.
2. Case-specific preferences are a judge’s preferences on the very specific issues of
the case. They are only partly determined by a judge’s general views. Judges
only have a rough idea about each other’s case-specific preferences. Unlike
chamber proceedings, the content of senate proceedings is genuinely new and
49 “FCCA §31 and the legal force of norm-rejecting FCC decisions do not bar the legislator from passing
a new regulation of the same or of similar content” (BVerfGE 77, 84, own transl.).
50 “In the event of new insights and social requirements, the Federal Conditutional Court depends on the
legislator’s spirit of contradiction. The legislator must not give up his readiness to learn just because
the Court has once declared a legal regulation unconstitutional” (Limbach 2001, 54, own transl.). See
also Limbach (1999, 135ff).
51 See also Maltzman, Spriggs II and Wahlbeck (2000, 20).
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touches yet undissolved constitutional questions (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012,
78). So judges can not recall their colleagues’ behavior from prior negotiations
on the same question. Uncertainty refers to the remaining variance in case-
specific ideal preferences that can not be explained by prior preferences.
This assessment is in line with previous findings. FCC judges cannot foresee the
course of consultations (Kranenpohl 2010, 170ff). They know each other well but
they do not know their colleagues’ precise notions on a case in advance.52
Status Quo There is an exogenous, case-specific, and stable status quo policy. This
policy remains enacted until an alternative proposal is accepted by a majority of
judges. It can be thought of as “the current legal state of affairs in the country on
the case under consideration” (Hammond, Bonneau and Sheehan 2005, 83). The
status quo might be precisely defined by a specific legislative regulation or previous
court rulings. But it might also be a state of legal ambiguity or the absence of any
regulation at all. The status quo generally is the legal state of affairs that prevails
until the Court publishes its decision.
Despite its major impact on the final outcome, the status quo has been largely
ignored in judicial politics research (Hammond, Bonneau and Sheehan 2005, 23f).
This is surprising, given the importance of status quo policies in spatial models of
collective decision-making. The whole proceeding is about moving the status quo.
When complainants or plaintiffs file a case at the FCC, they seek to change the legal
status quo. If judges are policy-oriented, they are likely to compare each alternative
policy to the status quo. Once a decision is published, it defines the legal status
quo for upcoming legislative and judicial policy-making processes.
The status quo is case-specific like the set of relevant policy dimensions. Different
legal states of affairs matter for different proceedings. While some labor legislation
might define the status quo of the first proceeding, it might be completely irrelevant
for the second.
I assume the status quo to be stable over the course of the proceeding. Only in
rare cases would the legislator be expected to change regulations just because a
52 FCC judges report:
“You always notice a certain ‘direction’ of a judge’s thinking. It is very often hard to
predict how this will finally realize in the case” (No. 5, cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 172,
own transl.).




case is pending at the FCC. If the political majority feared an opposing decision by
the Court that much, the opposition’s plain thread of filing a request to the Court
should have been enough incentive to proactively change legislation. If other factors
like changing parliamentary majorities caused a new status quo and rendered the
proceeding completely obsolete, judges would simply close it. In most cases, politics
would rather await the FCC’s decision in order to avoid additional effort and the
risk of having the new reform declared unconstitutional just after its adoption.
The status quo is assumed to be exogenous. As long as the final decision is not
published, the Court can not self-determine or change the legal state of affairs.
Parallel proceedings on the same issue are usually conjoint. One might regard
temporary injunctions as an exception. They either freeze the status quo in order
to prevent irrevocable external shocks, which would at least support the assumption
of stability. Or they might indeed be a first change to the status quo. Either way,
they are a procedural measure of limited scope and do not relieve the Court from
its obligation to find a main decision on the merits. For the sake of simplicity, I
assume general exogeneity of the status quo.
Costs of Bargaining Delay Bargaining delay is costly. Judges prefer to pass mutually
benefitial outcomes sooner than later. Their future payoffs are discounted by a
common discount factor. Judges might be more or less patient. Since such a personal
trait is unrelated to political preferences, I opt for the simplified version of common
discount factors. It is assumed to be case-specific, as some issues are more urgent
than others. Again, this difference is likely to affect all judges. If a judge was
directly involved in a case, he or she would need to be recused (Benda, Klein and
Klein 2012, 108ff).
There is a variety of conceivable costs of bargaining delay. Cross (1965; 1969)
distinguishes three types: a discount of future benefits, a time-variant utility of
the agreement itself, and a fixed cost of each bargaining period (see also Cramton
1991, 1221f; Rubinstein 1982, 99). I assume that only the first type of costs (i.e.
discounting future payoffs) matters for FCC negotiations. The second type might
apply to the division of a shrinking pie. But in policy negotiations, the value of an
agreement is determined by subjective utility functions. So the agreement as such
does not have an objective or inherent value.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the third type of bargaining costs, i.e. fixed
opportunity costs, is not relevant. There are no opportunity costs of continued
bargaining, making proposals, and repeated voting. In contrast, Lax and Cameron
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(2007) argue that high-quality opinion-writing is very costly. But opposing proposals
in FCC negotiations can be made at very low costs. A judge would only have to
raise his voice in a consultation meeting. The decision draft and the final decision
are written by the rapporteur, with extensive support by legal assistants.
This last assumption of no opportunity costs probably is the most restrictive one
with regard to the enormous caseload and a humane need for leisure time. The main
reason to stick with this simplification is practical: Hypotheses will be derived via
simulations (cf. chapter 5). The computational resources available for this study do
not allow for the estimation of subjectively expected numbers of future bargaining
rounds (i.e. the expected total opportunity costs of continued bargaining) at all
stages of the game for a sufficiently large number of simulations. While the time-
varying caseload is controlled for in the empirical analysis, the inclusion of fixed
opportunity costs in the model remains up to future research.
Decision-Making Rules Judges alternately vote on policy proposals with equal voting
weights until a proposal is accepted by a predefined number of judges. For the sake
of simplicity, I disregard both the possibility of ending a proceeding by a status
quo-upholding 4:4 vote and the possibility of ex-post changing a vote until the
decision is published. Both eventualities can be expected to be rare exceptions
from the conventional procedure, given the Court’s collaborative mode of operation
(Kranenpohl 2010).
Formally, most FCC decisions require a simple majority of judges. The effective
target quorum may be higher, though. FCC judges seek high majorities in order
to increase the Court’s legitimacy or public support (Kranenpohl 2010, 402, 407).
There is a norm of consensus that varies between senates and across time (Kranen-
pohl 2010, 183).
The use of separate opinions serves as an indicator of a changing preference for
consensus. The prevailing norm is that separate opinions should only be published in
the case of deep personal convictions (Kommers and Miller 2012, 29). The significant
decline in separate opinions since its introduction in 1971 (Ho¨nnige 2007, 51) used
to be explained by an increased caseload (Lamprecht 1992, 298). But this approach
does not account for the increase of dissents in the 1990s (Kommers and Miller
2012, 29) despite a simultaneous increase of docketed cases (Bundesministerium der
Justiz 1998). Indeed, the Court’s preference for visibly consensual decisions seems
to change over time.
Research on the U.S. Supreme Court reveals a similar picture: The level of cohesion
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varies over time and these changes are rather long-term (Caldeira and Zorn 1998).
There was a radical and enduring increase of dissenting and concurring opinions in
the early 1940s that many scholars trace back to a dramatic decline of the norm of
consensus (Epstein, Segal and Spaeth 2001). While some consider different Chief
Justice leadership styles to be the driving force behind changing levels of cohesion
(Caldeira and Zorn 1998; Haynie 1992; Walker, Epstein and Dixon 1988), others
point to the impact of the Court’s composition with more or less conflicting legal
mindsets (O’Brien 1999) and to the Court’s caseload.53 Recent findings show that
decisions are unanimous when ideological stakes are low (Epstein, Landes and Posner
2013, 124ff).
The model presented in this chapter does not explicitly account for a norm of con-
sensus. But it is flexible in terms of the majority threshold. While negotiations
under unanimity come close to proceedings in times of a strong norm of consensus,
simple majority voting is more realistic in other decades.
Independence From External Political Actors and Public Opinion Policy negotiations
between judges are independent from external constraints by political actors or the
public. The consultation process is not affected by interaction with external play-
ers, anticipation of external reactions, or strategic signalling considerations betweem
institutions.
This assumption is contrary to previous studies both on the U.S. Supreme Court
(Bailey and Maltzman 2011, 95ff) and the FCC (Vanberg 2005). The Court “does
not have any marshals” (former FCC president Ernst Benda, cited by Rath 2013, 35,
own transl.). It has no coercive means and “no influence over either the sword or the
purse” (Hamilton [1788] 1987, 437). The FCC depends on support by the public and
political institutions for its decisions to be implemented (Herrmann 2010; Limbach
1999; Schaal 2004; Vanberg 2005). So the assumption of complete independence
from external actors needs to be justified.
The present model focuses on the Court’s internal negotiation process. The impor-
tance of external actors should not be overestimated. FCC judges are personally
independent in light of their long tenure without reelection prospects (see section
2.3). German citizens are more confident in the FCC than in any other political
institution (Vorla¨nder and Brodocz 2006).54 The FCC is said to be one of the most
53 “As demands on the Court increase, the justices lose the luxury of ample time to build consensus”
(Walker, Epstein and Dixon 1988, 366).
54 The police, which scores slightly higher, should not be classified as a “political” institution (Vorla¨nder
and Brodocz 2006, 261f).
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independent constitutional courts worldwide (see chapter 1). It enjoys great au-
tonomy as an independent and self-administrated constitutional organ with its own
budget (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 55ff). So the Court can be assumed to be a
largely unconstrained actor that does not fear immediate repression or interference
by external political actors (Ho¨nnige 2007, 67).
Public support seems to be a key premise for such political independence. The U.S.
literature supports this conjecture. Shifts in public ideology are strongly related
with changes in collective Supreme Court decision-making (Mishler and Sheehan
1993) and with individual justices’ voting behavior (Flemming and Wood 1997).
The undisputed empirical association misses a clear causal link, though. Three
commonly proposed explanations are:
1. Shifting political majorities favor different candidates to be selected as justices
(Segal and Spaeth 2002, 424ff). This causes collective decisions to gradually
follow changes in public ideology.
2. Individual justices are motivated to maintain institutional trust and compli-
ance with their decisions. The generally high level of public support is sen-
sitive to disagreement with particular decisions (Caldeira 1986; Durr, Martin
and Wolbrecht 2000; Grosskopf and Mondak 1998). So justices might seek to
avoid negative attention and public opinion directly influences judicial behavior
(Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth 2011).55
3. Justices are part of the public just as anyone else. Their attitudes respond to
the same social forces that shape public opinion in general, reducing the em-
pirical association to a statistical artefact without substantive meaning (Giles,
Blackstone and Vining, Jr. 2008; Segal, Spaeth and Benesh 2005, 326ff).
The previously introduced assumptions on judicial preferences are consistent with
potential changes in the selection process (1) and long-term shifts in individual
preferences (3). The model would need to be extended only if the second explanation
was of great significance. Recent empirical evidence on the U.S. Supreme Court
does not consistently support this claim. Despite very comprehensive research over
decades it is still unclear whether public opinion exerts a direct influence on Supreme
Court decision-making (Epstein and Martin 2010).
There are similar findings on the FCC. The Court has enjoyed a very high level
of public support in all decades under study (Schaal 2006; Vorla¨nder and Brodocz
2006). At this high level, it is sensitive to reactions on particularly controversial
55 See Staton (2010) for very similar line of argument on the Mexican Supreme Court.
48
4.1. Model Assumptions
decisions. It reached a low mark in the mid-1990s crisis around the Classroom Cru-
cifix decision but has recovered afterwards. Such short-term reactions and strong
disagreements with particular decisions have not affected general trust in the FCC
in the long run (Vorla¨nder 2006a; Vorla¨nder and Schaal 2002). FCC judges real-
ize the importance of public support for their decisions (Kranenpohl 2010, 400ff)
and they are concerned about declines in institutional trust.56 Public awareness
of specific decisions seems to foster the judges’ trust in political implementation of
their decisions. FCC judges are more likely to veto legislation if public awareness
is high (Vanberg 2005). The more popular the parliamentary opposition’s position
in a pending proceeding, the more likely will the FCC vote in favor of that position
(Sternberg et al. 2014).
However, research on public opinion effects at the FCC faces similar (or even more
severe) theoretical and methodological issues as the previously discussed U.S. liter-
ature. Again, judges might vote in line with public opinion just because they are
part of the public and inherently share the same views. Most conjectures are hard to
prove given the rare collection of relevant survey data (Schaal 2004, 130). Vanberg
(2005)’s operationalization of public attention raises concerns about potential endo-
geneity.57 The public might become aware of a case just because it is controversial58
and a veto is more likely.
With regard to these methodological concerns, very limited findings on long-term
effects, and similar conclusions in the U.S. literature, public opinion is not assumed
to have a relevant direct impact on FCC decision-making. Indirect effects via judge
selection or long-term preference changes are consistent with previous assumptions.
The assumption of FCC bargaining independence from public opinion should be
relaxed in future, more general versions of the model.
In summary, I assume single-minded, policy-seeking judges to strategically bargain
about moving the legal status quo in a multi-dimensional policy space without external
constraints by legal doctrines, political actors, and the public. Judges have an incomplete
understanding of their colleagues’ case-specific preferences and the game continues until
56 About one year after the Classroom Crucifix decision, the then leaving FCC judge Ernst-Wolfgang
Bo¨ckenfo¨rde feared: “Today the FCC is not anymore what is used to be until August 10, 1995 [when
the Classroom Crucifix decision was published]” (Bo¨ckenfo¨rde 1996, 281, own transl. and comment).
57 Vanberg (2005, 103) operationalizes public awareness as (a) whether an oral argument was held and
(b) as the total number of amicus briefs filed by interest groups, lower courts, or governments. First,
the Court might hold an oral argument just because it seeks to prepare the public for a controversial
veto decision. Second, third actors might have a higher incentive to file amicus briefs in proceedings
where they anticipate the realistic chance or risk of a veto.
58 Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth (2011, 81) make the same argument.
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a proposal has reached the necessary majority.
Now that these basic assumptions are stated and justified, I will present Banks and
Duggan (2006)’s model of dynamic policy bargaining under complete information in the
following section. This model is extended to a dynamic policy bargaining game under
incomplete information in section 4.3. The extension will allow for an explanation of
variance in bargaining duration beyond immediate agreement and across different kinds
of proceedings.
4.2. Dynamic Policy Bargaining with Complete
Information
Banks and Duggan (2006) present a dynamic policy bargaining model under complete
information. The actors or “legislators” are impatient and continue to bargain in a mul-
tidimensional policy space until a decisive coalition agrees on a new proposal to replace
the status quo. My theory of FCC negotiations closely builds on Banks and Duggan’s
model. I introduce and discuss their work before the model is extended in section 4.3.
Complex formal models of political science like the one at hand sometimes lack com-
municative accessibility for a broad audience of empirical scholars. For the reader’s con-
venience, I do not discuss some of the model’s less relevant technical details. Instead, I
add some further commentary on equations that Banks and Duggan consider “straightfor-
ward to derive” (2006, 56). Readers with particular interest in formal theory are strongly
advised to study this undervalued piece of game theory in original.
Banks and Duggan (2006, 53ff) set up their “general bargaining model of legislative
policy-making” as follows.
X ⊆ <d denotes a nonempty, compact, convex set of policies with at least two policy
alternatives. q ∈ X is the status quo policy. There are n ≥ 2 legislators i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}
and they play an infinite-horizon policy bargaining game.
Each period t comprises three consecutive steps: (1) Legislator i is randomly selected
with recognition probability ρi (2) to make a proposal pi ∈ X.59 (3) All legislators j ∈ N
then simultaneously vote either to accept or reject the proposal. If a decisive coalition60
of judges accepts the proposal, the game ends in period t and the adopted proposal pi
59 Recognition probabilities ρi ≥ 0 are exogenously fixed throughout the game and normalized to∑
i∈N ρi = 1.
60 A decisive coalition is any set of legislators whose collective agreement will lead to the adoption of the
proposal. See Banks and Duggan (2006, 53) for a more explicit definition. They hardly impose any
restrictions on voting rules or weights.
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will replace the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo remains in force and steps 1-3 are
repeated for period t+ 1.
Each legislator i’s temporary utility ui(xt) of policy xt ∈ X in period t is described
by a continuous, concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : X → < with
a unique ideal point x˜i ∈ X.61 Future utilities are discounted by a common discount
factor δ ∈ [0, 1) per period. Legislator i’s payoff useqi (Xseq) of a sequence of policies
Xseq = (x1, x2, . . .) over time is defined as




If Xseq = (x, x, . . .) is a sequence of identical policies, the temporary utility of x will be
equal to the payoff of having policy x enacted from period t = 1 onwards:
useqi ((x, x, . . .)) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ui(x) = ui(x). (4.2)
Now equation 4.1 can be further simplified. If policy x ∈ X is adopted in period t, the
status quo remains enacted until period t − 1. The first t − 1 elements of such a game’s
policy sequence Xseq are q and all other elements are x. Legislator i receives temporary
utility ui(q) each period until t − 1 and ui(x) from period t onwards. Then legislator i’s
total payoff term is
useqi (Xseq) = (1− δt−1)ui(q) + δt−1ui(x). (4.3)
Legislator i’s strategy σi defines what policies to propose in the event of recognition
and what proposals to accept at the voting stage. Strategies are assumed to be stationary
in that they do not depend on bargaining history or length. So there is no signalling or
bluffing involved. Legislators are willing to propose and accept the same sets of policies
in all periods of the game. Strategies are mixed in that proposals are randomly selected
based on a predefined probability distribution pii over subsets of X.
62 Ai ⊂ X denotes
the set of proposals that i would vote to accept. Then i’s strategy σi = (pii, Ai) consists
of his mixed proposal pii and his acceptance set Ai and is the same for all periods of the
game.
61 See Banks and Duggan (2006, 54 and 73) for more precise conditions on the utility function. I use
a more extended notation in order to explicitly distinguish between temporary policy utilities and
payoffs from policy sequences.
62 Such a probability distribution might also determine a single policy to be selected with probability 1.
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A stationary equilibrium of the game requires two conditions:
1. A legislator will accept a proposal if and only if it weakly dominates continued
bargaining. In other words, legislator i will vote to accept proposal x if and only
if he prefers x at least as much as rejecting the proposal and opening another
bargaining period t = 2. The payoff realized in t = 2 cannot be perfectly predicted
because proposal-makers are randomly recognized. Legislator i’s expected utility to
be achieved in t = 2 is specified by the continuation value υi(σ) with σ = (σ1, . . . , σn)
denoting the profile of all legislators’ mixed stationary strategies.
Now the expected total utility of both alternatives can be derived from equation
4.3. If the proposal is accepted, the game will end and i’s utility will be ui(x). If
the proposal is denied, the status quo will prevail for another period and the total
expected utility will be (1 − δ)ui(q) + δυi(σ). So i’s acceptance set in stationary
equilibrium is
Ai = {x ∈ X | ui(x) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q) + δυi(σ)} . (4.4)
2. Legislators are sequentially rational. Their strategies must be best responses at
every stage of the game (Kreps and Wilson 1982). Hence, the recognized legislator
will consider the social acceptance set A of all policy alternatives that would be







where C ∈ 2N \ {∅} is a coalition of at least one legislator and D ⊆ 2N \ {∅} is the
set of decisive coalitions. Legislator i will propose a most preferred outcome y ∈ A
if he prefers y over continued bargaining. Formally,
pii (arg max {ui(y) | y ∈ A}) = 1 (4.6)
if sup{ui(y) | y ∈ A} > (1 − δ)ui(q) + δ υi(σ). If continued bargaining makes him
better off than any outcome y ∈ A, he will make a socially unaccepted proposal
y ∈ (X \ A) to be rejected. If he is indifferent, he will choose any of these two
options.
Now i’s continuation value υi(σ) is the only unknown. If a new bargaining period starts,
legislator j ∈ N will be recognized with probability ρj. He will propose a socially accepted
outcome z ∈ A with probability pij(z). So the cumulated probability of j proposing any
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socially accepted outcome is
∫
A
pij(z)dz. The proposal z would be passed and legislator
i’s payoff would be ui(z). With a probability of pij(X \ A), the recognized legislator j
will make a socially unaccepted proposal. The status quo would prevail, yet another
bargaining round would be needed, and i’s payoff would be (1 − δ)ui(q) + δ υi(σ). If
legislator j is recognized, i would expect a total payoff of∫
A
ui(z)pij(z)dz + [(1− δ)ui(q) + δ υi(σ)]pij(X \ A).
Considering all potential proposal-makers and their recognition probabilities, we get a







ui(z)pij(z)dz + [(1− δ)ui(q) + δ υi(σ)]pij(X \ A)
]
.






ui(z)pij(z)dz + (1− δ)pij(X \ A)ui(q)
]
1− δ∑j∈N ρjpij(X \ A) . (4.7)
A stationary equilibrium of the game is defined by the coupled set of equations 4.4 to
4.7. Legislators are strategically rational. They are completely informed about the set of
legislators n, decision rules, decisive coalitions D, policy space X, the status quo q, all
players’ preferences u(x), the common discount factor δ, and recognition probabilities ρ.
Strategies are stationary, so they do not depend on the history of the game. Legislators
will have the same information and strategies in all periods. They anticipate other players’
strategies and form their own strategy as follows.
A legislator’s vote choice depends on his continuation value for continued bargaining
(equation 4.4). The continuation value depends on all legislators’ proposal strategies
(equation 4.7). These proposal strategies in turn depend on both continuation values and
socially accepted outcomes (equation 4.6 with further specifications). The set of socially
accepted outcomes depends on individual vote choices (equation 4.5) and we have come
full circle. The stationary mixed strategy profile σ is in equilibrium for all self-consistent
solutions of these equations.
Banks and Duggan (2006, 65ff) prove that there always exists a stationary equilibrium
with immediate agreement in the first period. There may be multiple no-delay equilibria
with different payoffs. Delay can only occur under very specific circumstances and the
authors conclude that “there will typically be immediate agreement in multidimensional
settings” (Banks and Duggan 2006, 52).
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The assumption of strategic voting probably is the most important deviation of Banks
and Duggan’s model from more established models of spatial policy-making. At first
sight, Hinich and Munger (1997)’s example of committee voting reads very similar:
“Each member can make any proposal [...] New proposals are compared
against the status quo, using majority rule. [...] If a new proposal loses,
it is discarded. If it wins, the proposal becomes the new status quo” (Hinich
and Munger 1997, 25, original emphasis).
But then they require all committee members to “vote based only on their preferences for
the proposals then under consideration” (Hinich and Munger 1997, 25). Members decide
“regardless of what other proposals might later be raised if y becomes the new status
quo” (Hinich and Munger 1997, 27). Though less explicitly, Tsebelis (2002)’ veto player






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.1.: Sincere vs. strategic voting: Estimated winsets of a five-player policy
bargaining game in two dimensions. Sincere voting (Hinich and Munger 1997;
Tsebelis 2002) on the left. Strategic voting (Banks and Duggan 2006) on the
right. SQ: status quo policy. A-E: players’ ideal policies. Circles: indifference
curves. Grey area: majority winset. Arrows: proposals by players outside
the winset.
All of these scholars assume players to be rational and strategic. This assumption has
a significant impact on predicted bargaining processes and their outcomes. But it will not
be consistent with the assumption of sincere voting if the agendasetter is not fixed. Why
54
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would a player consider other players’ future behavior in proposal-making but not in his
voting behavior? If strategic players care anything about future policies (i.e. the discount
factor is δ > 0), there is no reason to expect sincere voting in absence of a predefined
agendasetter. Different agendasetters can be expected to make more or less advantegous
proposals in future bargaining periods. So strategic players would compare proposals
against expected gains from continued bargaining rather than against the status quo.
Figure 4.1 illustrates an example policy bargaining situation to clarify this point. Five
players bargain about moving a given status quo policy in a two-dimensional policy space.
A policy alternative requires a simple majority of at least three players to replace the status
quo. Preferences are defined by quadratic utility loss functions with circular indifference
curves. In the standard spatial policy-making model on the left, the status quo is included
in the winset. All players’ sincere indifference curves intersect at the status quo (Hinich
and Munger 1997; Tsebelis 2002). A player will vote to accept any proposal that is
closer to his ideal point than the status quo. If the proposal is more distant, he will
reject. Players C and D will successfully propose their ideal point if they are recognized.
Predicted proposals by players A, B, and E are indicated by arrowheads at the winset’s
boundary.
The right figure illustrates the same bargaining situation in stationary equilibrium as
defined by Banks and Duggan’s dynamic policy-making model with strategic voting.63
Here, indifference curves do not cut the status quo. Players compare proposals against
expected utilities rather than against the status quo. Players B, D, and E would not accept
a status quo proposal. Bright prospects of future bargaining make them more demanding.
In contrast, players A and C would even vote for some policies they prefer less than the
status quo. Continued negotiations might result in very distant policy outcomes. So these
players prefer a moderate utility decline over the risk of facing more severe losses in the
future. If recognized, D will successfully propose his ideal policy. Players A, B, C, and
E will propose policies with moderate concessions, as indicated by the arrowheads. Their
proposals are more “right” on the first dimension as compared to the previous figure. So
the assumption of sincere vs. strategic voting has remarkable implications on the predicted
bargaining process and outcome.
Banks and Duggan have provided a spatial bargaining model that accounts both for
the dynamics of policy-making and for strategic voting. They have moved spatial theory
beyond the inconsequential assumption of sincere voting. Eight years have passed, since
their model was published (Banks and Duggan 2006). An earlier version had been pub-
lished in the American Political Science Review (Banks and Duggan 2000). But still, the
63 The stationary equilibrium was solved via the estimation method presented in section 5.2.1 with
discount factor δ = 0.5. Similar results are obtained with alternative discount factors 0 < δ ≤ 1.
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scientific community does not recognize the great value of their theory. State-of-the-art
models of policy-making are typically based on sincere indifference curves and winsets
as promoted by Tsebelis (2002) and Hinich and Munger (1997). Banks and Duggan’s
abtract, formal style of presentation might have hampered a more widespread use of their
model. The present study provides an example of how to apply their model to empirical
phenomena of political decision-making.
In this section, I have introduced Banks and Duggan’s model of dynamic policy bar-
gaining under complete information. Players bargain about moving a multidimensional
status quo by alternating proposals and votes until a collective decision is reached. The
assumption of strategic voting most distinguishes this model from the static model of spa-
tial policy bargaining. Indifference curves do not necessarily cut the status quo. There
always exists a no-delay stationary equilibrium and the game typically ends in the first
period. In a footnote, Banks and Duggan (2006, 52) suggest that more substantive delay
may be obtained by adding incomplete information to the model. I will take this hint
and extend their model to a version with incomplete information about other players’
preferences in the following section.
4.3. Dynamic Policy Bargaining with Incomplete
Information
The following model of policy bargaining with incomplete information is a modification
of Banks and Duggan (2006)’s dynamic bargaining model as presented in section 4.2. It
is primarily designed to fit the assumptions on policy bargaining at the FCC (cf. section
4.1). Largely institution-free senate consultations are at the core of FCC proceedings
(cf. section 2.5). Judges engage in detailed discussions about the case until at least a
majority of them agrees on the final outcome. They are well informed about the case
and potential outcomes. But uncertainty about each other’s preferences remains. FCC
senate discussions are represented in the dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete
information, where alternating players make policy proposals, vote on each proposal and
learn throughout the game.
“Proposals” can be thought of either formal proposals (e.g. the very first proposal in the
Votum) or as informal suggestions in the oral debate. “Votes” can either be formal (e.g.
on a potentially final decision) or informal, continuous feedback on previous propositions
in the ongoing oral debate (explicit statements, facial expressions etc.). “Recognitions” of
proposal-makers can either be formal (the rapporteur is formally assigned) or informally
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determined by the order of speakers at any point in the discussion. A specific “policy” can
be any combination of statements on a (partial) legal norm’s constitutionality, legislative
interpretation, deadlines, directives, obiter dicta, etc. (cf. section 2.6). The general outline
allows to apply this model to policy-making processes (e.g. in legislative committees)
beyond the context of the FCC.
Banks and Duggan’s model is modified in two ways. First, I assume quadratic utility loss
functions and majority voting with equal voting rights and weights. The more general
model by Banks and Duggan can easily be applied to a great variety of institutional
decision-making rules and preference representations. This flexibility comes with the
downside of overly abstract formalism. The additional assumptions of quadratic utility
loss functions and plain majority voting simplify the formal presentation of the game.
They are by no means necessary for modelling durable negotiations under incomplete
information. The following account could easily be re-modified to a more general version.
Second, I assume players to be incompletely informed about other players’ preferences.
All players have commonly known general positions on issues (e.g. political ideology, a
general set of attitudes, value systems, ...) that I call priors. All bargaining-relevant pol-
icy dimensions can be assigned to one of these priors. A player’s concrete policy position
on that dimension is only roughly determined by that prior.64 In terms of game theory,
I model a Bayesian game where nature draws all players’ ideal positions on bargaining-
relevant policy dimensions from a normal distribution around that player’s prior (Harsanyi
1967). The normal distribution’s variance corresponds to the degree of uncertainty. The
greater the variance, the less precise concrete policy positions can be determined from a
player’s prior. Players’ beliefs about each other’s preferences are represented by proba-
bility functions and updated based on observed behavior.
The extended model of dynamic policy bargaining with incomplete information is pre-
sented in the following.
Let X ⊆ Rd denote a nonempty, compact, convex set of policies with at least two policy
alternatives in an n-dimensional space. q ∈ X is the status quo policy. There are n ≥ 2
players i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} who play an infinite-horizon policy bargaining game.65
In each period t ∈ N, player i is randomly selected with a fixed and commonly known
recognition probability ρi to make a proposal p
t
i ∈ X. All players j ∈ N then simulta-
64 E.g., a judge might be known to be rather conservative, so he probably opposes same sex marriage
equality in income tax but his stance on equality in inheritence taxes might be less clear. Another
legislator might be a known moderate welfare state supporter. Would he prefer the child benefit to be
increased by 20, 30, or 40 euros per month?
65 Unlike Banks and Duggan, I choose “players” as the more general term. These acting entities will be
“judges” in my empirical application and might be “legislators” in others.
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neously vote either to accept or reject the proposal. There is a fixed decision rule. If at
least m players with 0 < m ≤ n accept the proposal, the game ends in period t and the
adopted proposal pi will replace the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo remains in
force and a new period starts.
Before negotiations start, nature draws player i’s most preferred policy x˜i from a normal
distribution around i’s prior µi ∈ X:
x˜i ∼ Nd(µi, s2), (4.8)
where s2 ≥ 0 is a common degree of uncertainty.66 Player i’s utility of policy x ∈ X is
described by a quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui(x) = −(x− x˜i)2,
where x˜i ∈ X is player i’s most preferred policy. Future utilities are discounted by a
common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1) per period. Player i’s total payoff of a sequence of
policies x1, x2, . . . over time is




If policy x is passed in period t, the status quo q prevails until period t− 1 and the total
payoff term is simplified to
(1− δt−1)ui(q) + δt−1ui(x).
Players perfectly know their own preferences but they can only estimate each other’s
x˜i. They will assess the more general definition of i’s utility function:
ui(x, x
∗
i ) = −(x− x∗i )2, (4.9)
where x∗i ∈ X is i’s presumed ideal policy. Players build and constantly update subjective
expectations θ = {θ1, θ2, . . .} about each other’s ideal positions x˜ = {x˜1, . . . , x˜n}, where
θt denotes preliminary expectations in period t. Rational players take these expectations
into account so that their strategies depend on previous observations. These strategies
are not stationary. By assumption, observed voting behavior is the only cause of changing
expectations and strategies in the bargaining process.67
66 Conceptually, the degree of uncertainty could be player- and dimension-specific. The change in notation
would be trivial. Here and in the following chapters, I assume a common degree of uncertainty for
reasons of simplicity.
67 This implies that there are no tit-for-tat coordination strategies and the like. A player’s voting decision
is least likely to be manipulated. One could alternatively assume players to learn from proposals. But
since proposals allow for a much more accurate estimation of real preferences, they would be more
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Player i’s strategy σi = {pi, vi} consists of a mixed proposal strategy pi = {p1i , p2i , . . .}
and a pure voting strategy vi = {v1i (x), v2i (x), . . .}. pti denotes the policy alternative that
i would propose in period t if i was recognized, given θt. i’s proposal strategy is mixed in
that i may randomly choose pti from a set of alternative proposals. For each period t, i’s
voting strategy vi includes a function vti : X → {0, 1} of whether i would vote to accept
(=1) or deny (=0) policy x ∈ X, given θt. The social acceptance set of all proposals that









Any other player j’s expectation in period t about player i’s ideal policy is represented
by the probability distribution θti : X → [0, 1] with
∫
X
θti(x)dx = 1 and j ∈ N \ {i}. More
precisely, θti(x) gives the expected probability of x = x˜
i as estimated by any other player
j in period t. In the first period t = 1, no voting has been observed yet and θ1i (x)
corresponds to the probability distribution of nature’s draw:
θ1i (x) = Nd(µi, s2), (4.11)
where µi and s
2 are common knowledge so that all players i, j ∈ N can estimate θ1i (x).
In every following period t > 1, θti(x) is updated based on i’s observed voting behavior
in t − 1. Let ωti : X → {0, 1} be a function of whether i’s voting decision on proposal pt
in period t is consistent (=1) or inconsistent (=0) with the assumption of x˜i = x. Let
f(pt, x) be an indicator function of whether player i is expected to vote for proposal pt in
period t, based on the assumption that x is i’s true ideal point: x = x˜i. Then
ωti(x) =
∣∣vti(x) + f(pt, x)− 1∣∣ . (4.12)
In each period t > 1, players erase observation-inconsistent expectations. Previous ex-
pectations on player i’s ideal point in period t − 1 are represented by the probability
distribution θt−1i (x). Probabilities for previously presumed ideal points that turned out
to be inconsistent with actual voting behavior are set to 0 by multiplicating θt−1i (x) with
ωt−1i (x). The denominator standardizes the updated probability distribution θ
t
i(x) to a
prone to signalling and bluffing incentives. With the scientific aim of complexity reductive models in
mind, I assume that learning is limited to observed voting behavior.
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Players are assumed to be strategically rational. In equilibrium, a player will accept a
proposal if and only if he prefers it at least as much as continued bargaining. For each
player i and each period t,
vti(x) =
1 if ui(x) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q) + δ υti(σ)0 else , (4.14)
where υti(σ) is the continuation value of rejecting the proposal and proceeding to a new
bargaining period t + 1. Other players j ∈ N \ {i} can only estimate i’s voting strategy.







1 if ui(x, z) ≥ (1− δ)ui(q, z) + δ Eυti(σ)0 else , (4.16)
where Eυti(σ) is any other player j’s expectation of i’s continuation value in period t.
Having estimated all other players’ voting strategies, a player j ∈ N ’s estimate of the














with the set of majority coalitionsM =
{
C ∈ 2N \ ∅ ∣∣ |C| ≥ m} and complete information




j(x) is a cumulated Poisson binomial
distribution. It describes the subjectively expected probability of at least m players voting
in favor of x in period t as perceived from j’s perspective.
Players are sequentially rational. In each period t, the recognized proposer i ∈ N will
propose the policy alternative that maximizes his subjectively expected utility. If policy
y ∈ X is proposed, it will be enacted with subjectively expected probability EAti(y)
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and i’s payoff will be ui(y). Otherwise, i.e. with a subjectively expected probability of
1−EAti(y), the status quo will prevail for another period, bargaining continues in t+1, and
i’s subjectively expected payoff will be (1− δ)ui(q) + δ Eυti(σ). Proposer i’s subjectively







(1− δ)ui(q) + δ Eυti(σ)
)
. (4.18)
The sequentially rational proposer i will propose policy





in period t. This conjecture implies that i will propose a socially unaccepted proposal
if he favors continued bargaining over any socially accepted proposal, consistent with
Banks and Duggan’s model under complete information. If there is a tie between several
expected utility-maximizing policies, i’s eventual proposal is randomly chosen from the
set of optimal proposals with equal probabilities.68
The continuation value υti(σ) denotes player i’s subjectively expected payoff from con-
tinued bargaining in period t + 1. Players can not perfectly predict future bargaining
because all players’ strategies σt+1 = {σt+11 , . . . , σt+1n } in period t + 1 depend on the
then available sets of information θt. In the complete information model, strategies are




i (σ). So the continuation value can be represented
by equation 4.7 (Banks and Duggan 2006, 56). This does not hold for the incomplete
information model.
From a purely theoretical perspective, one would expect strategically rational players
i ∈ N to estimate θt+1, υt+1i (σ), θt+2, υt+2i (σ), etc. of continued bargaining periods with
incomplete information for all potential preference constellations x∗ = {x∗1, . . . , x∗n} and
to weigh these estimates by θti . With contemporarily available computational ressources,
such a model would not be solvable for a sufficient number of simulated negotiations
within reasonable time and at reasonable costs (see chapter 5). For pragmatic reasons, I
therefore assume that players estimate their continuation values based on the assumption
of complete information in t+1. For each presumed preference constellation, players would
expect a total payoff equal to what they would gain from complete information bargaining
with the very same preferences. Uncertainty remains about each other’s preferences, i.e.
about which game they actually play.
68 Since proposer i likes all pti ∈ arg max{Euti(y)} equally well, there is no reason to assume non-random
choice. Banks and Duggan (2006, 56) are less specific and only conclude that the proposer would choose
any optimal proposal. The additional assumption of random choice does not affect continuation values
but it might affect the course of bargaining.
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This heuristic is a reasonable approximation of the continuation value under incomplete
information. First, real-world players’ computational capacities are not unlimited. So
more complexity would not necessarily add any realism. Second, players learn about each
other’s preferences each period. Their expectations converge to a game with complete
information. So future bargaining becomes more and more similar to complete information
games, indeed.
Let υCi (σ, x
∗) denote player i’s continuation value in the equivalent game under complete
information with presumed ideal positions x∗ = {x∗1, . . . , x∗n} and utility functions as
described by equation 4.9. The stationary equilibrium of υCi (σ, x
∗) then is defined in










For each potential preference constellation x∗ ∈ Xn, i estimates his payoff υCi (σ, x∗) from
continued bargaining under complete information in period t+1. Player i perfectly knows




1 if x∗i = x˜i0 else (4.21)
effectively limits the set of relevant preference constellations to those with x∗i = x˜i.
The continuation values from all these continued games under complete information are
weighted by i’s current expectations θtj(x
∗
j) about other players’ real preferences and sum
up to i’s continuation value in period t.
Finally, players estimate each other’s continuation value in order to determine expected
voting strategies and social acceptance sets. In period t, player h ∈ N expects player














In this section, Banks and Duggan (2006)’s dynamic model of legislative bargaining
has been extended to a dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete information.
The model fits the assumptions on policy bargaining at the FCC (section 4.1) and will be
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tested against empirical evidence in part III.
The policy bargaining model with incomplete information assumes rational, strategic
players to bargain about replacing the status quo in a multi-dimensional policy space.
They bargain in sequential periods of proposals and votes. Players know their own pref-
erences but they can only estimate their opponents’ preferences by their commonly known
ideology and observed voting behavior. Best-response proposal and voting strategies de-
pend on these temporary subjective expectations about each other’s preferences. Players
learn over time and update their beliefs each period.
The incomplete information model is highly complex. The game’s sequential equilibria
are clearly defined but an equilibrium solution is hard to find. The game’s infinite horizon
inhibits backwards induction. Strategies are non-stationary and highly interdependent.
Each period starts with a recognized proposal-maker. In equilibrium, a player’s proposal
strategy depends on the subjectively estimated social acceptance set, which in turn de-
pends on the expected voting strategy of other players. Such an expected voting strategy
again depends on these other players’ expectations about everyone else’s strategies. These
“second-order expectations” (Harsanyi 1967, 163f) – subjective expectations about other
players’ expectations – make it hard to derive clear conclusions. An analytic solution of
the game is not feasible. I will conduct computer simulations in chapter 5 in order to
derive explicit hypotheses.
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In this chapter, computer simulations are conducted in order to derive hypotheses on pol-
icy bargaining at the FCC. A dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete informa-
tion has been formulated in chapter 4. At every stage of the game, there is an enormously
complex set of equations to be balanced in equilibrium. Non-stationary strategies and
the high number of players’ interdependent higher-order expectations render an analytical
solution impossible.
Fortunately, modern-day computer simulation techniques offer a feasible alternative.
In order to derive concrete hypotheses from the model, I simulate a high number of
negotiations under varying parameters. The main independent variables such as players’
preferences, the amount of uncertainty, the status quo position, the majority rule, and the
number of players are varied. For each setting, an equilibrium course of the bargaining
process is simulated. The results allow to analyze these independent variables’ effects on
bargaining duration and to derive specific hypotheses for empirical tests.
The present chapter first gives a short introduction into the scientific methodology of
simulation techniques (section 5.1). Then the setup of simulations of dynamic policy
bargaining with complete and with incomplete information is presented (section 5.2).
Finally, simulated results are presented and discussed for a range of parameters that will
be relevant for the subsequent empirical application (section 5.3).
5.1. Simulation Techniques
Numerical computer simulations have been applied in social sciences for a long time
(Troitzsch 2000). They have been conducted to solve large game theory sets of equations
even at a time when computational ressources were much scarcer than nowadays (e.g.
Baron and Herron 2003; Grossman and Perry 1986). Today’s computational capacities
allow for a great potential of analyzing non-trivial political and social processes. Despite
these technical advance, there still are few applications of computer simulations in po-
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litical science. The German Scientific Council has recently called upon social scientists
to expand the use of modern-day simulation techniques in both research and teaching
(Wissenschaftsrat 2014). This chapter shall contribute to the promotion of simulation
techniques in political science.
Computational models are generally accepted as a scientific method to investigate prob-
lems, when analytical deduction fails (De Marchi and Page 2008). Scholars have divergent
views on whether simulation should be classified as a purely deductive method. Axelrod
(2007) argues that simulations do not prove theorems. They start with assumptions and
generate data that can be analyzed inductively. So he considers simulation to be a “third
way of doing science” besides deduction and induction (Axelrod 2007, 92).
I disagree and go with Epstein’s line of argument that “every realization of an agent
model is a strict deduction” (Epstein 2006, 56, original emphasis). Every part of the
simulation’s setup is strictly deduced from explicit theoretical assumptions. The set of
simulated realizations of the theory is stochastic and depends on the explicitly selected
parameters. But random probability distributions are part of the theory. Just because
one induces statistical patterns over a large sample of individual realizations of the theory,
does not make these conclusions any less derived from pure theory (Epstein 2006, 66f).
The conclusions in section 5.3 are purely theory-based hypotheses for the selected range
of parameters, strictly derived from the bargaining model in section 4.3.
Hypothetical bargaining outcomes derived via computer simulations are even more
convincing than a purely analytical account that is limited to the description of stable
equilibria. Concepts like the Nash equilibrium may explain why actors would not deviate
from their state, once they are in equilibrium. But they do not give an explanation of
whether and how actors will reach that equilibrium in the first place (Coddington 1968,
24ff). It is important to show how human actors will attain a specific outcome: “If you
didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain it” (Epstein 2006, xii). Simulation models are not
limited to predictions of the bargaining outcome. They allow to explain and predict the
whole course of bargaining processes. The simulation model starts with clearly defined
initial conditions and explains all the way up to the final bargaining decision.
The literature distinguishes different types of simulation techniques, of which two come
close to the requirements for the dynamic policy bargaining model: discrete-event simu-
lation models and agent-based models.
Discrete-event simulation models are stochastic, dynamic, and discrete-event in that
significant changes occur at discrete time instances only (Leemis and Park 2006, 3). The
dynamic bargaining model formally fits these requirements. The recognition rule is a
stochastic element, dynamic bargaining takes place over time, and bargaining periods
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are discrete time instances. But discrete-event simulation techniques are more tailored
towards investigating queues, production lines, and logistics. Even though there is a very
broad range of potential applications (Allen 2011), their flow system-oriented setup is not
suitable for our purpose.
Agent-based models are a more recent simulation technique that has been applied by
political scientists with great success (Laver and Sergenti 2012; Lorenz 2012). In agent-
based models, autonomous agents are assumed to dynamically interact with each other
and with their environment according to a set of rules (De Marchi and Page 2008). Gen-
eral patterns and structures of interaction typically emerge from individual behavior of
numerous, oftentimes heterogeneous actors (Macal and North 2010). So agent-based
models are a good tool to do the “micro-to-macro mapping” (Epstein 2006, 21). Whereas
top-down discrete-event simulations model the macro flow of passive entities through a
centralized, queue-related system, bottom-up agent-based simulations show how macro
behavior emerges from micro decisions of active individuals and their decentralized inter-
actions (Siebers et al. 2010, 207). This interaction most distinguishes agent-based models
from previous techniques (Macy and Willer 2002).
The dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete information formally fulfills all
basic characteristics of an agent-based model (Macal and North 2010): Players are au-
tonomous, heterogeneous, uniquely identifiable, and self-directed individuals with limited
information. Their voting decisions are specified by an abstract set of rules and reveal
some information about their preferences. Players have a large set of attributes including
policy preferences, subjective expectations, and discount factors. Negotiations can be
regarded as ongoing interactions in a given environment.
However, it differs from typical agent-based models in two important ways: First, the
bargaining interaction of judges involves all players all the time. Players do not merely
locally interact with ideological “neighbors” (Epstein 2006, 52; Macal and North 2010,
154). They always have the entire group of players in mind. Second, whereas agent-based
models typically involve a very large set of agents (Laver and Sergenti 2012, 5) with
rather simple rules of behavior (Macy and Willer 2002, 146), the dynamic bargaining
model involves very complex decision rules and possibly few players.69 Once all actors’
strategic behavior is defined, the emergent pattern is quite obvious at all stages of the
game: The proposal will be passed if and only if a majority of judges agrees. Complexity
is imputed by the choice of optimal strategies rather than by the system.
In summary, the dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete information does
69 Between six and eight judges negotiate a proceeding at the FCC (chapter 2).
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not fit any of the standard types of simulation. None of the standard simulation software
packages seemed suitable and simulations are hand-coded in R (Development Core Team
2008, cf. section 5.2). Nevertheless, the standard procedure of sound simulation analyses
can well be transfered to our application.
Lorenz (2012, 34f) specifies six major steps to proceed in simulating agent-based models:
1. Definition of agents and parameters
2. Definition of behavioral rules
3. Choice of initial parameters
4. Implementation of the simulation process in a computer programm
5. Definition of relevant macro variables
6. Conducting mass simulations
All these steps and a variety of validity and consistency checks are conducted. Agents,
parameters, and behavioral rules have been defined in chapter 4. Initial parameters are
discussed at the beginning of section 5.3. The simulation process is implemented in a
hand-coded script that is discussed in section 5.2 and attached in appendix A. The macro
variable of interest is bargaining duration. In the bargaining model, duration is defined
as the number of bargaining periods until a proposal is passed. Finally, mass simulations
are conducted and results are discussed in section 5.3.
The following section gives an overview of how the computer-based dynamic bargaining
simulations are set up and proceeded.
5.2. Implementation of the Simulation Process
A Monte Carlo simulation is conducted in order to derive hypotheses for a large variety
of independent variables. Some initial parameters like the number of judges, the majority
threshold, or the degree of uncertainty are varied in order to uncover systematic effects on
bargaining duration. Other factors like policy preference constellations and the sequence
of proposers are random as assumed by the bargaining model. In order to distinguish
robust systematic effects from random noise, a very high number of simulation runs is
necessary.
Numerous runs have been conducted for developing, testing, and refining this model.
The final mass simulations (section 5.3) alone are based on more than 2 million sepa-
rate runs of simulated negotiations with incomplete information. This includes about
67
5. Simulation of Dynamic Policy Bargaining
20 million simulated bargaining periods and more than 90 billion simulated games with
complete information. A modern-day single core computer would have needed more than
a century of computational time to deliver these results.
These numbers make clear three points:
1. A simulation model’s complexity comes with high economic and ecological costs.
Despite a tremendous increase over the last decade, computational ressources still
effectively limit a researcher’s flexibility. Exponentially more simulations would
have allowed for the estmation of more precise continuation values or expected
opportunity costs in future bargaining. With current ressources, such extensions
would not be feasible without a loss in precision for individual sets of parameters.
Facing these restrictions, I opt for a limited model and reliable predictions rather
than potentially random noise on a more complex theory.
2. A computing time-efficient way of programming is essential. The simulation model
is coded in R 2.15.3 (Development Core Team 2008), an established open-source
statistical software with sufficient flexibility to set up all routines and analyses in one
program. Other programming languages might have been more efficient. But R is a
good choice in terms of personal prior experience, programming flexibility, platform
independence, and accessibility by other quantitatively oriented social scientists.
I sought to optimize the code by efficient structures, commands, and the use of
matrices rather than loops. The code is attached in appendix A and ready to be
further improved.
3. A large network of computers was necessary to perform these calculations. Mass
simulations were conducted on computers made available by bwGRiD (2007-2010),
mainly on the bwGRID clusters located at the universities of Freiburg, Heidelberg,
and Mannheim. The simulation R code and further scripts to define starting values,
detect errors, aggregate results, and manage data in the clusters’ linux environment
were coded as run-alone routines. Parallel simulations were conducted over a period
of four months on up to 1100 processors at peak time.70 The computing time
required for a single simulated run varied from about 10 minutes to three weeks,
depending on initial parameters and the number of bargaining periods. In order to
prevent any bias towards low computing time-consuming negotiations, all initiated
runs were followed up and included in the final dataset.
70 At the Mannheim/Heidelberg cluster, computer nodes of eight cores are exclusively assigned to one
batch job at a time. A computing routine of parallel simulations ensured that all cores were used to
capacity.
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5.2. Implementation of the Simulation Process
A player’s continuation value in the incomplete information policy bargaining model
depends on his expected payoff from games with complete information. Both models –
the complete and the incomplete information versions of the dynamic policy bargaining
model – need to be coded for computer simulations. The simulation R code with complete
information could well be used independently in order to estimate attainable equilibria of
Banks and Duggan (2006)’s model. For the present purpose, it merely serves as a sub-
routine in simulating bargaining with incomplete information. The following subsections
explain the setup of both simulation models.
5.2.1. Simulating the Complete Information Model
The simulation model of dynamic policy bargaining with complete information is based on
the coupled set of equilibrium equations in section 4.2. Any self-consistent solution of these
equations describes a stationary equilibrium. As announced in the model’s assumptions,
the simulation model is restricted to two policy dimensions as the most simple, non-trivial
case of a multidimensional policy-space (cf. section 4.1).71 I further assume quadratic
utility loss functions and majority voting with equal voting rights and weights as defined
in the incomplete information model (section 4.3).
The number of players n, the majority threshold m, the set of ideal points x˜, the status
quo policy q, the discount factor δ, and recognition probabilities ρ are exogenous input
parameters. Based on this information, a set of “relevant policies” is determined and an
equilibrium solution is estimated in an iterative way. I discuss both steps in the following.
Determination of Relevant Policies
The prevalent method to solve bargaining games like this one is to reduce the policy
space to a finite grid of possible policy alternatives. E.g., Duggan and Kalandrakis (2011)
estimate social acceptance sets and proposal strategies in equilibrium for a very similar
dynamic policy bargaining model based on a policy grid of 51 × 51 = 2601 alternatives.
Similarly, Selck (2004) assumes 100 possible positions per issue dimension in a computer
simulation of legislative bargaining. With more 90 billion repetitions of the complete
information model in mass simulations, policy grids are no feasible option for the present
simulation study. Very fine grids with a high number of nodes would be necessary in
order to gain precise results (Duggan and Kalandrakis 2011, 635f). Instead, I develop a
71 The estimation procedure presented in the following is based on circular indifference curves in two
dimensions. Transfers to more than two dimensions would require a more advanced estimation method
and more computing time. A one-dimensional model could be estimated by assigning the same policy
position on one dimension to all players.
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Figure 5.1.: Relevant policy alternatives: The policy space is reduced to potentially
rational proposals for simulation purposes. A-D: players’ ideal policies. Large
circles: indifference curves. Grey area: social acceptance set. Arrowheads:
proposals. Small circles/triangles: relevant policies.
new method to reduce the set of policy alternatives to be considered by the simulation
procedure to “relevant” policy alternatives.
Relevant policies are a limited set of policies that includes all rational proposals for a
given set of ideal points and indifference circles in an otherwise unlimited policy space
X = R2.72 Figure 5.1 illustrates how the set of relevant policies is defined:
1. Consider the three-player example of the left. The grey area indicates the social
acceptance set A of all policies that will gain a two-thirds majority if the circular
indifference curves are rightly estimated. Player A’s ideal position is inside A. If
recognized, A would propose his ideal policy to be voted on. More generally, all
ideal positions inside A are potentially rational proposals. As the more computing
time-efficient way, I consider all ideal positions to be relevant policies.
2. Players B and C both hold ideal positions outside A. If recognized, they would each
72 The concept of relevant policies can be transferred to any number of policy dimensions and to bounded
dimensions as well. A transfer to d > 2 dimensions would complicate the estimation of and enlarge
the set of relevant policies. E.g. in a three-dimensional policy space, the intersection of indifference
spheres would be circles. The intersection point of such a circle with the connection line between the
circle’s center and any ideal point would be a relevant policy. With regard to limited computing time,
the present estimation method assumes two dimensions.
The assumptions on FCC bargaining (section 4.1) do not suggest restrictive boundaries to the policy
space on otherwise negotiable dimensions. So I do not impose any boundedness of policy dimensions
either.
70
5.2. Implementation of the Simulation Process
propose the policy alternative at A’s boundary that comes closest to their ideal
point. Most segments of A’s boundary are defined by a single player’s indifference
curve. Consider B’s proposal. The shortest distance of B’s ideal point to A’s in-
difference curve is on the straight line that connects B and A. The intersection of
A’s indifference circle with the half-line (or ray)
−→
AB constitutes a rational proposal.
Any other policy would either be beyond A’s indifference curve or more distant from
B. The same logic applies to all combination of players. So for all combinations of
players {i, j} with i ∈ N and j ∈ N \ {i}, the intersection of i’s indifference curve
with the half-line
−−→
x˜ix˜j is considered to be a relevant policy.73
3. Now consider the right part of figure 5.1. There is a new player D and a three-
fourths majority voting rule. D’s expected proposal is at the northern edge of A. No
other socially accepted policy is closer to D’s ideal point. Hence, a third category of
relevant proposals is to be added. Any intersection point of two indifference curves,
as indicated by triangles in the figure, is considered to be a relevant policy.74
4. The status quo policy is added to the set of relevant policies for pragmatic reasons.
Games with very small social acceptance sets are prone to difficulties in the sim-
ulation model’s execution due to rounding errors. These technical difficulties have
been eased with the consideration of the precise status quo position as a relevant
policy. Under these circumstances, the status quo is almost identical to other esti-
mated relevant policy positions. So this last extension can be disregarded from a
theoretical point of view.
The set of relevant policies is defined as the set union of all players’ ideal positions, the
status quo position, all intersections of i’s indifference curve I(x˜i) with the half-line
−−→
x˜ix˜j












with i 6= j. XR includes all rational proposals but not all x ∈ XR are rational proposals.
Being a rational proposal is not a necessary but a suffient condition for a relevant policy
x ∈ XR. If ideal point and indifference curve estimates are right, there will be no socially
73 In this particular example, intersection points CA and AC could be disregarded because they are not at
a boundary of A. Point BA could be ignored if the set of relevant policies was restricted to indifference
curve intersections with line segments x˜ix˜j . In terms of computing time, the more general definition
turned out to be more efficient.
74 This includes intersection points outside A, non-boundary intersection points within A, and concave
edges of A. Again, a more restrictive selection would consume more computing time.
71
5. Simulation of Dynamic Policy Bargaining
accepted policy outside this set that is more preferred by any potential proposer under
complete information.
The precision of relevant policy estimates is limited only by the maximum number of
decimal places in the software’s computation process. At the same time, this new method
requires far less policy positions to be used for further computation than the standard
policy grid approach. With eight players, the number of relevant policies sums up to a
maximum of 121 as compared to 2601 in Duggan and Kalandrakis (2011)’s less precise
policy grid estimation.
In the following, I describe the applied procedure to derive the location of relevant
policies by linear algebra. Ideal policies and the status quo location are exogenously
determined and do not need to be derived. Intersection points depend on the size of
indifference curves. They have to be reestimated at each iteration stage in the simulation
process at minimum computational costs.
For each combination of players i and j, the intersection point xi,jint1 of i’s indifference
circle and half-line
−−→






where ri is the radius of i’s indifference curve as defined in equation 4.4 and |x˜ix˜j| is the
length of line segment x˜ix˜j. In terms of linear algebra, the vector that points from i’s
ideal point to j’s ideal point is rescaled to a length of i’s indifference circle radius. The
sum of this rescaled vector and i’s ideal point vector then defines the intersection point.
The intersection points of indifference curves are a little more complicated to derive.
Figure 5.2 illustrates all potential combinations of relative positions of two players’ indif-
ference circles:
1. In figure 5.2a, rA + rB < |AB|. Indifference curves do not overlap, so there is no
intersection point.
2. In figure 5.2b, rA + rB = |AB|. Indifference curves touch at a unique intersection
point C on the line segment AB. This intersection point is already covered by the
previous set of intersections between indifference curves and half-lines.
3. In figures 5.2c-d, |rA − rB| < |AB| < rA + rB. Indifference circles partially overlap
and there are two intersection points C and C’.
72
























Figure 5.2.: Intersection of indifference curves: Potential combinations of two indif-
ference circles. A, B: players’ ideal policies. C, C’: intersection points.
73
5. Simulation of Dynamic Policy Bargaining
4. In figure 5.2e, |AB| = |rA − rB|. Indifference curves touch at a unique intersection
point C on the half-line
−→
AB. In the special case of |AB| = |rA − rB| = 0 and
rA = rB, both indifference circles would be identical and there would be infinitely
many intersection points. Either way, there are no relevant policies to add that are
not already covered by the previous set of intersections between indifference curves
and half-lines.
5. In figure 5.2f, |AB| < |rA − rB|. B’s indifference circle is completely absorbed by
A’s indifference circle. There is no intersection point to be calculated.
Only in the case of |rA−rB| < |AB| < rA+rB (figures 5.2c-d) are there any intersection
points to add to the set of relevant policies. Basic geometry helps to determine the
positions of C and C’. Consider the dashed triangle in figure 5.2c. A and B are exogenously
given, |AB| can be derived. |AC| is the radius of A’s infifference curve and |BC| is the
radius of B’s indifference curve. So the lengths of all sides of the triangle are known.
The law of cosines gives
α = arccos
|AC|2 + |AB|2 − |BC|2
2 · |AC| · |AB| .
The length of the height then is |HC| = sin(α) · |AC|, where H is the foot of the height
on AB. The Pythagorean theorem gives |AH| =
√
|AC|2 − |HC|2 and the position of H
is determined by H = A + |AH||AB| (A−B).

















that turns a vector by pi/2 or 90◦ counter-clockwise. Then the position of C is given by
C = H + |HC||AH|R(pi/2)(H − A). Analogously, the position of C’ is determined by C’ =
H + |HC||AH|R(pi/2)(A− H).
The same procedure can be applied to preference constellations where β > pi/2 (see
figure 5.2d). If α > pi/2, the position of H will be determined by H = A− |AH||AB| (A−B) and
the otherwise unchanged procedure will be conducted. For any combination of ideal points
x˜i and x˜j with i, j ∈ N and i 6= j, the presented approach allows to derive indifference
curve intersection points {C,C’} at relatively low computational costs.
In summary, the set of relevant policies XR includes all players’ ideal points, the status
quo, all intersection points of a player’s indifference curve and the half-line from that
74
5.2. Implementation of the Simulation Process
player’s ideal point towards another player’s ideal point, and all intersection points of two
players’ indifference circles. The set of relevant policies is a theoretically determined a
priori reduction of policy space X. For a given set of indifference circles, XR includes all
players’ rational proposals. This will either be the player’s ideal point, if it lies within the
social acceptance set, or the most preferred socially accepted policy at the boundary of A,
else. With eight players, at most 121 positions are to be considered in further calculations.
Numerical strategy estimations based on XR are much more computing-time efficient than
previous dependence on policy grids.
Iterative Solution of Bargaining Equilibria
In line with Duggan and Kalandrakis (2011)’s estimation approach on a very similar
bargaining model, I estimate bargaining equilibria in an iterative procedure. Stationary
equilibria are defined by any self-consistent solution of equations 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7.
Since there may be multiple equilibria, the choice of reasonable starting values is decisive.
Strategic incentives make players adjust their sincere behavior. But players can reason-
ably be expected to start their thoughts about rational strategies from what they would
like to do if there were no constraints. So the initial, preliminary assumption of sincere
voting is the most natural starting point for an iterative estimation of strategy equilibria.
The iteration proceeds as follows.
1. Each player i’s continuation value is set to i’s status quo utility: υiσ
!
= ui(q).
This implies that i would compare any policy against the status quo only and vote
sincerely before strategic constraints come into play.
2. Player i’s utility function ui(x) is determined by x˜
i and the presumed υi(σ).
Indifference curves I(x˜) and the set of relevant policies XR are determined
accordingly.
3. Each player i’s acceptance set Ai is determined over all x ∈ XR and based on the
presumed υi(σ) (see equation 4.4).
4. The social acceptance set A is aggregated accordingly (see equation 4.5).
5. Each player i’s proposal strategy pii over XR is determined based on A and υi(σ)
(see equation 4.6). If there is more than one optimal proposal, the proposer is
assumed to randomly select among optimal proposals.
6. Each player i’s continuation value υi(σ) is determined based on pii and A (see
equation 4.7).
75






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.3.: Flip-flop iterations: Excerpt of an endless back-and-forth iteration process.
A-C: players’ ideal policies. Circles: indifference curves. P1/P2: player C’s
proposal strategies. Arrows 1-4: iteration steps.
7. Steps 2-6 are repeated at every subsequent iteration stage until the estimates of
all continuation values υ(σ) are equal to the estimated set of υ(σ) at a previous
iteration stage within a predefined degree of tolerance.75
For some preference constellations, a perfectly self-consistent solution, i.e. a stable
stationary equilibrium, can not be estimated with this procedure. Figure 5.3 illustrates
an example of such a constellation. At some point in the iteration process, player C is
expected to propose policy P1 if recognized. Based on this estimated proposal strategy,
continuation values, indifference curves, and acceptance sets are updated for players A
and B. In anticipation of a rather favorable proposal strategy, A’s updated indifference
circle is estimated to be smaller than at the previous iteration stage. In contrast, B’s
indifference circle is enlarged in light of the unfavorable proposal (step 1 in the figure). A
new social acceptance set results and C’s proposal strategy switches to P2 (step 2). Based
on the newly revised proposal strategy, A would be more willing to compromise and B
would be more demanding. Their indifference curves are readjusted accordingly at the
next iteration stage (step 3). Based on the updated social acceptance set, C’s proposal
strategy switches back to P1 (step 4). The iteration process would continue to flip-flop
75 There is a payoff between estimate precision and computing time. In mass simulations, final continu-
ation value estimates are precise to one decimal place.
76
5.2. Implementation of the Simulation Process
between these estimates without ever reaching a self-consistent solution at two subsequent
iteration stages.
This example illustrates a simple iteration flip-flop with one player’s estimated pro-
posal switching between two positions P1 and P2. More complex bargaining settings may
include more complex flip-flops. Estimates may recur over a higher number of iteration
stages. Whenever a previous set of estimated continuation values recurs in the iteration
process, equilibrium continuation values are approximated by the average estimates over
the sequence of circular iteration stages. Technically, the iteration process stops as soon
as all υi(σ) estimates at a new iteration stage τb are identical to the estimates of any
previous iteration stage τa within a predefined degree of tolerance. The estimate of υ(σ)
is averaged over all iterations τ ∈ {τa+1, . . . , τb}, where τa+1 is the iteration stage directly
following τa.
This solution might not deliver a perfectly stable equilibrium. For two reasons, this
downside of the estimation procedure can be neglected. First, the estimated continuation
value typically does not change much for most players in the course of such back-and-
forth iterations.76 So the estimate usually is a close approximation of a perfect stationary
equilibrium. With a typically high number of complete information games to be conducted
for the estimation of continuation values in incomplete information games, the relevance
of perfect estimate precision in complete information games further diminishes.
Second, the iteration procedure is more realistic than any abstract equilibrium that
is not attained from a natural starting point. Translated into the thought process of
real-life bargainers, the iteration process would read as follows: “I know all our ideal
preferences. If we all vote sincerely, only these option would gain a majority. So A would
like to propose..., B would propose..., and I would propose... Our interest in continued
bargaining then is... With this in mind, we would all vote strategically and propose... But
wait, then A has more to gain from prolonged negotiations than B. So his strategy really
is... and I should...” Real-world strategy-building is less about the very last decimal point
in precision and more about making one’s naive expectations consistent with everybody’s
strategic behavior.
In summary, continuation values in stationary equilibrium of the complete information
model are estimated in an iterative procedure. We start with the assumption of sincere
voting and update each player’s strategy until they are mutually consistent. If a perfectly
consistent equilibrium solution is not attained, the estimate will be approximated by
76 Results from a high number of manual runs of the iteration procedure prior to mass simulations
support this conjecture. With higher numbers of players, individual proposal strategies only have a
minor impact on total continuation values.
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the last set of iteration stages that lead to back-and-forth predictions. For each set of
input parameters, the simulation routine returns the vector of estimated continuation
values. The procedure is deterministic in that every repetition delivers the same output
for identical input parameters. The source code is attached in appendix A.1.
5.2.2. Simulating the Incomplete Information Model
Bargaining processes in the incomplete information model depend on initial parameters
and the partially random course of the game. Strategies are not stationary and players
learn from observed voting behavior. The random sequence of proposers can have a large
impact on the outcome and duration of negotiations. So a large number of repetitions
needs to be conducted for each set of initial parameters in order to gain reliable estimates.
Initial parameters are the number of players n, the majority threshold m, recognition
probabilities ρ, the discount factor δ, players’ ideological priors µ, the degree of uncertainty
s, and the status quo position q. At each period of the game, rational strategies are
defined by the coupled set of equations 4.9-4.22. An equilibrium is defined by a self-
consistent solution of these equations at each period of the game. In equilibrium, no
rational player has an incentive to deviate from predicted strategies, given the subjective
sets of information available in each period.
Since predicted strategies depend on previous observations, all periods of the game
are simulated separately in chronological order. Note that iterations in the estimation
procedure of the complete information game refer to the stepwise calibration of rational
strategies in stationary equilibrium. No actual bargaining course is simulated by these it-
erations. The estimation’s output simply gives rational continuation values to be expected
from such a game for each player. This will be different in the following simulation model
with incomplete information. A precise bargaining trail with concrete actions (proposals
and votes) is simulated based on rational expectations. The equilibrium is not just proven
but also “grown” (see p. 65). Repetitions of the following procedure refer to the passing
of durable bargaining periods rather than to an iterative estimation procedure.
The simulation procedure starts in period t = 1 and is set up as follows:
1. Ideal points and subjective expectations: Monte Carlo simulations gener-
ally conduct numerical computations on random draws from predefined probability
distributions. Accordingly, subjective expectations on player i’s ideal point are rep-
resented by a large set X iθ of random realizations of θi(x).
77 In the first period,
77 A high number of k = 500 potential ideal points is drawn for each player in mass simulations. This
number turned out to be a reasonable payoff between estimate precision and computing time.
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θi(x) corresponds to the normal distribution around i’s prior (see equation 4.11).
xiθ ∼ Nd(µi, s2) for all xiθ ∈ X iθ in the first period.
Player i’s real ideal position x˜i is assumed to be drawn from the same normal
distribution by nature (see equation 4.8). Technically, x˜i is randomly drawn from
X iθ so that the set of expected ideal points includes the actual one.
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2. Expected continuation values: For every realization xiθ of expectations on player
i’s ideal point, i’s expected continuation value Eυti(σ) in period t is estimated (see
equation 4.22). At least l > 30 complete information simulations are conducted for
each realization xiθ. Each of these simulations combines i’s presumed ideal point x
i
θ
with other all player j’s ideal points randomly drawn from Xjθ . Player i’s average
continuation value over all these complete information simulations estimates Eυti(σ)
for x∗i = x
i
θ.
A sufficient number l of simulated complete information games per presumed ideal
point xiθ is neccessary because the distribution of estimated continuation values is
left-skewed. The expected continuation value for a given xiθ is likely to be overes-
timated (i.e. biased upwards to a less negative level of utility) if estimated on the
basis of one random set of preferences only. The central limit theorem implies that
largely unbiased estimates can be achieved with a sufficient number of repetitions.79
In subsequent periods t > 1, expectations on some players’ ideal positions typically
are more precise than for other players. At least l complete information simulations
are conducted for every xθ ∈ Aθ. If the number of observation-consistent presumed
ideal points is reduced more for player i than for player j, continuation values for i’s
presumed ideal points will on average be estimated based on more than l complete
information simulations.
3. Continuation values: By definition, all players’ ideal points are included in the
set of presumed ideal points: x˜i ∈ Aiθ for all i. Thus, i’s continuation value υti(σ)
(see equation 4.20) is extracted from the results of the previous step.
4. Recognition of proposer: A proposer j ∈ N is selected with recognition proba-
bility ρj.
78 Since θ1i (x) = Nd(µi, s2) (equation 4.11), this procedure corresponds to a direct draw of x˜i from
Nd(µi, s2) from a theoretical perspective. With regard to the limited number k of numerical realiza-
tions, this procedure prevents technical estimation inconsistencies in the case of unlikely but possible
ideal positions far off the prior.
79 For mass simulations, l = 50.
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5. Set of potential proposals: Proposal and voting strategies are numerically esti-
mated and the policy space is represented by a limited set of proposals XP ⊂ X.
With incomplete information on players’ preferences, indifference curves are un-
known and the policy space can not be reduced to a small set of relevant policies.
With unbounded policy dimensions, a limited policy grid would exclude extreme
policies without theory-based justification. A very high number of potential pro-
posals is drawn from a normal distribution that approximates the distribution of
players’ ideal positions.80 This way, extreme outcomes are possible but estimated
proposals and outcomes will be more precise in the region where bargaining typically
takes place.
Players can not infer any information about each other’s ideal preferences from
the distribution of potential proposals. So the normal distribution’s dependence on
subjectively unknown ideal positions does not bias predictions.
6. Voting strategies: Proposer j’s voting strategy vti(x) over all x ∈ XP is determined
based on his utility function uj(x) and his continuation value υi(σ) (see equation
4.14).
7. Expected voting strategies: All other players’ expected voting strategies Evt(x)
as expected by the proposer j are estimated over Xθ \ Xjθ based on expected con-
tinuation values Eυt(σ) (see equations 4.15 and 4.16).
8. Expected social acceptance set: For each potential proposal x ∈ XP , the prob-
ability EAtj(x) of x gaining a majority as expected by proposer j is estimated (see
equation 4.17).
9. Proposal strategy: For all x ∈ XP , proposer j’s expected utility Eutj(x) is esti-
mated (see equation 4.18). The proposer then selects the most preferred proposal
ptj (see equation 4.19). If there is more than one most preferred proposal, the first
most preferred proposal in the random list of potential proposals is selected.
Two marginal modifications go beyond the theoretical model as defined in section
4.3. First, if no proposal x ∈ XP is expected to find a majority, j will randomly
propose a subjectively preferred proposal rather than any proposal. This assumption
hardly ever leads to an immediate aggrement. In only 0.01% of all mass simulation
repetitions did a majority of players agree on a proposal, when no proposal was
80 For mass simulations, 10 000 potential proposals are considered each round. The status quo position q
and the proposer’s ideal point x˜j are added to XP in order to improve predictive precision. Graphical
illustrations of hypothetical bargaining situations show that this number is sufficient to cover all
relevant regions of the policy space.
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expected to find a majority. The apparent logical inconsistency is explained by
technical rounding errors. In all of these cases, at least one player’s ideal position
was still as unknown as in the first bargaining period and the expected probability of
social rejection of the proposal was very close to zero. The assumption of proposing
a subjectively preferred rather than any policy in the case of expected gridlock
is justified by the marginal but existent technical (as well as human) degree of
imprecision.
Second, I assume a very small preference at the eighth decimal place for immediate
aggreement. This implies that the status quo will be proposed if it is the only
socially accepted outcome. Otherwise, the proposer’s expected utility would be 0
over all x ∈ XP and negotiations would continue virtually forever. This non-theory
based modification is a marginal attempt to account for the debatable assumption
of no opportunity costs.
10. Collective voting: All players’ voting decisions on proposal ptj are determined
based on their voting strategy (see equation 4.14). If at least m players agree, the
simulation procedure ends in period t with outcome ptj.
11. Updated expectations: If no majority has been reached, the simulation proce-
dure continues. For all presumed ideal points xiθ of all players i ∈ N , the consis-




j) is determined (see equation 4.12). All
observation-inconsistent presumed ideal points {xiθ|ωti(xiθ) = 0} are dropped from
X iθ. The simulation procedure advances to period t+ 1 and steps 2-11 are repeated
until a proposal is accepted by at least m players.81
Figures 5.4-6 visualize example bargaining processes as derived with the help of the
presented simulation procedure. Unanimity voting and a discount factor of δ = .9 are
assumed throughout. For each player, k = 100 presumed ideal positions are estimated.
Consider the first example in figure 5.4. There are three players with clearly distinguish-
able preferences. Player A has a “southern” prior and A’s ideal position can well be
estimated by the prior. B’s ideology is moderate and his ideal position is closer to A than
one would have expected in the first period. C has a very “northern” ideology but an
81 In mass simulations, a very small number of extremely durable simulated negotiations or “repetitions”
has been stopped at some point after period 200. At first, repetitions were continued until they reached
period 900. There was a gradual decrease in open repetitions over the whole range of periods. This
very late stage of bargaining processes depends on marginal differences in decimal places and the
assumption of no opportunity costs. It does not deliver any valuable predictions.
81










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.4.: Simulated Policy Bargaining with Incomplete Information: A three-
player unanimity example. SQ: status quo. Big letters A-C: players’ ideal
policies. Small letters A-C: ideal policies as presumed by proposer. Arrow:
proposal. +/-: voting decision. Line segments: proposal history.
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unexpectedly moderate ideal position on the issues at stake. The status quo is located
close to C.
In period 1, A is recognized and proposes a moderate policy. This is rational, given A’s
continuation value and the possibility of a rather south-eastern ideal position of C. Note
that A’s proposal would not be Pareto optimal if players were completely informed. In
the light of A’s more eastern subjective expectations on C’s preferences, the proposal is
strategically rational. A and B vote to accept the proposal, C denies. Players learn from
observed voting behavior. B’s agreement is not surprising, given his close position to A.
Obviously, C’s ideal point is less south-eastern than A would have hoped for. C’s denial
of A’s proposal is inconsistent with some of the presumed ideal points. So the set of C’s
presumed ideal points is reduced to the upper left region around his prior as depicted in
the “Period 2” picture.
In period 2, player B is recognized. His proposal is a little closer to C’s presumed
ideal points. Most of these presumed ideal points were close to the expected threshold of
agreement and B hopes to get C on board with a small degree of compromise. A and B
agree but C denies. Again, players learn from observed voting behavior. In period 3, B is
recognized again. Realizing that his last offer was not sufficient to win C over, he overs
more consession in a renewed proposal. Again, C rejects.
In period 4, C is recognized. He has not learned a lot about A’s and B’s ideal positions
since the first period. Their voting decisions have been consistent with almost any of their
presumed preferences. Proposer C utilizes his very privileged veto position between the
status quo and the other players’ presumed locations. He makes just enough concession
to win the other players’ expected approval. Players A and B agree. Bargaining ends in
period 4 and the outcome is almost identical to C’s ideal point.
Figure 5.5 illustrates another bargaining example with eight players. There is a high
degree of uncertainty and a very homogeneous set of ideologies. At the beginning, the
presumed preference setting is unclear. In period 1, A makes a proposal slightly north
of the status quo. All players except for H agree. Players learn from observed voting
behavior. In period 2, player H remains to be the only player who is considered to be
located south of the status quo.
Player F is the next proposer. Hoping for a rather eastern ideal preference of H, he
makes a proposal closer to his own ideal point. Preferences still are very unclear, so the
proposal is worth a try. Players A, G, and H deny. With each additional vote, players’
expectations get more and more precise. In period 5, player D finally makes a successful
proposal close to the status quo.
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Figure 5.5.: Simulated Policy Bargaining with Incomplete Information II: An
eight-player unanimity example. SQ: status quo. Big letters A-C: players’
ideal policies. Small letters A-C: ideal policies as presumed by proposer.
Arrow: proposal. +/-: voting decision. Line segments: proposal history.
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Figure 5.6.: Simulated Policy Bargaining with Incomplete Information III: A
more durable eight-player unanimity example. SQ: status quo. Big letters
A-C: players’ ideal policies. Small letters A-C: ideal policies as presumed by
proposer. Arrow: proposal. +/-: voting decision. Line segments: proposal
history.
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A more durable example with eight players is depicted in figure 5.6. Again, the perceived
preference constellation is very unclear in the beginning. With each period, players grad-
ually update their expectations. Proposals switch around a lot and it takes until period
12 to reach a unanimous decision. In the end, all players have a very precise understand-
ing of each other’s ideal position. Just one period before, the remaining uncertainty was
marginally higher and player H’s almost identical proposal has been rejected.
These examples make clear the complexity of bargaining behavior. A precise theory of
dynamic policy bargaining with incomplete information can be of enormous explanatory
power. Simulation techniques are a valuable instrument to predict the course of bargaining
processes.
More general hypotheses beyond the scope of particular examples need to be derived.
The simulation procedure is applied to mass simulations with a very high number of
repetitions. The selected starting parameters and simulation results are presented in the
following section. The complete source code of the simulation procedure with incomplete
information is attached in appendix A.2.
5.3. Simulation Results
The simulation setup for the bargaining model with incomplete information has been
described in the previous section. A total of 2.015.373 single bargaining processes is
simulated for a selected range of starting values. In this section, starting values and
simulation results are presented in order to derive theory-based hypotheses on bargaining
duration in FCC senate consultations.
5.3.1. Starting Values
Unlike analytical solutions, computational results only hold for the range of tested values
(Laver and Sergenti 2012, 6; De Marchi and Page 2008, 72; Morton 1999, 50ff). They
can not be generalized beyond the starting values chosen for bargaining simulations.82 It
is important to carefully define these parameters. Since all hypotheses will be applied to
senate consultations at the FCC, I choose ranges of starting values that correspond to
the assumptions made in section 4.1. Variable starting values are the number of players,
82 It is important to keep this in mind. For example, the bargaining model might lead to totally different
predictions in legislative bargaining settings with more veto players. A separate simulation study with
the same R code but different starting values would need to be conducted. A heavily reduced number
of simulation runs will be sufficient if a researcher is interested in outcome parameters like votes or
policy outcomes with less variance than for bargaining duration.
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the majority threshold, recognition probabilities, the set of prior positions, the degree of
uncertainty, the status quo position, and discount factors:
1. Number of players: Eight FCC judges typically participate in senate consulta-
tions. But the number of involved judges can go down to a minimum six. In 82% of
all simulation runs, I assume eight players. Another 7% of all bargaining simulation
runs is computed with six or seven players. Five, nine, or ten players are assumed
in all other cases for robustness checks at the margins. Results from these latter
simulations runs correspond to the general picture for 6-8 players and will not be
further discussed.
2. Majority Threshold: A simple majority is formally required in senate consulta-
tions. The effective threshold can be higher when there is a strong norm of con-
sensus. A majority threshold of five players is assumed in 46% of all eight-player
simulation runs. In another 46%, unanimity voting is assumed. The remaining
eight-player simulation runs are based on majority thresholds of six or seven players.
Since computational ressources are restricted, the majority threshold is not varied in
simulation runs with more or less than eight players. Unanimity voting is assumed
in these cases.
3. Recognition probabilities: Once the Votum is introduced, there is no fixed,
exclusive or privileged agenda-setter in senate consultations. Equal recognition
probabilities for all players are assumed throughout.
4. Prior positions: FCC judges are selected in a political procedure that heavily
favors candidates with moderate beliefs and value systems. In each simulation run,
each player’s prior position is randomly drawn from a normal distribution N (0, σ2)
for both dimensions separately. The prior distribution’s standard deviation σ varies
between simulation runs and is randomly drawn from a set {0, 1, 2, . . . , 100} with
equal probabilities. So the simulated bargaining settings vary in the level of policy
preference heterogeneity. In line with the center-biased political selection process of
FCC judges, the normal distribution implies that players’ priors are typically spread
around a common center rather than separated into extreme, clearly distinguishable
camps.
5. Degree of uncertainty: FCC judges know their colleagues well but they can
not perfectly predict each other’s precise notion on a case. In other words, there
typically is a moderate degree of uncertainty. In the bargaining model, each player’s
ideal position is drawn from a normal distribution around his prior with variance
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s2, the degree of uncertainty. For each simulation run, the standard deviation s is
randomly drawn from a set {0, 1, 2, . . . , 100} with equal probabilities.
6. Status quo position: The study focuses on FCC proceedings that object German
federal legislation. Hence, the legal status quo is determined by the German legis-
lator. The same political parties in the Bundestag and Bundesrat both select FCC
judges and adopt legal statutes. So the status quo is likely to be biased towards
the same political center as players’ prior positions.83 For each simulation run, the
status quo position is randomly drawn from normal distribution N (0, 50) on both
dimensions separately. Moderate status quo positions are input more often than
extreme positions.
7. Discount factors: FCC judges might have any kind of discount factors. If a policy
is only relevant for singular historical events (e.g. German Reunification), discount
factors will be low. If a policy has long-term implications, discount factors will be
close to 1. I do not impose any ex-ante restriction on the range of discount factors.
They are theoretically limited to a range of [0, 1). For each simulation run, the dis-
count factor is randomly drawn from a set {0, 0.02, 0.04, . . . , 0.98, 0.999999999}
with equal probabilities.
Mass simulations are computed based on this FCC-oriented set of starting values. The
simulated dataset is used to derive hypothesis on how these independent variables affect
bargaining duration. The results are discussed in the following section.
5.3.2. Hypotheses on Bargaining Duration
Predictions based on simulated data are valid for the selected range of starting values only,
as discussed in the previous section. Eight players and unanimity voting are the baseline
bargaining situation. Variations with less players, lower majority thresholds, varying prior
preference distributions, degrees of uncertainty, status quo positions, and discount factors
allow for analyzing effects on bargaining duration. Since recognition probabilities are
constant across all simulation runs, no agenda-setter effect can be inspected.
The dependent variable of interest is bargaining duration, defined as the number of bar-
gaining periods needed until a proposal is adopted. The minimum number of bargaining
periods is 1. The sequential bargaining game is infinite-horizon, so the dependent variable
83 Since a two-thirds majority is required, candidates for FCC judgeship depend on the support of both
christian and social democrats. Depending on the type of legislation and majorities in the Bundestag
and Bundesrat, federal legislation often does not require such a broad coalition. So the strength of
center-bias might be lower for status quo positions than for judicial priors.
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can take any positive integer value. The main research question is whether and how ju-
dicial policy bargaining affects the duration of FCC senate consultations. The analysis of
simulated data starts with a look at the relation between prior preferences and duration.
Preference Heterogeneity, the Status Quo, and Bargaining Duration
FCC judges’ prior policy preferences are generally assumed to be biased towards the
political center. Hence, judicial preference constellations can best be distinguished in
terms of preference heterogeneity.84 Technically, prior positions are drawn from a normal
distribution with a standard deviation that varies across simulation runs. For the following
analysis, preference heterogeneity is operationalized as the mean Euclidean distance of
players’ prior position to the average prior position of all players.85 The analysis of direct
effects is limited to prior preferences. Player’s case-specific ideal positions are partly
determined by the degree of uncertainty. It would be hard to disentangle preference and
uncertainty effects if we focused on case-specific ideal positions. The question of interest
is: How does prior preference heterogeneity affect the expected number of bargaining
periods?
Figure 5.7 illustrates the simulated relation of both variables for eight-player games
with unanimity voting. The upper graph depicts the shares of simulated bargaining
processes classified by the number of periods for each level of preference heterogeneity. The
continuous preference heterogeneity measure is rounded to integer values. If preference
heterogeneity is close to 0, about 60% of all simulated bargaining processes will last longer
than two periods and 20% of all bargaining processes will end in periods 3-5. If the mean
prior distance to the average prior position is about 80 Euclidean policy units, the first
proposal will be adopted in 20% of all cases. The diffuse jittering at the right end of
the graph is due to limited number of simulation runs. Relatively few runs have been
conducted for extremely high levels of policy heterogeneity so that predictions are less
precise for this range of starting values.
The predicted bargaining duration first increases and then decreases with preference
heterogeneity.86 But the pattern heavily depends on the location of the status quo. If the
Euclidean status quo distance to the average prior position is very small, the expected
84 If there was no center-bias, the number and relative strength of preference clusters might be more
suitable criteria to classify preference constellations.
85 This operationalization allows for a straightforward comparison to the “relative status quo position”
measure that will be introduced later. If preference heterogeneity was operationalized as the variance
or standard deviation of prior positions instead, or if it was based on Euclidean distance to the political
center 0, the main conclusions would be identical.
86 This result is robust for different numbers of players, discount factors, and levels of uncertainty. No
clear pattern emerges with reduced majority thresholds.
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Figure 5.7.: Preference Heterogeneity and Duration: Eight players, unanimity vot-
ing. The preference heterogeneity effect on bargaining duration is conditional
































































0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Figure 5.8.: Relative Status Quo Positions: Eight players, unanimity voting. Low
relative SQ positions are associated with central status quo policies and het-
erogeneous prior preferences. High relative SQ positions are associated with
distant status quo policies and homogeneous prior preferences.
bargaining duration mostly decreases with preference heterogeneity (see lower left chart in
figure 5.7). If the status quo distance to the average prior is large, preference heterogeneity
increases bargaining duration (see lower right chart in figure 5.7).
This clear result is remarkable. Preference heterogeneity clearly affects bargaining
duration. But the effect is conditional on the location of the status quo. Empirical scholars
have often stated general hypotheses on the effect of policy preference on bargaining
duration (see section 3.2) with a cursory reference to veto player theory. None of these
more or less ad-hoc explanations has revealed such a clear but conditional pattern. There
could be no better argument for the necessity of a sound theory than such non-obvious
insights.
A closer inspection of the simulated data reveals that the “peak” of long-lasting nego-
tiations in figure 5.7 simultaneously wanders from left to right with the selected level of
status quo distance. It seems like the status quo distance to the average prior is a good
measure to mark the turning point of the heterogeneity effect.





be the average prior position across all players. Then ci = ‖µi − µ¯‖ is





is the mean prior distance to the average prior. Let cq = ‖q − µ¯‖ denote the
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Euclidean distance of the status quo position to the average prior. Then the ratio of the
status quo distance to the mean prior distance is given by cq
cn
. For practical reasons, this
measure is rescaled by a monotonous transformation to a the interval [0, 1) and rounded
to steps of 0.02. The Relative Status Quo Position is defined as r = 1 − 2− cqcn . For
0 ≤ r < 1, the status quo is closer to the mean prior than players are on average. For
r > 1, players are closer to the mean prior on average than the status quo.
Figure 5.8 illustrates how this new measure combines information on players’ preference
heterogeneity and the status quo location in a single number. For each value of relative
SQ positions, the graph depicts the distribution of status quo distances and mean prior
distances in simulated bargaining processes with eight players and unanimity voting.87.
Dots indicate mean values of these distributions and vertical lines indicate inner 90%
ranges. As the relative SQ position approaches 0, the status quo is typically very close to
the average prior and players’ preferences are very divergent. With relative SQ positions
around 0.5, the status quo and players’ preferences are about equally dispersed. As the
relative SQ position approaches 1, the status quo is more extreme than most players’
preferences.
In the dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete information, the final outcome
partly depends on the random order of agenda setters and players’ subjective information.
There is no objective “core” of indefeasible status quos as in Tsebelis (2002)’ static veto
player theory. Nor does the relative status quo position perfectly define the boundaries
of such a complex, more-dimensional set. But the general idea may help to understand
the causal mechanism behind the conditional heterogeneity effect. The lower the relative
SQ position, i.e. the more centrally the status quo is located in relation to players’ prior
preferences, the more likely the status quo is surrounded by players’ ideal positions and
the sooner players will learn that there is no collectively preferred alternative to the status
quo. Players would then end the game by proposing and adopting the status quo policy.
A different mechanism is at work whenever the status quo is very distant to the set of
all players’ preferences. The larger the relative SQ position, the more likely the status
quo is far away from what players collectively prefer. They will soon realize that there
are feasible alternatives to the status quo. The more similar their ideal preferences are
in comparison to the status quo, the sooner they will realize their common interest, the
larger will be the individual utility from adopting any other player’s preferred policies
quickly, and the sooner a player will propose a socially accepted alternative. The more
divergent their preferences become (maintaining the outlying status quo), the larger will
be individual utility differences between potential policy alternatives and the higher will
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Figure 5.9.: Relative Status Quo Positions and Policy Outcomes: Eight players,
unanimity voting. Vertical bars: share of status quo decisions. Circles: mean
distance of the final outcome to the status quo.
be the incentive to find an even better but still socially accepted agreement in another
bargaining period. The policy alternative will ultimately replace the status quo.
The data depicted in figure 5.9 confirms this point.88 With low relative SQ positions
(e.g. r < 0.3), almost all simulated negotiations end with the adoption of the status quo
policy. Accordingly, the mean distance of the bargaining outcome to the status quo policy
is very low. In contrast, when the relative SQ position is high (e.g. r > 0.7), the status
quo policy is adopted in only one-fourth of all cases and the mean distance of the policy
outcome to the status quo is five times as high.
Figure 5.10 provides a very clear picture of how preference heterogeneity and the status
quo position collectively affect bargaining duration. Remember that extreme status quo
positions are associated with higher “relative SQ position“ values, whereas preference
heterogeneity decreases with relative SQ position values. The upper graph in figure 5.10
confirms the previous line of argument for unanimity voting with eight players. When
the status quo is centrally located inside the region of players’ prior preferences (r < 0.3),
preference heterogeneity decreases bargaining duration. When the status quo is very
distant to the region of players’ preferences (r > 0.7), preference heterogeneity increases
bargaining duration. At the turning point, when the status quo and players’ preferences
88 Similar results are obtained with less players. With lower majority thresholds, the general relation is
confirmed. But the pattern is less clear, since a policy can be adopted irrespective of the most extreme
players’ preferences that still heavily influence the relative SQ measure.
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Figure 5.10.: Relative SQ Position and Duration: Preference heterogeneity decreases
duration, when the status quo is very central. It increases duration, when
the status quo is distant. As the majority threshold decreases, the positive
preference heterogeneity effect becomes prevalent.
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are about equally dispersed (0.3 < r < 0.7), no clear pattern emerges. This conclusion is
robust for different numbers of players, varying levels of uncertainty, and discount factors.
The size of the effects increases with decreasing levels of uncertainty (see figure B.1 in
appendix B).
Until now, we have focused on the preference heterogeneity effect under unanimity
voting. The lower three graphs in figure 5.10 show how the majority threshold affects
our conclusions. As the majority threshold decreases, the ”peak“ or turning point of
the heterogeneity effect wanders to the left and the positive heterogeneity effect becomes
more prevalent. This is not surprising. The relative SQ position measure relates the
status quo position to the preference heterogeneity of all players. It is strongly determined
by preferences of extreme players who are likely to effectively veto moderate proposals
under unanimity voting. Under majority voting, these players’ consent is not needed for
proposal adoption. The relative SQ position measure then is a rather unreliable indicator
of whether a status quo can be replaced under majority voting. In fact, indefeasible
status quo policies hardly ever exist under majority rule. Whereas the status quo policy
is finally adopted in 58% of all simulated eight-player unanimity negotiations, players agree
on an alternative policy in 99,9% of all simulated eight-player games with simple majority
voting. This conclusion is in line with Tsebelis’ static veto player model, where increased
majority thresholds are associated with increased policy stability (Tsebelis 2002, 54).
As the majority threshold approaches simple majority voting, preference heterogeneity
increases bargaining duration.
In summary, the following hypotheses on bargaining duration are derived:
Hypothesis 1. Under unanimity voting, bargaining duration will increase with preference
heterogeneity if the status quo is very distant to the region of players’ prior preferences.
Hypothesis 2. Under unanimity voting, bargaining duration will decrease with prefer-
ence heterogeneity if the status quo is centrally located within the region of players’ prior
preferences.
Hypothesis 3. Under simple majority rule, bargaining duration increases with preference
heterogeneity.
Two more hypotheses are derived on the bargaining outcome:
Hypothesis 4. Under unanimity voting, the adoption of the status quo policy will be
more likely if it is centrally located within the region of players’ prior preferences than if
it is very distant to the region of players’ prior preferences.
Hypothesis 5. The adoption of the status quo policy is more likely under unanimity rule
than under simple majority.
95
5. Simulation of Dynamic Policy Bargaining
This paragraph has discussed the impact of preference heterogeneity and status quo
positions on bargaining duration. Four potential factors of varying bargaining duration in
the simulated dataset remain: The majority threshold, the number of players, preference
uncertainty, and the discount factor. The analysis of simulation results proceeds with a
look at the impact of majority thresholds.
Majority Threshold and Duration
The upper graph in figure 5.11 illustrates the bargaining duration of all simulated eight-
player games by majority thresholds. There are four different levels of majority thresholds:
either five, six, seven or all eight players are needed to adopt a proposal. The small number
of categories allows for a more detailed presentation of bargaining duration patterns in
this figure. The graph can be interpreted as a cross section to a contour line graph like
the one in figure 5.10. For each level of majority thresholds, a step function indicates the
proportion of unsettled negotiations in each period.89 Before period one, all negotiations
are pending. 23% of all unanimity cases end in period 1 and the unanimity step function
drops to 77%. Another 8% of all unanimity cases end in period 2, the step function drops
to 69%, and so forth.
The general picture is that bargaining duration increases with majority threshold.
Learning about other players’ preferences takes time. The higher the majority thresh-
old, the more sensitive a collective voting decision is to each subjectively misjudged ideal
position. 81% of all first-period proposals are accepted under simple majority rule. Virtu-
ally none of the simple majority bargaining games proceeds beyond period 4. In contrast,
only 47% of all unanimity games end within the first four periods.
Robustness checks for different levels of discount factors, degrees of uncertainty, and
relative status quo locations mostly confirm this conjecture (see figure B.2 in appendix B).
The two lower graphs in figure 5.11 depict the only two exceptions from this regularity.
Let us consider the left graph first. When the relative SQ position is low (r < 0.3),
unanimity games are settled faster than 7/8-majority games and, from period 5 onwards,
even faster than 6/8 majority games. This clearly visible exception from the rule can be
explained by the causal mechanism discussed in the previous paragraph. The positive
preference heterogeneity effect on bargaining duration is hardly affected by the status
89 Vertical 95% bootstrap confidence intervals have been computed. The width of these condidence
intervals is marginally greater for majority thresholds 6/8 and 7/8 than for simple majority and
unanimity voting due to a lower number of simulation runs. All confidence intervals hardly exceed the
line width of the printed step functions, so they are not displayed in the graphs. All clearly visible
differences between these step functions are statistically significant. The same is true for the step
function graphs in figures 5.12, B.2, and B.3
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Figure 5.11.: Majority Threshold and Duration: Eight-player games. Higher ma-
jority thresholds are typically associated with longer bargaining duration.
Exceptions occur with central status quo positions and high degrees of
uncertainty.
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quo position in majority games. However, as soon as unanimity is required, games with a
central status quo are settled quickly because players soon realize that there is no feasible
alternative to the status quo.
The same mechanism causes the exception in the lower right graph. If uncertainty is
very high, players’ ideal positions will be even more dispersed than their prior positions.
The status quo becomes more likely to be surrounded by veto player preferences in all
directions. In these cases, players will realize the anticipated gridlock and adopt the
status quo. The effect of high uncertainty on the likelihood of a subjectively perceived
indefeasibility of the status quo is rather indirect. Accordingly, the deviation from the
general pattern is less distinct than in the left figure. When games with low relative SQ
positions are exluded, the deviation completely diminishes.
The relatively small difference in bargaining duration between unanimity games and
7/8-majority games can be traced back to the same mechanism. For large SQ positions
(r > 0.7), the predicted increase in bargaining duration is similar to the differences
associated with an increase from 5/8 to 6/8 or from 6/8 to 7/8-majority thresholds (see
figure B.2).
The general result is that bargaining duration increases with the required majority
threshold. This does not hold true for unanimity voting if the relative SQ position is low
or the degree of uncertainty is very high. The following hypothesis is derived:
Hypothesis 6. If the status quo is not centrally located within the region of prior prefer-
ences, bargaining duration will increase with the required majority threshold.
Number of Players and Duration
Figure 5.12 displays the simulated association of the total number of players and bargain-
ing duration. The upper graph includes all simulated unanimity games with six, seven,
or eight players. No clear pattern emerges. Again, the effect is conditional on the relative
SQ position. If the relative SQ position is low, more players accelerate the bargaining
process (see the lower left graph). With more players involved, the chance of subjectively
recognizing policy gridlock is higher and players will adopt the status quo earlier. This ef-
fect is robust for variations in discount factors and uncertainty (see figure B.3 in appendix
B).
The opposite is true for relatively distant status quo policies. An increased number of
players then consistently leads to a slight increase of bargaining duration (see the lower
right graph). Players soon expect the status quo to be replaced by an alternative policy.
In order to make an optimal socially accepted proposal, players need to estimate more
ideal positions of other players. The chance of misjudging the ideal position of a required
98
5.3. Simulation Results














































rel. SQ pos. < 0.3







rel. SQ pos. > 0.7
Figure 5.12.: Number of Players and Duration: Unanimity voting is assumed
throughout. If the relative SQ position is low, more players will decrease
bargaining duration. The opposite is true for outlying SQ positions.
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Figure 5.13.: Uncertainty and Duration: Bargaining duration increases with the de-
gree of preference uncertainty.
veto player increases with each additional players involved. This effect is rather small and
vanishes with very high degrees of uncertainty.
The following hypotheses are derived:
Hypothesis 7. If the status quo is centrally located within the region of prior preferences,
unanimity bargaining duration will decrease with the number of players involved.
Hypothesis 8. If the status quo is very distant to the region of players’ prior preferences,
unanimity bargaining duration will increase with the number of players involved.
Uncertainty and Duration
Uncertainty is the key driver of bargaining duration (see section 3.3). Figure 5.13 re-
veals a very clear pattern for eight-player games with unanimity voting. If there is no
uncertainty, players will be completely informed about each other’s preferences and the
first-period proposal will be accepted. The higher the degree of uncertainty, the longer
will be the expected bargaining duration. Players learn from observed voting behavior.
With increasing uncertainty, they will need more time to adequately predict each other’s
preferences and to make socially accepted proposals. The positive relation is robust for all
simulated majority thresholds, numbers of players, discount factors, and relative status
quo positions (see figure B.4 in appendix B).
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The following unconditioned hypothesis is derived:
Hypothesis 9. Bargaining duration increases with the degree of uncertainty.
Discounting and Duration
The discount factor is a measure of how much importance players attach to future utilities
as compared to present utilities. Figure 5.14 illustrates the simulated effect of players’
discount factor on bargaining duration. The upper graph includes all simulated eight-
player unanimity games. The larger the discount factor, i.e. the more patient players
are, the longer will be the bargaining duration. The effect is rather moderate and most
pronounced when the discount factor is close to 1. It is robust for the number of players,
the level of uncertainty, and qualified majority threshold of 6/8 or 7/8 players (see figure
B.5 in appendix B).
The second row of graphs in figure 5.14 reveals a more distinguished picture. The posi-
tive discount effect on duration is strongest for high relative SQ positions and diminishes
with low relative SQ positions. When the status quo is very distant to the region of prior
preferences (r > 0.7), players broadly agree on the general direction of policy change. The
more distant the status quo, the higher will be the individual utility gain from adopting
any other player’s preferred policy. Even if a player expects to gain more preferable pol-
icy outcomes from continued bargaining, this additional gain is marginal compared to the
overall utility increase from replacing the status quo by any policy close to all players’
preferences. The more impatient a player is, the more willing he will be to compromise
within that region in order to replace the status quo immediately. In such a situation,
players’ acceptance sets increase with impatience. More potential policies become socially
accepted and minor misperceptions of other players’ preferences are less likely to affect
the ultimate adoption of a proposal.
This logic does not apply to bargaining situations with a more central status quo. Then
the status quo is close to expected alternative policy outcomes. There is less to gain from
immediate agreement. Players’ subjective continuation values do not differ a lot from
their status quo utilities. So the discount factor has little leverage. As the relative SQ
position decreases, expected future utility gains go down and players become more and
more indifferent between immediate settlement and continued bargaining. Hence, the
discount effect diminishes with decreasing relative SQ positions.
The mechanism is a little different under simple majority rule (see the last row of
graphs in figure 5.14). The first graph depicts all simulated eight-player games with simple
majority rule. The predicted bargaining duration first decreases and then increases with
the discount factor. Again, this is due to the different nature of bargaining situations with
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5/8, rel. SQ > 0.7
Figure 5.14.: Discounting and Duration: The discount factor will prolong bargaining
if the SQ is distant. Under simple majority voting, the discount factor will
decrease bargaining duration if the SQ is centrally located.
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central vs. distant status quo policies (cf. the remaining two graphs). When the status
quo is distant to a relatively homogeneous region of prior preferences (r > 0.7), bargaining
duration increases with player’s patience. Players broadly agree on the preferred direction
of policy change and expected utility gains are high. They will only opt for the the
chance of marginal improvements in continued bargaining if they hardly care about present
utilities. So the causal mechanism is the same as with similar bargaining setting under
unanimity voting.
When the relative SQ position is low (r < 0.3), players’ ideal positions are likely to be
spread around the status quo. Typically, no other policy alternative would be accepted by
all players. But some alternatives might be supported by a majority of players. Players
with disadvantageous policy preferences are likely to end up with a policy outcome they
prefer less than the status quo. Now their voting behavior strongly depends on the
discount factor. Assume that such a player faces a proposal that makes him slightly
less off than the status quo. He anticipates that future proposals might be even less
advantageous. He prefers the status quo over the present proposal and both of them
over expected future outcomes. If the discount factor is sufficiently low, he will reject the
proposal and accept even worse prospects in future bargaining in order to keep the status
quo for one more period. If the discount factor is high, he will accept the proposal in order
to prevent the risk of even higher losses in future bargaining. With increasing patience, he
will be more willing to compromise and the adoption of particular proposals becomes less
vulnerable to minor preference misperceptions. The expected bargaining duration then
is expected to decrease with the discount factor. The lower the majority threshold, the
more players are likely to be in such a disadvantageous position and the more pronounced
will be the effect. Based on the set of selected starting values, the negative discount effect
on duration turned out to be visible under simple majority rule only.
The size and direction of the discount effect is conditional on both the relative status quo
position and the majority threshold due to opposing causal mechanisms. The following
hypotheses are derived:
Hypothesis 10. If the status quo very distant to the region of players’ prior preferences,
bargaining duration will increase with the discount factor.
Hypothesis 11. If the status quo is centrally located within the region of players’ prior
preferences, the discount factor will not affect bargaining duration under unanimity rule.
Hypothesis 12. If the status quo is centrally located within the region of players’ prior
preferences, bargaining duration will decrease with the discount factor under simple ma-
jority rule.
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In this chapter, I have introduced a simulation procedure to derive hypotheses from
the dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete information. I have derived several
hypotheses on bargaining duration related to players’ preferences and the bargaining
setting. These hypotheses will be applied to the case of FCC senate consultations. They
are not generalizable beyond the range of selected starting values.
The results reveal a very distinguished picture of conditional hypotheses and opposing
causal mechanisms. For the range of starting values relevant in FCC senate consultations,
the degree of uncertainty generally prolongs the bargaining process. If the status quo is
distant, bargaining duration increases with preference heterogeneity, the majority thresh-
old, the number of players, and the discount factor. If the status quo is centrally located
in the region of prior preferences, duration decreases with preference heterogeneity un-
der unanimity rule and with the discount factor under simple majority rule. Preference
heterogeneity generally increases duration under simple majority rule.
Preference heterogeneity affects bargaining duration. But the effect is indirect and
conditional on the type of the bargaining situation. More divergent policy preferences
make bargaining situations with central status quo positions more likely. Depending on
whether the status quo is central or distant, marginal raises in preference heterogeneity
either accelerate or delay bargaining settlement. Empirical scholars of policy bargaining
duration should take the variety and conditionality of these conclusions seriously and






In part II, I have developed a dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete informa-
tion. Hypotheses on bargaining duration in FCC senate consultations have been derived
via simulation techniques. These hypotheses shall be tested on empirical data. I conduct
an event history analysis of FCC senate proceedings with reference to federal legislation
from 1972-2008. The dataset on FCC senate decisions is linked to an existing dataset on
German federal legislation so that policy-related information is available.
The present chapter introduces the research design including case selection (section 6.1),
the statistical model of analysis (section 6.2), and choices of operationalization (section
6.3). Empirical results will be presented in chapter 7.
6.1. Case Selection
The FCC sometimes combines separate pending proceedings to a conjoint proceeding,
when they refer to similar or identical issues. In such a case, judges bargain about a
common solution to all proceedings in a single policy space. The outcome is published in a
single decision on the merits (Hauptentscheidung). So conjoint proceedings are treated as
one and the same bargaining process. In the following, I refer to (conjoint) proceedings as
identified by a published decision on the merits as “proceedings” and to initially separate
proceedings as identified by unique file numbers as “initial” or “partial” proceedings.
A senate’s final decision on the merits marks the end of a proceeding. Closed senate
proceedings are the unit of analysis.
The analysis includes all proceedings that have been filed before 2009, decided, and
resulted in a published decision on the merits between January 1972 and August 2014.
The set of cases is further reduced to proceedings on constitutional complaints (file number
reference BvR), concrete judicial reviews (BvL), abstract judicial reviews (BvF), and
disputes between constitutional bodies (BvE), where at least one federal law is fully or
partially objected. I will briefly discuss these selection criteria.
• The FCC’s greatest power is to effectively declare a law unconstitutional. FCC
consultation outcomes are most relevant whenever a proceeding might result in
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such a decision. Chambers do not have the power to annul legal statutes. Plenary
decisions are binding for the submitting senate in answering the initial proceeding.
But they rarely occur and only a senate can come to an externally binding decision
(Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 82). Therefore, I focus on senate decisions only.
• There are numerous kinds of senate decisions dealing with procedural aspects of a
case. This includes the recusal of judges, directives of enforcement, and reimburs-
ment of expenses. None of these aspects directly affects legal norms. Temporary
injunctions might be targeted against a legal norm. But they typically refer to pre-
liminary measures until a decision on the merits is made. The inherent time pressure
of temporary injunctions would make it hard to compare their bargaining dynamics
and duration with the standard case of policy bargaining. Therefore, the analysis is
limited to decisions on the merits, where potential long-term consequences for
the legal status quo are typically determined.
• The analysis considers published decisions only. Obviously, non-published de-
cisions would be hard to observe. This criterion is not a big constraint, though.
Senate decisions are generally published in the official Collection of FCC Decisions
(BVerfGE). Judges might have excluded particular decisions from being published
(§31 GOBVerfG Abs. 2; Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 167). But these decisions
are unlikely to affect politically relevant issues. It is hard to imagine how the Court
could keep a politically salient decision secret. The FCC has an interest in mak-
ing decisions public. If a decision with regard to a legal norm was not known of
outside the Court, it would not have any effect. Published decisions are collected
from BVerfGE (2012) and complemented by more recent decisions from the FCC
(2014b)’s online decision database.
• The set of cases is limited to proceedings that have been filed before 2009. Deci-
sions on proceedings that have been filed in 2009 or later are excluded for method-
ological reasons. The inclusion of more recent but already closed proceedings would
have caused a selection bias on the dependent variable towards less durable proceed-
ings (see section 6.2 for details). For conjoint proceedings, I require that the oldest
initial proceeding has been filed no later than in 2008 as indicated by file numbers.
• The data contains decisions made between 1972 to August 2014. Older
decisions are excluded for two reasons. The first reason is data availability. Some
information beyond the published decision document is not available for very old
FCC decisions. E.g., the legislation database that I will refer to only dates back to
the 7th election period of the German Bundestag.
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Second, the selected time period largely ensures institutional stability. Important
institutional changes with a potentially large impact on the nature of FCC bar-
gaining processes had been enacted just before the selected time frame. The Fourth
Reform of the Federal Constitutional Court Act in 1970 set the total number of FCC
judges to 16, abolished the possibility of re-election, fixed the length of a judge’s
term to 12 years and introduced the legal possibility of published Sondervoten.90
Due to numerous previous reforms, the FCC had been under virtually permanent
institutional change before.
In 2011, the German legislator amended the Federal Constitutional Court Act and
introduced the instruments of delay objection (Verzo¨gerungsru¨ge) and delay com-
plaint (Verzo¨gerungsbeschwerde)91 against the FCC in the Legal Protection in Over-
long Court Procedures Act92. These new means allow parties to the proceeding to
sue the FCC for a fair compensation out of the Court’s budget if the proceeding
is delayed by at least 18 months. The Court itself decides on these complaint pro-
cedures in a complaint chamber (Beschwerdekammer) of four FCC judges and the
rapporteur is to provide a formal statement on the delay. It is unclear how this
amendment will affect FCC proceedings in practice. FCC judge Wilhelm Schlucke-
bier (2012) considers the legal commitment to be a yet unresolved challenge to the
Court. A time-dependent control dummy variable will account for potential effects
on duration by this recent institutional reform.
• A decision is only considered if at least one federal law is objected by the
plaintiff or complainant. The objection might affect single parts of a law or the
entire statute. For decisions on conjoint proceedings, at least one partial proceed-
ing is required to object to a law. This criterion mainly excludes a large number
of constitutional complaints against ordinary courts’ decisions (Urteilsverfassungs-
beschwerden) that typically refer to particular circumstances of minor political rel-
evance. The reference to legislative norms ensures that the proceeding is about
policy-related issues rather than about procedural formalities at lower courts. Ob-
jected federal laws from 1972 onwards are directly linked to an existing database of
federal legislation.
• The case selection is further reduced to constitutional complaint, concrete or ab-
90 Viertes Gesetz zur A¨nderung des Gesetzes u¨ber das Bundesverfassungsgericht of Dec 21, 1970 (BGBl
I, 1765).
91 §§ 97a - 97e BVerfGG; see also Benda, Klein and Klein (2012, 512ff) and Schlaich and Korioth (2012,
233ff).
92 Gesetz u¨ber den Rechtsschutz bei u¨berlangen Gerichtsverfahren und strafrechtlichen Ermittlungsver-
fahren of November 24, 2011 (BGBl I, 2302).
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stract judicial review, and dispute between constitutional bodies proceedings. This
effectively excludes two proceedings on different forms of action. The first refers to
two disputes between the federation and the La¨nder (Bund-La¨nder-Streit ; BVerfGE
105, 185 - 2 BvG 1, 2/01). The second involves other public law disputes (andere
o¨ffentlichrechtliche Streitigkeiten; BVerfGE 49, 10 - 2 BvH 1/76). These forms of
action might not be directly comparable to other cases. The additional degrees of
freedom from these cases would be completely exhausted by two dummy variables
controlling for the form of action. These proceedings would not add any explanatory
value and are disregarded in the following.
6.2. Event History Analysis
The duration of FCC senate proceedings is the dependent variable of interest. Explanatory
variables include time-variant data. Potential selection bias might occur at the lower and
upper ends of the selected time period. Event history analysis is the method of choice
because it is designed deal with these methodological challenges.93
In event history analysis, a hazard function is estimated. For each time interval, the
hazard function expresses the probability of an event, given that the event has not occured
before this time interval. In the present analysis, the final decision on the merits is the
only relevant “event”. It is unique for each proceeding and marks the end of bargaining
duration. So the hazard function gives the probability of a proceeding being decided
within a specified time interval, given that it is still pending at the beginning of this
interval.
There is no theoretical reason to assume a specific form or time-dependence of the haz-
ard function. Following Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004)’s recommendation, I regard
time dependency of the hazard function as “statistical nuisance” and opt for a non-
parametric model. A Cox proportional hazards model is applied.94 The study focuses
on whether and how policy bargaining factors affect bargaining duration in FCC senate
proceedings. My approach is factor-centric (Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2011). Rather
than aiming at an all-encompassing explanation of duration in FCC proceedings, I am
interested in the effect of policy preferences and other policy bargaining-related factors
93 See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) and Hosmer, Lemeshow and May (2008) for application-
oriented introductions to event history modeling. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) provide a com-
pact overview for political scientists. The method originates from biostatistics and has successfully
been applied to duration data in political science (e.g. Martin and Vanberg 2003; Warwick 1994).
94 The sample is sufficiently large and there is enough empirical variation in senate proceeding duration
to justify this choice. No more than three decisions (i.e. 0.4% of all cases) share identical values on
the dependent variable. Ties are not an issue.
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on bargaining delay. The underlying baseline hazard is not of major interest and the Cox
proportional hazards model is a reasonable choice.
Dealing with duration data, careful case selection is necessary to avoid substantial
selection bias on the dependent variable. Consider the lower end of the time period first.
If all senate decisions from 1972 onwards were equally considered in the analysis, the data
would be biased towards more durable decisions in the 1970s. E.g., a proceeding that
entered the Court in 1968 and that was decided on the merits in 1973 would be included
in the dataset. But a proceeding that was filed at the same time and decided in 1970
would not be included in the dataset. Statisticians speak of “left truncation” (Klein and
Moeschberger 2003, 72f): cases that experience the event before the selected time interval
of observation would not be considered in the analysis and results would be biased.
One alternative would be to select proceedings based on their dates of receipt instead
of their dates of decision. The earliest date of receipt in the dataset is in December 1966.
Dates of receipt for senate decisions from 1966-1970 are not available. Numerous cases
would need to be dropped from the analysis. Therefore, I opt for the second alternative
and modify the statistical analysis. The number of days that have passed between a
proceeding’s date of receipt and January 1, 1972 are defined as the case’s “age” at study
entry. The case is treated as left-censored for further analysis. For example, a proceeding
that was filed 50 days before January 1, 1972 merely affects the estimated hazard function
on the time interval from 51 days onwards. Predicted hazard rates over the first 50 days
of a proceeding are not affected. This method allows to make most efficient use of the
available data without risking systematic bias (Cain et al. 2011).
A different approach is required at the upper end of the selected time period. Data is
currently available for all proceedings that have been decided until summer 2014. The
inclusion of all these proceedings would cause a substantial bias towards less durable
proceedings for recent years. Proceedings that were filed in 2011 would only be included
in the dataset if they were finished within three years. The inclusion in the study would
be conditional on the dependent variable and hazard rates would be overestimated. Data
on pending proceedings is not available. So the only methodologically correct way is to
select on the date of receipt at the upper end.
Proceedings are included if they were filed no later than 2008 and decided by 2014. For
conjoint proceedings, the earliest date of receipt among all initial proceedings is considered
(see section 6.1). According to the FCC’s yearly statistics, eight constitutional complaints
and one concrete judicial review proceeding from before 2009 were still pending at the
end of 2013 (FCC 2014a). The first senate has decided at least one of these constitutional
complaints in the meantime (1 BvR 3217/07). In August 2014, this leaves at most four
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pending constitutional complaints from 2008 and one concrete judicial review from 2008
in the first senate. In the second senate, at most one constitutional complaint from 2007
and two constitutional complaints from 2008 might still be pending. Most constitutional
complaints are closed by chambers, even if they have been pending for a long time. In
addition, many of these proceedings do not target a federal law. Either way, they would
not be included in the study. Overall, the remaining risk of selection bias is marginal.
A maximum of eight falsely excluded cases would not cause substantial bias in the light
of 694 cases in total. The actual number of false exclusions is likely to be lower or even
non-existent.
6.3. The Data
The data is mainly collected within the DFG-funded project “The Federal Constitutional
Court as a Veto Player”.95 The project’s database includes FCC senate decisions from
1972-2010. I have extended this dataset by additional variables and by 14 decisions
from 2011-2013. No decision from January-August 2014 fulfills all selection criteria for
my study. Decision-related information is mostly collected from the Collection of FCC
Decisions (BVerfGE 2012) and from the Court’s website for more recent decisions (FCC
2014b).
In the following, I will discuss the structure of the study’s underlying dataset (section
6.3.1) as well as operationalization choices for the dependent variable (section 6.3.2), and
for independent variables (section 6.3.3).
6.3.1. Data Structure
Figure 6.1 describes the basic data structure and its multi-level setup. The example case
is a conjoint proceeding on income tax subsidies. It is identified by the first senate’s
decision on the merits on November 11, 1989. The decision has later been published on
pages 108ff in volume 81 of the Collection of FCC Decisions (BVerfGE 81, 108). Decision-
related information like the responsible senate, participating judges, the date of decision
etc. is added. The analyzed dataset comprises at total of 694 senate decisions. This
includes 444 first senate decisions and 250 second senate decisions.
The example decision in figure 6.1 refers to two initial proceedings with file numbers
“1 BvR 1402/87” and “1 BvR 1528/87”. Initial proceedings are identified by unique file
numbers. The first digit specifies the senate. “BvR” is an acronym for constitutional com-
plaints. The last number relates to the year of receipt. “1402” and “1528” are consecutive






















































Figure 6.1.: Basic Data Structure: The example decision refers to a conjoint proceed-
ings of two constitutional complaints. Both complainants object to the same
federal law. The FCC decision database is linked to the GESTA database of
German federal legislation. *The date of receipt is estimated.
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numbers to specify docketed proceedings. The first complaint was filed on November 20,
1987, shortly after the objected Federal Finance Court decision. Based on the file number,
the second complaint is estimated to be filed on December 15, 1987.96 Both complainants
are private individuals. Information related to the initiation of proceedings like the date
of receipt and the form of action is added at this level of the database.
Both complainants objected to a number of measures as listed in the decision’s rubrum.
The set of objected measures defines the Court’s external agenda and relevant policy issues
in a proceeding.97 The first complainant targets against a prior notice and a decision by
the Federal Finance Court in 1987. He indirectly objects to the removal of §34(4) Income
Tax Act that used to grant reduced income tax tariffs for auxiliary income from scientific,
artistic, or literary activities. The Bundestag has removed this subsidy by adopting Art.
10 No. 3b Subsidy Reduction Act of June 26, 1981. The second complainant, a married
couple, objects to a decision by the Finance Court Cologne of November 3, 1987. They
indirectly object to the same legislative measure as the first complainant. Both complaints
target the same policy issue and the joining of both initial proceedings is comprehensible.
Information on the dates and types of objected measures is collected at this level of the
database. There is a total of 1316 initial proceedings in the analyzed dataset. This
includes 631 constitutional complaints, 597 concrete judicial reviews, 68 abstract judicial
reviews, and 20 disputes between constitutional bodies. The FCC has connected 863 of
these initial proceedings to 241 conjoint proceedings. 453 decisions refer to single file
numbers only. 48 proceedings are left-censored because they were filed at the FCC before
1972.
Finally, objected measures with reference to federal law are linked to an external leg-
islation dataset. If a complainant or plaintiff explicitly objects to particular articles or
paragraphs of a federal law separately, these objections will be coded as separate mea-
sures. If he objects to a legal norm “in conjunction with” (i.V.m., in Verbindung mit)
one or more other legal norms, the conjunction will be coded as a single measure. Fol-
lowing Ho¨nnige and Gschwend (2010)’s initiation, these objected federal law measures
are linked to Burkhart (2008)’s GESTA dataset, which contains comprehensive data on
German federal legislative processes from 1972-2005. The GESTA dataset includes both
failed legislative initiatives and ultimately announced legislative acts but only ultimately
96 The exact date of receipt is not available. Another initial proceeding with file number “1 BvR 1527/87”
(BVerfGE 79, 80) was filed on Dec 15, 1987. So the date of receipt for “1 BvR 1528/87” can be
estimated with a relatively high degree of precision. See section 6.3.2 for more information on the
coding rule. In this case, the date of receipt is estimated for presentation purposes only.
97 The FCC occasionally reviews and comments on measures that were not explicitly objected by the
complainant or plaintiff. Complete and reliable data on these measures would be hard to collect.
Unobjected but reviewed measures seem to be a rare exception and are not considered in the analysis.
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announced acts are linked. Burkhart’s dataset is extended to the 16th legislative period
2005-2009 in order to account for more recent legislation.98
Objected measures in the area of federal legislation typically refer to a legal situation
at a given point in time rather than to legislative action. Oftentimes, a law has been
introduced and amended several times before it is objected in a FCC proceeding. In the
example case, complainants directly target the legislative amendment act that has caused
the alleged violation of the Basic Law. The legislative process that resulted in the named
amendment act as announced in the 1981 Federal Law Gazette volume I, pages 537ff
(BGBl I, 537) is linked. In other cases, complainants or plaintiffs merely target a legal
norm without reference to specific legislative act.
A general coding rule is provided: Objected legal norms in the area of federal legislation
are linked to the most recent legislative act that has amended, revised, or introduced the
objected legal norm in a way that is relevant to the proceeding. If no case-relevant point
in time is specified, the time of objection is decisive. In this legislative process, the
legislator has determined, changed, or at least confirmed the legal status quo, which is
relevant to the dynamic policy bargaining process in the proceeding. Frequent examples of
non-relevant amendments are fine-related currency conversions from D-Mark to euro, the
renaming of responsible ministries, and amendments of non-objected passages or wordings
in the statute. The published reasoning of a decision with comments on the matter of
dispute, the legal situation and legal history as well as the Federal Law Gazette are the
most important sources to identify relevant amendments. Relevance to the proceeding is
assumed in cases of doubt. The linked data provides reasonably valid data on the location
and controversiality of the case-relevant status quo policy.99
The analyzed dataset includes a total of 2916 objected measures. Out of 2126 measures
that relate to federal legislation, 1591 are linked to the extended GESTA dataset. The
remaining 535 objected but unlinked measures relate to federal legislation that is not
captured by the GESTA dataset. This includes legislative processes prior to the 7th
legislative period, one legislative act from 1977, and three legal norms originating from
the former German Democratic Republic (DDR). 136 GESTA entries connect to at least
one objected measure. Ordinary court decisions are objected 585 times. 12 objected
measures relate to La¨nder legislation. The remaining measures comprise administrative
and other acts or public authority.
For event history analysis, all legislation-, measure-, and file number-related information
98 Credit is due to Christian Stecker and Philipp Broniecki who have done most of the extension work.
99 The FCC typically reviews the constitutionality of a norm in the objected version or at a given point
in time only. Even if it also decides on more recent amendments enacted after the objection has




is aggregated to the (conjoint) proceeding-, i.e. the decision on the merits-level. The
dataset is then transformed to long format so that time-variant explanatory variables can
be specified. Each row in the ultimate data matrix refers to the case-time combination of
a proceeding and a one-day time interval during the course of that proceeding. Detailed
information on concept operationalization and rules of aggregation is presented in the
following.
6.3.2. Dependent Variable: Duration
Until recently, there was hardly any public data on the duration of FCC available. Pub-
lished senate decisions reveal the date of decision on the merits. With very few exceptions,
dates of receipt for incoming requests could only roughly be approximated from file num-
bers. Thanks to the effort of diligent FCC staff, a long list of dates of receipt collected
from historical records is now available for scientific investigation. This is the first study
to analyze the rich source of information.
Until now, the Court’s newly released data covers file number-related dates of receipt on
senate decisions in the time period from 1971-2003. For 546 initial proceedings, the date
of receipt of original files in the Court’s office is collected from these records. The FCC has
only recorded the first file number’s date of receipt for most conjoint proceedings. This
typically is either the most central initial proceeding to a decision or, if all requests are of
similar importance, the earliest file number of a decision.100 Either way, the recorded date
of receipt provides a good measure of when the main issue of a case has first been docketed
so that judges can start to find a decision. At least one date of receipt is available for 538
decisions on the merits in the analyzed dataset.
For all remaining proceedings - mainly those from 2004 onwards -, dates of receipt are
added in the following order. First, the German Bundestag’s Data Guide lists dates of
receipt for all FCC proceedings from 1951-2012 that were initiated out of the Bundestag
(Bundestag 2014; Schindler 1999). The data is consistent with the Court’s record. Dates
of receipt are added from this source for eight initial proceedings. Second, the date
of receipt is mentioned in some decisions’ published reasoning. This source contributes
precise dates to an additional 16 proceedings. Third, the online press archives of the
Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung and the tageszeitung add dates of receipt for four abstract judicial
reviews. Fourth, dates of receipt are estimated for the remaining cases.
Concrete judicial reviews enter the FCC on average 51 days after the ordinary court’s
order of suspension and referral (Aussetzungs- und Vorlagebeschluss).101 Dates of receipt
100This conjecture is confirmed by a random sample of recorded file numbers that I have compared to
the respective conjoint proceedings in the decision dataset.
101Dates of orders of suspension and referral are published in the rubrum of FCC decisions. This average
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for 100 concrete judicial reviews are estimated accordingly. For the remaining proceedings,
I refer to file numbers.
Let us consider constitutional complaints first. In most cases, the BvR-file number
is consistent with the recorded order of received complaints. Let “1 BvR 354/01” be a
complaint to be estimated. Then the closest complaints submitted before and after this
file number in the same year and senate, of the same type, and with a known date of
receipt are determined. Assume that dates are available for “1 BvR 295/01” received
on March 3 and “1 BvR 380/01” on April 24, 2001. A uniform distribution of incoming
requests is assumed, so the estimated date of receipt for our constitutional complaint
would be April 8, 2001. The same procedure is applied for all remaining dates yet to be
estimated. If, as a rare exception, the closest proceeding points to a date of receipt in a
different year, the next closest complaint will be referred to. If there is no lower reference
proceeding available, the constitutional complaint with consecutive number “1” will be
assumed to be filed on January 1. If there is no higher reference proceeding available, the
total number of received constitutional complaints in the respective year and senate is
collected from the FCC (2014a)’s online statistics or from Bundesministerium der Justiz
(1998)’s report. The last complaint will be assumed to be received on December 31. 126
dates of receipt for constitutional complaints are estimated this way. Dates for three
abstract judicial reviews are estimated by a similar procedure.102
At least one recorded or estimated date of receipt is now available for all decisions on
the merits. A case’s duration is operationalized as the time difference in days between
the earliest recorded or estimated date of receipt and the ultimate date of decision on
the merits. On average, a senate proceeding in the analyzed dataset lasts 3 years and 2
months with a standard deviation of 2 years and 3 months. The total range is from 12
days (BVerfGE 82, 322) to 4355 days (BVerfGE 89, 132 and BVerfGE 89, 144).
A critical comment on the duration measure’s content validity is needed. The policy
bargaining model is tailored to explain the duration of senate consultations. Ideally,
bargaining duration would be measured as the time period between the rapporteur’s
introduction of the Votum and the final decision on the merits (see section 2.5). This
would exclude potentially long time periods of case preparation by the administration,
time period is computed based on the available data. The concrete judicial review proceeding with
file number “2 BvL 10/82” was filed 1399 days after the respective order of suspension and referral.
As an extreme outlier, it is excluded from calculation of the average. The average time period would
have been 55 days, otherwise. The estimated time period is robust for classifications by decade or by
federal vs. lower courts.
102The New Year’s Day and New Year’s Eve-assumption was slightly adjusted for these proceedings in
order to account for the lower number of abstract judicial reviews per year.
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the rapporteur, and involved judges. Since senate consultations are confidential, no such
data is available. Instead, I measure the time period between the receipt of original files
in the Court’s office and the decision on the merits.
How does this affect measurement validity of my measurement? Random comparisons
of the date of receipt to the partially available date of a proceeding’s allocation to a
rapporteur suggest that the administration typically forwards incoming request within
few days. Administrative delay does not seem to be an issue. Complaints will enter the
General Register only if they are obviously inadmissable or if they lack any chance of
success. Even if a complainant insists on a decision by a judge, these complaints will
most likely be closed by a chamber. Hence, I do not expect any major bias caused by the
General Register either.
Constitutional complaint and concrete judicial review proceedings might have been
in chamber consultation before they entered the senate. Even if the rapporteur has
underestimated a proceeding’s controversiality and opted for chamber consultation, the
small group of three experienced judges would soon realize that there is no consensus and
pass the proceeding to the entire senate. Chambers do not seem to be a major cause of
delay in senate proceedings. Form of action-specific dummy variables will control for the
formal possibility of chamber consultation.
Most of the non-senate consultation-related delay is likely to occur at the stage of
rapporteur preparation. The rapporteur enjoys large discretion on when to introduce
a case. The work pace of FCC judges is said to vary a lot (Kranenpohl 2010, 486).
E.g., former FCC president Gebhard Mu¨ller allegedly complained about lazy colleagues,
whereas Wolfgang Zeidler, one of his successors, is said to be a particularly hesitant
judge (Lamprecht 2011, 90-97, 180). Unfortunately, the FCC does not publish data on
rapporteur assignments that would allow for controlling this factor (Menzel 2011, 11).
The rapporteur stage may cause a large proportion of unexplained variance in overall
duration. But I do not expect systematic bias affecting the direction of preference-related
effects. The more durable and intense a rapporteur expects a senate consultation to be,
the more time he will invest into case preparation. A judge’s general pace is independent
from case-specific bargaining settings and can be regarded as random noise. If a major
cause of senate bargaining duration is also related to delay in the rapporteur’s preparation
phase, it is likely to be in the same direction. A salience measure is included to control
for the preponement of high-priority cases.
Senate bargaining duration is operationalized as the time period between a proceeding’s
earliest recorded or estimated date of receipt and the date of decision on the merits. This
measure is imperfect but the best available. It is more precise than any previous data
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on FCC proceeding duration. Control variables are included. There is substantial risk of
underestimating the size of effects. A closer look at rapporteur incentives and the typical
course of a proceeding suggests that the measurement is unlikely to bias the direction of
predicted effects.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 refer to the adoption of the status quo as the dependent variable.
The falsification of these hypotheses remains up to future research. FCC decisions have
been hand-coded within the DFG project into four outcome categories from the plaintiff’s
or complainant’s perspective: “no success”, “partial success”, “full success”, and “other”.
One could argue that a non-success of the plaintiff typically indicates a status quo adoption
by the FCC. However, in only eight out of 694 senate decisions under study has the plaintiff
been coded as being completely unsuccessful in all partial proceedings. Such a limited
variation in the dependent variable does not allow for a meaningful statistical analysis.
The focus of this study is on bargaining duration and the development of a more direct
measure to test hypotheses 4 and 5 is left for future analyses.
6.3.3. Independent Variables
All remaining hypotheses from section 5.3 shall be tested empirically. This section intro-
duces empirical measures for each explanatory variable: the status quo position, prefer-
ence heterogeneity, the number of judges, the majority threshold, preference uncertainty,
and the discount factor. The section concludes with a set of control variables in order to
prevent biased estimates. Table 6.1 (p. 134) gives an overview on all variables and their
measurements.
Status Quo Position
Hypotheses 1-8 and 10-12 are conditional on the position of the legal status quo in relation
to judges’ preferences. I am not aware of any available measure that provides spatial
policy positions for the whole set of German federal laws. It would be even harder to
locate particular laws and empirical policy preferences of FCC judges on the same scales.
Hence, there is no direct measure to the concept of relative status quo positions in FCC
proceedings.
Instead, I rely on a set of auxiliary assumptions. FCC judges are nominated by the
largest German political parties. Two-thirds majorities are necessary to elect a candidate
(see section 2.3). Nominating parties have an incentive to propose candidates that are
close to their own ideology and policy preferences. The two-thirds threshold makes com-
promise across party lines necessary so that ideologically extreme candidates would not
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be elected. So there presumably is a moderate range of FCC judge preferences in relation
to the policy space relevant to German legislative parties.
The second assumption is that policy positions of particular legislative acts can be ap-
proximated parties’ voting behavior. Data in the extended GESTA dataset is summarized
to a new dummy variable that indicates whether both CDU/CSU and SPD agreed (=1)
to a law in the final vote by the Bundestag. This broad legislative majority variable serves
as a proxy for low relative status quo positions, i.e. for bargaining situations where the
legal status quo is located inside the set of FCC judge preferences. If a legislative act was
more distant, at least one of the two major parties would be expected to disagree. For
the 7th legislative period, data on parties’ voting behavior is not available. The broad
majority variable then points to all enacted laws requiring the consent of the Bundesrat
(Zustimmungsgesetz ). The SPD/FDP coalition faced a CDU-dominated Bundesrat ma-
jority at that time. Laws requiring the consent of the Bundesrat could not be enacted
without support by both christian and social democrats.103
A high relative status quo position, i.e. a legal status quo very distant to the set of FCC
judge preferences is operationalized in a similar way. A new GESTA dummy variable close
legislative majority indicates laws enacted against most votes of the large opposition party
(SPD or CDU/CSU) the final Bundestag vote. No data is available for the 7th legislative
period. Enacted laws with ambigous information on voting behavior or abstentions by
the large coalition party are coded 0 for both dummy variables.
Different objected measures in a proceeding can constitute separate policy dimensions.
A single objected measure is sufficient to make judges bargain about a distant legal
status quo. At the (conjoint) proceeding data level, the dummy variable distant status
quo indicates whether at least one objected federal law was denied by either CDU/CSU
or SPD in the final Bundestag vote (=1) or not(=0). The dummy variable central status
quo indicates whether all objected federal laws were accepted by a broad majority of both
CDU/CSU and SPD based on the previously discussed coding rule (=1) or not (=0). 284
proceedings are associated with a central SQ and 131 are associated with a distant SQ.
Preference Heterogeneity
The U.S. literature on judicial politics has developed numerous ways to measure ide-
ological preferences of Supreme Court Justices (Epstein and Mershon 1996; Fischman
103A comparison to later periods shows that this is a valid proxy. When the federal government faced
oppositional Bundesrat majorities in later periods, either SPD or CDU/CSU members of Bundestag
voted against 10% of all enacted laws requiring the consent of the Bundesrat as opposed to 24% of
all other enacted laws. A reasonable proxy for laws not requiring the consent of the Bundesrat is not
available. Robustness checks show that the status quo operationalization for the 7th legislative period
does not substantially affect the main results of the analysis.
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and Law 2009). Epstein, Landes and Posner (2013, 70ff) distinguish between ex ante
preappointment measures of judicial ideology like the political party of the appointing
president or senatorial courtesy, and ex post postappointment measures usually based on
judicial voting behavior. For example, Segal and Cover (1989) analyze the content of
newspaper editorials on Supreme Court justice nominees. For each justice, they derive a
preappointment measure of perceived ideology.104 Brace, Langer and Hall (2000) measure
U.S. state Supreme Court judges’ preferences based on elite and citizen ideology at the
time of appointment.
Postappointment measures typically rely on observed voting behavior at the Court.
Epstein, Landes and Posner (2013, 116ff) measure ideology as the fraction of a justice’s
conservative votes in non-unanimous cases. Martin and Quinn (2002) employ a dynamic
item response model to Supreme Court voting data in order to estimate time-varying ideal
points on a left-right dimension. Endogeneity problems will occur if this measure is used
to explain a justice’s voting behavior on the same cases (Epstein, Landes and Posner 2013;
Martin and Quinn 2005). Lauderdale and Clark (2012) estimate a more dynamic voting
behavior-based measure of judicial preferences. They show that preferences vary across
time and issue dimensions. Bailey and Maltzman (2008; 2011) even locate time-varying
preferences of Supreme Court justices, U.S. presidents, senators, and representatives in
a common policy space. They make use of political statements on Supreme Court cases
and judicial comments on precedent cases or votes as bridge observations. Bailey (2013)
further extends and improves this approach.
No such distinct measure of judicial preferences is yet available on the FCC. Senate
consultations are confidential and the Court does not reveal information on individual
voting behavior. For most of the time, there was a tie between judges nominated by gov-
erning and opposition parties in both senates (Ho¨nnige 2007, 172). So a simple dummy
measure to indicate a judge’s nominating party would not sufficiently describe preference
heterogeneity across time and senates. FCC judges themselves do not view nominating
parties or even party membership as reliable predictors of a judge’s voting behavior (Kra-
nenpohl 2010, 235f).105 Wittig (2009) has coded ideological positions for FCC judges
based on the ideological content of their own publications. Her method is similar to the
operationalization by Segal and Cover (1989) but the data is limited to eight judges.
Ho¨nnige (2007; 2009, 174ff) operationalizes FCC judges’ preferences as the nominating
parties’ ideological positions at the time of litigation. Shikano and Mack (2013) conduct
104See Segal et al. (1995) for an extended version.
105“Party political front-lines are less frequent at the FCC but there are different legal philosophies. Some
are more ‘thinkers of freedom’ and others rather pronounce the welfare state” (FCC judge No. 29,
cited by Kranenpohl 2010, 241, own transl.).
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Figure 6.2.: Party Positions and FCC Judge Elections (1951-2012): MCSS party
positions by legislative period (Ko¨nig, Marbach and Osnabru¨gge 2013). Solid
circles mark elections of FCC judges nominated by the respective party. Circle
area is proportional to the number of elected judges.
an item response analysis on published Sondervoten and derive a measure for FCC judges
in the second senate. The latter two approaches allow to apply two alternative measures
of judicial preferences in the study.
1. The preappointment measure by Ho¨nnige (2007; 2009) is built upon and improved
in two ways. First, a judge’s prior preference is operationalized the nominating
party’s ideological position at the time of the judge’s election.106 Party leaders have
a strong incentive to select ideologically close candidates (Benda, Klein and Klein
2012, 70). But once a judge is elected, the party does not have any control over
his views. So there is no reason to expect that an elected judge would adjust his
preferences to changing party ideology. A CDU-nominated judge will not become
more conservative just because his party chooses to do so. Second, I use the more
advanced measure of MCSS party positions provided by Ko¨nig, Marbach and Os-
nabru¨gge (2013). Their estimate combines information from party manifestos and
expert surveys. Most importantly, they incorporate reasonable bridge observations
so that party positions are comparable over time.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the change of MCSS party positions over time. Solid circles
106Nominating parties are collected from Wild, Reislhuber and Rauchhaus (2011). Dates of election are
collected from Badura and Dreier (2001a), Bundesrat records, and newspaper archives.
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refer to elections of FCC judges by the respective party. Mostly due to a conservative
shift by the CDU/CSU in the 1970s and 1980s, this measure indicates a historical
increase in judicial preference heterogeneity.
2. The postappointment measure by Shikano and Mack (2013) is available for judges
of the second senate only.107 Their estimates of judicial positions are based on
the occurence of published separate opinions. The measure substantially correlates
with nominating parties. Both CDU- and SPD-nominated judges are more likely to
publish separate opinions in favor of laws passed by their “own party” and against
laws by the “other party” (Kneip 2009, 241). Following Kneip’s data, 76% of all
law-related separate opinions were in line with judges’ affiliation to nominating
parties. Technically speaking, Shikano and Mack’s ideology measure is not entirely
exogenous to the policy bargaining process. But since the dependent variable of
interest is bargaining duration rather than individual voting behavior, I do not
expect any substantial endogeneity bias.108
Figure 6.3 shows the empirical relation of these two judicial ideology measures. As
expected, there is a strong overall correlation. The more conservative the nominating
party’s MCSS position at the time of judge election, the higher is the position estimate
by Shikano and Mack. However, this association can largely be explained by the identity
of the nominating party. There is no clear association between both measures within the
subgroups of SPD- or CDU/CSU-nominated judges. So at least one of the measures does
not quantify judicial ideology any better than a mere party dummy. Lamprecht (2011,
198)’s claim that former FCC president Wolfgang Zeidler’s views on civic rights and duties
were rather close to his conservative colleagues is more in line with the Shikano/Mack
measure. A comparison to Wittig (2009)’s ideological values does not reveal a consistent
picture. Since no measure is proven clearly superior to the other, both measurement
alternatives are considered in the analysis.
At the proceeding level, prior preference heterogeneity is operationalized as the variance
of all participating judges’ preferences for each of these two measures. The set of partici-
pating judges is collected from published decisions. Time- and issue-specific estimates are
desirable but yet unavailable.
The MCSS-based variance measure is slightly adjusted in order to prevent false conclu-
sions. Since SPD and CDU/CSU MCSS party positions drift apart over time (see figure
6.2), the variance measure is strongly correlated with the date of decision. Now consider
two proceedings that were docketed at the same time. The first enters senate consultations
107Many thanks to Susumu Shikano and Verena Mack for providing the yet unpublished data.








































































































Figure 6.3.: Comparing Judicial Ideology Measures: FCC judge positions based
on a) Ko¨nig, Marbach and Osnabru¨gge (2013)’s MCSS nominating party
positions and b) Shikano and Mack (2013)’s estimates. Second senate only.
123
6. Research Design
after two months and the second enters senate consultations after four years. Assume that
the actual senate consultation process takes the same time in both proceedings. Within
the first four years, at least one of the judges is likely to be newly elected. So preference
heterogeneity in the eventual set of participating judges is probably higher for the second
proceeding than for the first precisely because it spent more time in the pre-consultation
process. The statistical analysis would show a positive heterogeneity effect on overall
duration even though both consultation processes were equally long.
In order to minimize the risk of such false conclusions, the MCSS-based heterogeneity
measure is included from the date of inauguration of the most recently elected judge of a
proceeding only. From this point in time onwards, pre-consultation delay does not affect
the set of participating judges. If a proceeding had been pending before at that point
in time, the MCSS-based heterogeneity value for earlier time periods is set to the mean
heterogeneity value of all pending proceedings at that time and in the same senate. As long
as the final set of participating judges is unknown, this best represents the rapporteur’s
rational expectation on preference heterogeneity in the upcoming consultation process.
Number of Judges
The set and number of participating judges is collected from published senate decisions
in BVerfGE (2012) and FCC (2014b). Judges that have initially participated in the
consultation process but eventually dropped out due to illness or other reasons, are not
listed in the final decision. So the measure tends to slightly underestimate the average
number of judges along the entire bargaining process. So the analysis might slightly
underestimate the size of the effect.
Majority Threshold
Senate decisions formally require a simple majority. The effective majority threshold
depends on the prevailing norm of consensus at the time of the proceeding. Evidence
from the U.S. literature suggests that Chief justice leadership is an important source of
consensus orientation (see section 4.1).
The norm of consensus can not directly be observed and voting results on FCC decisions
are rarely published. I will use the frequency of separate opinions as an indicator for the
norm of consensus. The more prevailing the norm is, the less separate opinions are likely
to be published. For each period of FCC presidents, I determine the senate-specific share
of decisions on the merits with at least one published separate opinion.109
109Many thanks to Caroline Wittig for providing the data.
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A three-level norm of consensus variable is derived. The first level includes senate-
period combinations with a separate opinion share above 10%. This includes the second
senate under the presidencies of Ernst Benda (1971-83), Wolfgang Zeidler (1983-87), Hans-
Ju¨rgen Papier (2002-10), and Andreas Voßkuhle (since 2010). The second level refers to
separate opinion shares between 5% and 10%. This includes the second senate under the
presidencies of Roman Herzog (1987-94) Jutta Limbach (1994-2002), and the first senate
under Limbach and Papier. The third level refers to separate opinion shares below 5%
and includes all remaining presidencies in the first senate. The measure is coded as a
time-variant variable and the norm of consensus increases with higher levels. The higher
the norm of consensus, the higher will be the effective majority threshold.
Preference Uncertainty
The longer judges know each other, the better they are able to predict their colleagues’
preferences.110 The variable average contact time describes for how long judges have been
knowing each other on average. For each point in time and for each pair of participating
judges, the duration in days of shared prior FCC judgeship is determined.111 The case-
and time-specific average of these values over all pairs of participating judges gives the
average prior contact time. Negative values are set to zero.112 The square root of these
average values is computed so that differences in low contact time are weighted larger than
differences at higher levels of contact time. Mutual learning effects per day are higher in
the first months than after many years of working relations.
Increased contact time relates to lower levels of uncertainty. Hence, I expect a nega-
tive effect of contact time on bargaining duration. The longer judges know each other,
the better they can estimate each other’s preferences and the sooner they will find an
agreement.
Discount Factor
The discount factor describes how much judges favor future policy utility over present
policy utility. The higher the discount factor, the more patient judges are and the more
decisive the long-term outcome of a proceeding is. Judges’ case-specific patience is not
directly observed and auxiliary assumptions are necessary. Short-term changes to the
110“The longer you are in there, the better is the basis for prediciton and the better you can foresee
whether it will be presumably controversial or presumably unanimous” (FCC judge No. 19, cited by
Kranenpohl 2010, 172, own transl., original emphasis).
111Dates of inauguration are collected from Badura and Dreier (2001a), the FCC website, and newspaper
archives.
112This latter modification does not affect the main conclusions.
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legal status quo will be more relevant for judges if the disputed legal norm is of urgent
nature. 9% of all federal laws in the extended GESTA dataset were promulgated within
three months after initiation. This includes non-trivial acts such as the Federal Electoral
Amendment Act after German Reunification of Oct 8, 1990 (BGBl I, 2141 - eight days)
and the Mad-Cow Disease Measures Act of Feb 19, 2001 (BGBl I, 226 - 15 days). In
these cases, the legislator likely perceived some time pressure to accelerate the legislative
process. If a policy is urgent to legislators, it will most likely also be urgent to FCC
judges.
At the proceeding level, I take the average legislative duration over all objected federal
laws as a proxy for discount factors. The dummy variable low discount factor indicates
50 proceedings with an average legislative duration of less than three months. A sec-
ond dummy variable for particularly high discount factors is not included. A sample of
promulgates laws suggests that very long-lasting legislative processes (> two years) are
driven more by policy complexity and political controversy than by mere impatience.
Previous paragraphs have introduced empirical measures for the model’s key explana-
tory variables. In the following, I will define a set of control variables and their oper-
ationalization. Procedural rules, issue salience, complexity, the Court’s workload, and
public awareness are often discussed factors in the judicial politics literature. They might
be related to the key independent variables of this study and at the same time have a
substantial impact on bargaining duration. I will control for these factors in order to gain
largely unbiased estimates for the main effects of interest.
Procedural Rules
Formal and informal procedural rules might affect pre-consultation delay and the length
of bargaining periods. E.g., concrete judicial review proceedings come with a pending
lower court proceeding and might be dealt with a higher priority (Kranenpohl 2010, 91).
Formal and informal procedures might differ between senates. The recently introduced
instruments of delay objection and delay complaint might forestall overlong proceedings
(see section 6.1). Dummy variables are included for the form of action, the senate, and
years since 2011.
For conjoint proceedings, the form of action is coded based on the presumably most
relevant form of action. The priorities are: If there is at least one abstract judicial review
(BvF) or dispute between state organs (BvE) partial proceeding, the conjoint proceeding
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will be coded BvF or BvE accordingly. No proceeding includes both of these forms of
action. Else, if there is a concrete judicial review (BvL) partial proceeding, the conjoint
proceeding will be coded BvL. If all partial proceedings are constitutional complaints
(BvR), the conjoint proceeding will be coded BvR.
Salience
Issue salience is likely to affect pre-consultation delay. If a rapporteur considers a case to
be salient, he will bring it forward to the senate with high priority. I expect the overall
duration of salient proceedings to be shorter.
Epstein and Segal (2000) distinguish between measures of retrospective and contempo-
rary salience in the judicial politics literature. Retrospective measures are typically based
on constitutional law casebooks, official sources, Supreme Court citations, legal scholar
articles etc. (Epstein and Segal 2000, 69). They identify decisions that are considered
to be salient ex post. In contrast, measures of contemporary salience point to pending
proceedings that actors perceived to be salient at that time. E.g., Epstein and Segal’s
salience measure indicates whether a case was covered by a New York Times frontpage
article at the time of the proceeding.
No perfect salience measure is yet available for FCC decisions. Two alternative mea-
sures are selected for further analysis. First, a retrospective decision salience measure
identifies whether a FCC decision is considered to be important by experts ex post. Ex-
perienced judges are likely to anticipate the long-term relevance of particular decisions
and consider these proceedings to be salient. By definition, the measure is not exogenous
to the proceeding under study. Since it does not directly depend on the duration of the
proceeding, I do not expect substantial bias.
Second, a policy salience measure indentifies proceedings that deal with objections to
historically important federal laws. The historical relevance of federal laws is judged by
experts in retrospect. The measure is endogenous to the legislative bargaining process but
not to the FCC proceedings.113 The advantage of a reduced potential endogeneity bias as
compared to the previous measure comes a downside. Objections at the FCC might refer
to minor parts of generally salient laws. So the measure is less precise than the previous
alternative. A clearly exogenous salience measure for FCC proceedings similar to the one
by Epstein and Segal (2000) is desirable for future empirical analyses.
Both available measures are introduced in the following.
113In theory, ex post experts might consider legislative acts to be important just because these acts
were confirmed or denied by the FCC. A random sample of legislative key decisions suggests that this
criterion has not been of substantial impact for the selection of key decisions, though.
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Decision Salience My first approach to measure FCC decision salience is very similar
to the one by Cook (1993). She determines significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions by
references in constitutional law casebooks and monographs. A factor analysis reveals the
most valid measure. She generally prefers casebooks that appear in many editions to
avoid bias towards more recent cases (Cook 1993, 1129f).
For the FCC context, I have evaluated twelve potential sources of retrospective decision
salience measures:114
• Decisions mentioned in Wesel (2004, 373ff)’s comprehensive summary of FCC his-
tory. These decisions can be assumed to be of historical relevance. Wesel does not
explicitly claim to name the most important decisions only, though.
• Decisions included in at least one of the three editions of the case collection “Deci-
sions of the Federal Constitutional Court” by Grimm and Kirchhof (1993), Grimm
and Kirchhof (1997), and Grimm, Kirchhof and Eichberger (2007). The collection
targets law students and is supposed to cover the most important decisions on the
main regulations of the Basic Law.
• Decisions included in at least one of the two editions by Menzel (2000) and Men-
zel and Mu¨ller-Terpitz (2011). This collection is supposed to include the FCC
decision “classics”, a cross-section over time and topics, and a mixture of dog-
matically, historical-politically, and exemplarily important decisions (Menzel and
Mu¨ller-Terpitz 2011, p. VI). The audience seems to be both general and academic.
• Decisions included in the collection “Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court”
by Schwabe (2004). According to earlier editions, this collection aims at first-year
law students. More precise selection criteria are not available.
• “Featured cases” in the case collection by Kommers and Miller (2012, 833ff). The
collection targets an international audience and covers selected topics of Basic Law
jurisdiction.
• Decisions included in the Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung online collection by Bentsche (2011).
The interactive timeline collection is supposed to cover the 30 most important “de-
cisions that changed Germany” between 1951 and 2011. Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung is a
leading, nationwide German newspaper with a general audience. So this list can be
assumed to focus on historical, political and journalistic rather than purely academic
judicial salience.
114Compare this approach to the list of 209 “key decisions” by Kranenpohl (2010, 104f).
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• Decisions included in the collection by Robbers (2013). This source lists the most
important basic rights-related decisions for law students attending Robbers’ intro-
ductory lecture on constitutional law. It can be expected to have a rather academic
focus limited to the subset of basic right cases.
• Decisions discussed by Sa¨cker (2003, 101ff). This selection of decisions is part
of a general introduction to the FCC published by the Federal Agency for Civic
Education (Bundeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung). The focus is likely to be on
politically influential cases that can easily be assessed by a general audience.
• Decisions cited by Degenhart (2011). The law textbook focuses on constitutional
law.
• Decisions cited by either Pieroth and Schlink (2006) or Pieroth and Schlink (2012).
The law textbook focuses on basic rights.
• Decisions cited by Ipsen (2010a). The law textbook focuses on constitutional law.
• Decisions cited by Ipsen (2010b). The law textbook focuses on basic rights.
A principal component analysis is conducted for these measures. Figure 6.4 depicts the
results for data on FCC decisions published in BVerfGE volumes 1-109.115 All measures
load positively on the first component, which accounts for 32.5% of overall variance. The
first component seems to be related to overall decision salience. Textbook sources with
a very academic target group have the lowest loadings, whereas the Grimm et al. and
Menzel sources load highest.
The second component clearly distinguishes constitutional law-related sources with neg-
ative loadings from basic rights-related sources with positive loadings. Both the Grimm
et al. and Menzel measures are almost neutral on the second component. A third compo-
nent – not depicted in the graph – further separates academic sources with negative load-
ings (Degenhart, Pieroth/Schlink, Ipsen I/II) from popular sources with positive loadings
(Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung and - though less pronounced - Wesel, Kommers/Miller). Again,
the Grimm et al. and Menzel measures are almost neutral.
The Grimm et al. and Menzel measures clearly qualify as the most preferred alter-
natives. They load highest on the first, general salience component. Epstein and Segal
(2000, 68ff) discuss three sources of potential bias in salience measures: a selection will
be content biased if it favors particular kind of issues. Recency bias will occur if it over-
weighs recent cases. Time dependency will be an issue if the instrument of interest was
115Data from Sa¨cker (2003) is limited to volumes 1-100 and excluded from further analysis. A complete






















































Figure 6.4.: Principal Component Analysis of FCC Decision Salience Measures:
Salience measures on published FCC decisions in BVerfGE volumes 1-109.
Scree plot on the left shows eigenvalues. Loadings of the first two components
are depicted on the right.
more or less common over time. Both favored measures are largely unbiased in terms
of legal area and academic vs. public audience, so content bias is unlikely. They both
contain several editions so that the risk of recency bias is minimized (Epstein and Segal
2000, 68ff). Finally, the Menzel measure covers all FCC decisions until 2011, whereas the
Grimm et al. measure is limited to BVerfGE volumes 1-115. In terms of completeness
and time independeny, the Menzel salience measure is the most preferred one.
The dummy variable decision salience indicates all FCC decisions that are included in
at least one of the two editions by Menzel (2000) and Menzel and Mu¨ller-Terpitz (2011).
Policy Salience The legislative act-based policy salience measure is collected from three
different sources. First, Schindler (1999, 2595ff) provides a list of 177 most important
federal laws in Germany from 1949-1994. This is an extended version of von Beyme
(1998)’s list of “150 key decisions” as selected by legislative experts. Second, I add Reutter
(2007, 304f)’s list of legislative key decisions in legislative periods 13-15 (1994-2005). He
explicitly refers to Schindler’s listing and aims to apply consistent criteria. Third, I add
all federal laws from the 16th legislative period (2005-2009) whose enactment is mentioned
in Scharch’s “Chronology of the Grand Coalition 2005-2009” (Scharch 2010).
With 30 laws mentioned in Scharch’s chronology, the number of “key decisions” per
period is much higher than in the previous sources. This does not heavily affect my
analysis, though. Only five of these laws are dealt with by the FCC in the period under
study: the Tax Amendment Act 2007 (BGBl 2006 I, 1652), the Health Care Reform of
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2007 (BGBl I, 378), the Data Retention Act (BGBl 2007 I, 3198), the Economic Stimulus
Package II (BGBl 2009 I, 416), and the Accompanying Act to the Treaty of Lisbon
(BGBl 2009 I, 3022). All of these acts have been of major political relevance so that their
classification as “key decisions” is reasonable.
The dummy variable policy salience indicates proceedings with objections to at least
one legislative “key decision”.
Complexity
The more complex a case is, the more time the rapporteur will need to prepare senate
consultations. So issue complexity should be one of the control variables. Vanberg (2005,
104) operationalizes complexity of FCC proceedings based on policy area. He considers
proceedings dealing with issues of economic regulation, state-mandated social insurance,
civil servant compensation, taxation, the federal budget, and party finance to be complex.
Issues from these policy areas typically touch several policy areas at once, they often
involve technical regulatory questions and questions of revenue or ressource allocation.
Vanberg codes institutional disputes, family law, the judicial process, individual rights,
asylum rights, and military conscription as noncomplex policy areas.
The present study involves a larger set of FCC proceedings and information on policy
areas is collected from the extended GESTA dataset. Vanberg’s coding rule is adopted but
slightly extended and adjusted to the GESTA categorization of policy areas. Following
Vanberg’s general line of argument, the policy areas labor and employment, foreign trade,
foreign policy, international agreements, Europe and European Union, finance, budgetary
policy, health, social security, and economy are considered to be complex. Noncomplex
policy areas are education and research, family/women/seniors/youth, domestic policy
including institutional issues and asylum rights, legal policy, culture, agriculture, regional
planning, building and urban development, environment, abortion issues, transport and
communication, and defense.
For each objected federal law, the policy area is collected from the extended GESTA
dataset. The binary variable policy complexity indicates whether the majority of objected
federal laws in a proceeding is from complex (1) or noncomplex (0) policy areas. 235 out
of 470 proceedings with at least one link to the extended GESTA dataset are coded to
deal with complex policy areas.
Caseload
In the first years of the FCC, the second senate came to decisions much faster than the
first senate which was overloaded with constitutional complaints (Wesel 2004, 64). The
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Court’s caseload has heavily increased over time and still varies between senates. The
higher a senate’s workload, the longer a proceeding will likely be in the queue before it
enters senate consultations. The opposite effect might occur, once a case enters senate
consultations. The more alternative cases are pending, the higher will be the opportunity
costs of continued negotiations. Either way, it is important to control for the overall
caseload.
The variable caseload gives the number of docketed initial proceedings (in thousands)
in the respective senate and year.116 It is time-variant and varies from 5 cases in the
second senate 1951 to 3710 cases in the first senate 2013. The data is collected from the
FCC (2014a)’s online statistics.
Public Attention
Public attention on particular FCC proceedings might affect their overall duration. FCC
judges are aware about the importance of public support (Kranenpohl 2010) and they
learned from negative publicity in the 1970s, when the Court attracted attention due to
controversial selections of judges, conflicting interviews and letters to the editor (Her-
rmann 2010, 415). Yet, the direction of a potential public attention effect on delay is
unclear. Judges have an incentive to speed up proceedings under public attention in or-
der to appear as an efficient institution. On the other hand, they might be willing to
invest more time into negotiating these proceedings in order to find an outcome that is
more resistant to public opposition.117
Several measures of public attention on proceedings have been proposed before. Van-
berg (2005, 103) measures public awareness by a binary variable of whether an oral ar-
gument was held and by the total number of amicus briefs filed by interest groups, lower
courts, or governments. These measures are not suitable for the present study. Both the
appointment of oral arguments and the number of amicus briefs are potentially endoge-
nous to the dynamics of the bargaining process.
Vorla¨nder and Schaal (2002) code newspaper articles from three leading German na-
tionwide newspapers. They consider all articles from 1974-1998 with reference to FCC
proceedings within about two months before and after the respective decision on the
merits. A decision will be categorized as conflictual if it is mentioned in at least 10 arti-
cles (public awareness). Information on article types (reports, comment, and background
116The number of pending cases would be a better indicator for the overall caseload. Historical data is
limited and this measure could not be collected or derived from related data for several years in the
1970s. Both measures are highly correlated and the number of newly docketed cases is a good proxy
for overall caseload.




reports), lengths, and pages allows to further distinguish the measurement. Such a com-
pelling measure for the whole period under study is preferable for future applications but
yet unavailable.
Sternberg et al. (2014) provide a measure of specific public support on particular po-
sitions in FCC proceedings. They have collected public opinion survey data related to
the topics of 94 FCC decisions involving abstract judicial reviews and disputes between
federal organs and the La¨nder. These surveys have been conducted up to 18 months
prior to the decision in order to ensure exogeneity. For each FCC decision, their measure
gives the percentage of respondents in support of the opposition’s position on the issue of
dispute.
I will include Sternberg et al.’s public opposition measure as a proxy for public at-
tention. It is coded only for forms of action that directly involve major political actors,
i.e. for abstract judicial reviews and disputes between federal and La¨nder organs. These
proceedings can be assumed to be of sufficient political salience to be recognized by public
media. The higher the specific support for the opposition’s position, the more interested
the public will be in the outcome and the more likely the public will closely follow the
proceeding. The variable public opposition indicates the percentage of respondents who
support the opposition’s position in that proceeding prior to the decision. It is available
for 31 proceedings in the further analysis.
Table 6.1 summarizes the operationalization of all variables for further analysis. This
chapter has discussed the research design including case selection, the statistical model,
and choices of empirical measurements. An event history analysis is conducted in order to
test the hypotheses derived in section 5.3. The duration of FCC proceedings is expected
to depend on judicial preference heterogeneity, the relative location of the legal status quo,
the effective majority threshold, the number of judges involved, the degree of preference
uncertainty, and their discount factor. Results from event history analysis are presented
in the following chapter.
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Table 6.1.: Operationalization of Key Variables
Concept Measure Data Source Time-
variant
Dependent variable:
Bargaining duration Number of days
between date of receipt









Distant status quo Disagreement to at
least one objected
federal law by either
CDU/CSU or SPD
GESTA no
Central status quo Agreement to all
objected federal laws by
CDU/CSU and SPD
GESTA no










Number of judges Number of participating
judges in final decision
Published decisions no










Discount factor Legislative duration GESTA no
Control variables:












Policy complexity Policy area GESTA no
Caseload Number of docketed
cases
FCC (2014a) yes
Public opposition % of survey respondents Sternberg et al. (2014) no
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This study seeks to explain whether and how policy bargaining affects the duration of
FCC proceedings. Chapter 6 has introduced the research design including case selection,
the statistical model, the set of variables, and their measurements. An event history
analysis is conducted in order to test the dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete
information as introduced in chapter 4.118 The present chapter presents and discusses the
empirical results.
The analysis is based on a Cox proportational hazards model (see section 6.2). Table 7.1
summarizes the estimated hazard ratios. At any given time in the bargaining process, the
hazard is the probability of finding a collective bargaining outcome in that time period,
given that judges have not found an agreement before. The hazard ratio is the factor
by which the hazard of bargaining settlement increases with each unit in an independent
variable.119 If the hazard ratio is larger than 1, the independent variable will increase the
hazard ratio and thereby decrease overall bargaining duration. If it is less than 1, it will
increase overall bargaining duration. With bargaining duration as the dependent variable
of interest in mind, hazard ratio estimates below 1 are associated with positive effects.
The table shows hazard ratio estimates and their non-symmetric 95% confidence intervals
for each independent variable.
Models 1 includes all independent variables except for the GESTA-related variables
and the public opposition measure. Model 2 extends the set of independent variables by
all measures related to the extended GESTA dataset. GESTA-related information is not
available for FCC proceedings that refer to federal legislation prior to 1972. So model
2 is limited to a smaller set of proceedings to be analyzed, whereas all 694 proceedings
with reference to federal legislation are included in model 1. There are two versions
of model 1 with different measures of preference heterogeneity. Model 1a includes the
preference measure derived from Ko¨nig, Marbach and Osnabru¨gge (2013)’ MCSS data
that is available for all proceedings. Model 1b is based on Shikano and Mack (2013)’s
measure of judicial ideology and reduced to proceedings of the second senate.
118The R survival package (Therneau 2012) is used to run the statistical analysis.
119The assumption of proportional hazards has been checked an a graphical analysis of Schoenfeld resid-
uals for all models.
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Table 7.1.: Estimates from Event History Analysis on FCC Bargaining Duration
Hazard ratios Model 1 Model 2
[95% CI] Ko¨nig et al. Shikano/Mack Central SQ Distant SQ
Preference heterogeneity .95 1.24 1.11
(Ko¨nig et al.) [.85, 1.07] [1.00, 1.54] [.83, 1.50]
Preference heterogeneity 1.72
(Shikano/Mack) [.28, 10.51]
Number of judges (7) .78 .46 .53 .95
[.58, 1.05] [.26, .81] [.29, .94] [.39, 2.33]
Number of judges (8) .80 .49 .53 .91
[.60, 1.07] [.29, .82] [.31, .92] [.39, 2.12]
Norm of consensus (2) 2.43 3.29 2.49 3.24
[1.77, 3.34] [2.22, 4.85] [1.52, 4.08] [1.62, 6.49]
Norm of consensus (3) 1.44 1.85 2.24
[1.00, 2.08] [1.02, 3.35] [.83, 6.02]
Average contact time 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.16
[1.11, 1.14] [1.12, 1.17] [1.13, 1.17] [1.13, 1.20]
Short legislative duration 1.37 1.47
[.91, 2.08] [.69, 3.14]
Abstract judicial review .58 .53 1.01 1.07
[.29, 1.14] [.26, 1.09] [.35, 2.95] [.22, 5.15]
Concrete judicial review .55 .53 .75 .80
[.29, 1.02] [.28, 1.02] [.33, 1.69] [.16, 4.04]
Constitutional complaint .54 .49 .68 1.03
[.29, 1.00] [.25, .95] [.30, 1.55] [.21, 5.09]
Second senate 1.34 1.46 1.98
[.98, 1.83] [.91, 2.37] [1.04, 3.77]
Years since 2011 4.16 6.69 2.23 5.18
[2.27, 7.61] [1.51, 29.56] [.87, 5.73] [1.63, 16.43]
Decision Salience 1.00 .80 .60 1.28
[.71, 1.43] [.47, 1.38] [.33, 1.11] [.62, 2.66]
Key legislation 1.21 1.12
[.91, 1.61] [.74, 1.68]
Complexity .81 1.00
[.62, 1.06] [.65, 1.54]
Caseload .62 .48 .63 .66
[.50, .77] [.37, .61] [.43, .94] [.36, 1.20]
N 694 246 284 131
Likelihood ratio 883.3 305.6 405.8 212.6
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The public opposition measure is available for only 31 abstract judicial review proceed-
ings under study. Its estimated effect on duration lacks statistical significance and the
main conclusions on other estimates of interest remain unchanged. Therefore, it will not
be further considered in the following.
Most hypotheses derived in section 5.3 depend on further conditions like the relative
location of the status quo or majority thresholds. Ideally, one could precisely test all these
hypotheses with a large number of interaction effects. Given limited degrees of freedom
and the very indirect measurement of most concepts, such an approach does not deliver
any statistically meaningful results. Therefore, model 1 is limited to main effects: Model
two offers two versions: The first is limited to the set of proceedings with a central location
of the legal status quo (2a) and the second only includes proceedings with a distant status
quo position (2b). Alternative combinations have been tested and they reveal a similar
overall picture.
The empirical results presented in table 7.1 are analyzed in the following.
Preference heterogeneity is expected to prolong bargaining duration under simple
majority rule and with distant status quo positions. When the status quo is central,
it is expected to speed up the bargaining process (hypotheses 1-3). Neither measure of
preference heterogeneity provides a clear picture. The point estimates of hazard ratios for
the Ko¨nig et al. and the Shikano/Mack measures differ in direction. Due to very large
confidence intervals that include the non-effect hazard ratio of 1 for both measures, no
clear conclusion is derived. None of these two measures is superior120 and model 2 is based
on the Ko¨nig et al. measure with regard to its availability for both senates. The effect of
preference heterogeneity in model 2a is right at the edge to statistical significance at the
95% level. Given a central status quo, bargaining duration thus decreases with preference
heterogeneity – in line with hypothesis 2.
The number of judges is expected to increase bargaining duration when the status
quo is distant and to decrease duration when the SQ is central (hypotheses 7-8). The
empirical results are not in line with this expectation. All four models suggest that
proceedings with seven or eight judges tend to be longer than proceedings with merely
six judges. The hazard ratio estimate is closest to one in the distant SQ model (2b), just
where it is expected to be negative. Surprisingly, there is hardly any difference between
proceedings with seven versus eight judges. Merely 9% of all senate decisions under study
were made by six judges and the estimates in 1a and 2b lack statistical significance. So
the effect should not be overinterpreted.
120The likelihood ratio of model 1a being applied to the same restricted set of 246 cases as in model 1b
is 308.3, i.e. almost identical to the likelihood ratio of 305.6 in model 1b.
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The majority threshold is expected to prolong bargaining duration when the status
quo is distant (hypothesis 6). Again, the empirical results are not in line with the expecta-
tion. Remember that the majority threshold is measured by the share of separate opinions
in the respective senate and FCC chief judge period. When the status quo is distant, the
duration of senate proceedings is predicted to decrease as the norm of consensus raises
from level 1 to level 2. The large confidence interval and the change in direction from
level 2 to 3 do not allow for a definite conclusion. The positive, i.e. duration-decreasing,
and statistically significant hazard ratio estimates in models 1a, 1b, and 2a can not be
explained by the dynamic policy bargaining theory.
Preference uncertainty is expected to increase bargaining duration (hypothesis 9).
The more uncertain judges are about each other’s preferences, the more time they will
take to find an agreement. This is the only theoretically expected effect that is not
conditional on further specifications of the bargaining environment. It is confirmed by
empirical evidence: The average contact time consistently accelerates FCC proceedings
in all models of analysis in table 7.1. The longer judges know each other, the more likely
they are to agree immediately at any point in time and the shorter will be bargaining
duration.
The discount factor is expected to increase bargaining duration when the status quo
is distant. It will decrease duration when the status quo is central and judges decide by
simple majority (hypotheses 10 - 12). Short legislative duration is a proxy for low discount
factors (see section 6.3). The positive hazard ratio estimate in model 2b suggests that
the discount factor decreases the hazard of immediate agreement and thereby prolongs
bargaining duration. This is in line with hypothesis 10. But the large confidence interval
includes the non-effect hazard ratio of 1, so the estimate is not statistically significant.
Similar results are obtained in model 2a, where a slightly negative hazard ratio would be
expected. The overall empirical evidence remains inconclusive.
Further estimates are related to control variables, which are not of major interest for
our X-centered purpose. Caseload turned out to be the most important control variable.
Both caseload and the Ko¨nig et al.-based preference heterogeneity measure are strongly
related to time in an almost linear way. These two variables correlate with r = 0.80. Not
controlling for caseload would have caused a strong, positive estimate for the preference
heterogeneity effect. The large set of relevant control variables prevents from falling for
such a false friend.
There is little empirical evidence for systematic impacts of political bargaining fac-
tors on the duration of FCC senate proceedings. Many hazard ratio estimates point to
the expected direction and they are of substantive significance. E.g., figure 7.1 displays
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gs min. preference heterogeneity(95% CI)
max. preference heterogeneity
(95% CI)
Figure 7.1.: Predicted Impact of Preference Heterogeneity on the Duration of
FCC Proceedings: Predicted survival curves based on model 2a for min-
imum and maximum levels of empirical preference heterogeneity assuming
eight judges, second senate, a concrete judicial review proceeding, norm of
consensus level 2, all years before 2011, no short legislative duration, and all
other parameters set to their empirical mean value.
predicted survival curves of FCC senate proceedings for different levels of preference het-
erogeneity based on estimates from model 2a. The prediction refers to eight judges in the
second senate facing a concrete judicial review proceeding and a central status quo (see
the figure’s caption for further parameters). When the level of preference heterogeneity is
highest, 50% of such proceedings are predicted to end within 1 year and 8 months. When
preference heterogeneity is lowest, half of these proceedings last longer than 2 years and
10 months. More than one year of overall duration could be explained by preference
heterogeneity in these extremes. But as discussed before, these estimates come with very
large confidence intervals so that we can not draw definite conclusions.
The only robust and consistently statistically significant conclusion is on preference
uncertainty: The longer judges know each other, the sooner they will come to collective
agreements. Figure 7.2 illustrates predicted survival curves based on model 1a for two
different levels of average contact time at the beginning of a proceeding (see the figure’s
caption for further parameters). If judges know each other for about one year at the
beginning of a proceeding, the model predicts a 50% chance that the proceeding will end
within 2.5 years. In contrast, if judges know each other for 5 years on day 1, they will find
an agreement within 9 months with a 50% chance. Confidence intervals are relatively low
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gs average contact time: 1 year(95% CI)
average contact time: 5 years
(95% CI)
Figure 7.2.: Predicted Impact of Preference Uncertainty on the Duration of
FCC Proceedings: Predicted survival curves based on model 1a. Pre-
dicted values for minimum and maximum levels of average contact time at
the beginning of a proceeding. Further parameters: eight judges, second sen-
ate, concrete judicial review, norm of consensus level 2, all years before 2011,
and all other parameters set to their empirical mean value.
so that these first differences are clearly distinguishable.
In summary, the dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete information (see
chapter 4) is applied to FCC senate proceedings. An event history analysis is conducted in
order to investigate how preference heterogeneity, the number of judges, majority thresh-
olds, preference uncertainty, and discount factors affect the duration of senate proceedings.
For the first time, data on particular FCC proceedings has been linked to the extended
GESTA dataset. The FCC administration has made dates of receipt available for scientific
research for the first time. The data has been collected in the DFG project “The Federal
Constitutional Court as a Veto Player” and will be publicly available.
There is little empirical evidence to support the dynamic policy bargaining theory,
though. Bargaining duration in senate proceedings increases with preference uncertainty.
Some further estimates point to the expected direction. They make a substantive differ-
ence in prediction but they often lack statistical significance. This might have two major
reasons. First, senate consultations at the FCC might be less driven by policy preferences
than we expect. Second, the very indirect measurements of central concepts might have
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caused too much random noise to statistically filter out the associations of interest. Most
importantly, the dependent variable includes a potentially long period of case preparation
by the rapporteur that is not accounted for in the theoretical model. Some measures
of independent variables like preference heterogeneity, majority thresholds, and discount
factors depend on auxiliary assumptions instead of direct observation.
It is a challenge for future research to shed more light into the bargaining process of
FCC consultations and to develop better measures of these concepts. For now, there
is no definite answer to whether policy bargaining-related factors affect the duration of
FCC proceedings. The impact of most of these factors on the overall duration of FCC






8. Summary and Conclusions
This thesis seeks to explain how judicial policy bargaining affects the duration of FCC
senate proceedings. It starts off with building a new theory of dynamic policy-making
with incomplete information. A new simulation method is developed in order to derive
hypotheses. New data on FCC senate proceedings since 1972 is collected and combined
to empirically test these hypotheses in an event history analysis.
Previous studies of policy bargaining processes do not provide a compelling, logically
consistent answer to how and why policy preferences, the number of players, and majority
thresholds affect bargaining duration (see chapter 3). The extension of Banks and Duggan
(2006)’s sequential bargaining model by the assumption of incomplete information fills
this gap (see chapter 4). In this new dynamic policy bargaining model with incomplete
information, strategic players make alternating offers and votes until a collective outcome
is found. They have incomplete information about each other’s policy preferences and
update their expectations each period based on observed voting behavior.
Due to a highly complex set of interdependent equations, an analytical solution of such
a game is hard to derive. Instead, hypotheses are derived via computer simulations (see
chapter 5). I develop a new estimation method of bargaining equlibria in games with
complete information. The a priori, theory-driven reduction of potential outcomes to a
small set of relevant policies in combination with a geometric, iterative solution procedure
is much more computing-time efficient than previous estimation methods of complete, fine
policy grids (see section 5.2.1). A simulation procedure tailored to the new dynamic policy
bargaining model with incomplete information is developed (see section 5.2.2).
The simulation results reveal a much more complex picture of policy bargaining effects
on duration than previous scholars have assumed (see section 5.3). For the selected range
of starting values, bargaining duration will increase with preference heterogeneity, the
majority threshold, the number of players, and the discount factor if the status quo is
distant. But if the status quo is centrally located in the region of prior preferences,
duration will decrease with preference heterogeneity under unanimity rule and with the
discount factor under simple majority rule. Preference heterogeneity generally increases
duration under simple majority rule. The degree of uncertainty prolongs the bargaining
process.
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8. Summary and Conclusions
These hypotheses are tested on empirical data on FCC senate proceedings. The database
is new in that some variables like the list of inital proceedings’ dates of receipt have never
been available to scientists before. It is the first study that systematically links data on
FCC proceedings to the extended GESTA database on German legislation as initiated by
Ho¨nnige and Gschwend (2010, see chapter 6). Despite these efforts on data collection,
central measures remain indirect and most estimated results come with large confidence
intervals (see chapter 7). The current database and the set of measurements only allow
for limited conclusions. The longer judges know each other, i.e. the better they know
each other’s preferences, the sooner they will come to an agreement in senate proceed-
ings. The impact of policy preference heterogeneity and other bargaining-related factors
on the overall duration of FCC proceedings has not been strong and systematic enough
to clearly stand out from other causes.
This thesis contributes to political science research in three important ways:
1. The new model of dynamic policy bargaining with incomplete information
can be applied to almost any setting, where actors bargain about collectively setting
a new status quo policy with at least some degree of preference uncertainty. This
includes legislative decision-making, international politics, and coalition formation.
No other model so far provides a more compelling and consistent explanation of
how policy bargaining-related factors affect duration. Different, more distinguished
hypotheses than in previous accounts are derived. Empirical scholars of policy
bargaining duration should take the variety and conditionality of these conclusions
seriously and focus on more explicit and careful hypothesis-building.
Even if bargaining duration is not the feature of interest, such a model will better
explain dynamic bargaining processes than classic, static veto player theory. Differ-
ent outcomes and voting coalitions are predicted, so that scholars should carefully
select their model of choice.
2. The study promotes the use of simulation methods in political science. The new
simulation procedure based on set of relevant policies reduces required computing
time and can be applied to solve other complex policy bargaining games. The R code
of the simulation procedure is published in the appendix so that scholars can run
their own simulations on both versions of the dynamic bargaining model discussed
in this thesis.
3. The empirical data analysis offers a large set of measurements and combined
data sources available for future studies on the FCC. Most data has been collected
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within or in cooperation with the DFG project “The Federal Constitutional Court
as a Veto Player” and will be available for further analyses. Scholars will benefit
from combining these different sources of valuable data.
In all of these three core areas, potential improvements remain for future studies. First,
some assumptions of the dynamic bargaining model should be relaxed. Opportunity costs
of continued bargaining are obvious and they should be considered in future versions of
this model. The role of public opinion and external actors should be considered explicitly
in order to account for incentives of decision-makers that are embedded in an external
institutional setting.
Second, the simulation procedure can be further improved. Most importantly, it should
account for more than two dimensions so that hypotheses on the impact of issue complexity
can directly be derived. Once we have more precise data on current judges’ positions and
currently pending cases, simulations could be used to predict courses of actual, not yet
observed bargaining processes.
Third, much work is to be done on the improvement of empirical measures. The U.S.
judicial politics literature is much more advanced in this respect. More precise measures of
judicial preferences and the course of particular FCC proceedings would be most valuable.
Once private notes of FCC judges become available, this rich source of information might
be used for more revealing studies on judicial behavior – comparable to the work by
Epstein and Knight (1998) who used private notes of four former justices. Until now,
the FCC has not even published data on the voting behavior of individual judges. This
restrictive manner will not sustain in the long run: The archival retention period of 60
years has already expired for the very first FCC decisions. The Court should soon make
its internal notes on historical proceedings available (Benda, Klein and Klein 2012, 135f).
So there is hope for future political scientists to get a closer look into internal negotiations
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A. Simulation Source Code
The source code of both computer simulation models presented in chapter 5 is documented
and commented in the following. The simulation was conducted in R 2.15.3 (Development
Core Team 2008). No further packages are needed. See sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 for further
comments.
The source code is commented in small packages of coding lines. The original code can
be restored by merging the code snippets (presented in boxes) in the order of presentation.
A.1. Bargaining Model with Complete Information
The function banksduggan returns a vector υC(σ) of n continuation values in station-
ary equilibrium of the dynamic policy bargaining game with complete information. The
input parameters are the number of players n (n.judges), the majority threshold m
(n.majority), the number of dimensions d = 2 (n.dim), the d×n matrix of ideal positions
Xpos (Xpos), the position vector of status quo q (sq), the discount factor δ (discount),
the vector of recognition probabilities ρ (rho), and the degree of precision for returned
continuation values as the number of identical decimal places (round.digits).
banksduggan <- function(n.players, n.majority, n.dim=2, Xpos, sq,
discount, rho, round.digits){
In preparation of the iteration procedure, the iteration count variable count is set to
0. The status quo utility ui(q) is calculated for all players and saved as vector Usq of
length n. Initial continuation values for the first iteration stage are defined by status quo
utilities and saved as vector contvalue of length n. The matrix cviterations collects the
estimated continuation value rounded to round.digits decimal places for each iteration
stage.
If pii(X \ A) = 1 for all i and δ = 1, υi(σ) would need to be calculated dividing by
zero. So equation 4.7 holds true only for δ < 1. Larger input discount factors are set to
.999999999.
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The iteration procedure is further prepared. Some computations do not need to be
repeated for each iteration stage separately. They are conducted in advance in order to
save computing time. The matrix ijcountA contains all order-sensitive combinations of
two ideal points and is needed for further calculations of intersection points. The matrix
strlinesA contains vectors of straight lines from all players j to i as listed in ijcountA.
Vector lengthstrlinesA contains the length of these lines. The matrix ijcountBfull
contains all unique combinations of ideal points irrespective of their order of appearance.
The matrix strlinesBfull contains vectors of straight lines from all players i to j as
listed in ijcountBfull and vector cfull contains the length of these lines.
The rotation matrix R(pi/2) is saved as Rotmatrix.
disc_Usq <- (1 - discount) * Usq
ijcountA <- which(!diag(n.players),arr.ind=T)




strlinesBfull <- Xpos[,ijcountBfull[,2]] - Xpos[,ijcountBfull[,1]]
cfull <- sqrt(colSums((strlinesBfull)^2))
Rotmatrix <- matrix(c(0,1,-1,0),2,2)
The iteration procedure is coded in a repeat-loop and starts with increasing the iter-
ation count variable by 1. The radii of indifference curves I(x˜) are computed and saved
as vector r of size n.
In the following, the set of relevant policies XR is determined. Most of the following
lines deal with the intersection of two indifference curves. The ideal point combination
matrix ijcountB, the vector of straight connecting lines strlinesB and the length of
these vectors c are reset to their initial values. This will only be important at subsequent
iteration stages. The vectors a, b, and c refer to the lengths of triangle sides |BC|, |AC|,
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and |AB| in figure 5.2c. The vector nointersect indicates all ideal point combinations
in ijcountB with non-intersecting indifference curves. A marginal tolerance is added
in order to deal with potential rounding errors. Ideal point combinations with non-
intersecting indifference curves are excluded from the lists and no further considered at
this iteration stage.
For the remaining combinations, α (alpha), |HC| (height), and |AH| (cAh) are derived.
The derivation is slightly adjusted for rare cases, where the triangle’s height meets the
ground line segment AB exactly at point A. The interim calculation of Xpos_ijcountB1.
The position of the foot of the height H is computed and saved as vector Hc for each ideal
point combination.
The set of relevant policies XR is calculated as described in section 5.2.1. All relevant
policies in XR are saved as d × |XR| matrix X, where |XR| is the cardinality of XR. X is
reduced to non-missing values in order to prevent calculation errors. Missing values can
occur in the case of identical ideal points.
repeat{
count <- count+1















height <- b * sin(alpha)
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height <- b * sin(alpha)
cAh <- sqrt(b^2 - height^2)
}
Hc <- Xpos[,ijcountB[,1]] + rep(((-2*(alpha>pi/2)+1) * cAh / c),
each=n.dim) * strlinesB
X <- cbind(Xpos, sq, Xpos[,ijcountA[,2]] +
rep(r[ijcountA[,2]]/lengthstrlinesA,each=n.dim)*strlinesA,
Hc + rep(height / cAh,each=n.dim) * (Rotmatrix %*%
(Hc-Xpos[,ijcountB[,1]])), Hc + Rotmatrix %*% (rep(height / cAh,
each=n.dim) * (Xpos[,ijcountB[,1]]-Hc)))
X <- X[,!is.na(colSums(X))]
The procedure continues with the estimation of players’ voting strategies. Each player
i’s utility ui(x) = −(x˜i − x)2 of each relevant policy x ∈ XR is computed and saved as
|XR| × n matrix Ux. The vector A indicates whether a relevant policy in X is socially
accepted by at least m (n.majority) players. For the derivation of A, policy utilities are
rounded to the sixth decimal place in order to prevent rounding error issues.
Ux <- -colSums((aperm(array(Xpos,dim=c(n.dim,n.players,dim(X)[2])),
c(1,3,2)) - array(X,dim=c(n.dim,dim(X)[2],n.players)))^2)
A <- colSums(t(round(Ux,6)) >= round(-r^2,6)) >= n.majority
Proposal strategies are estimated. maxUA determines the maximal level of utility achieved
from socially accepted policies for all players. The |XR| × n matrix PIi indicates the op-
timal socially accepted policies for each player i. PIicolsums is a vector of length n that
gives the number of optimal policies for each player that are aubjectively preferred over
continued bargaining. The vector sumrhoPcs indicates all players that prefer no socially
accepted policy alternative over continued bargaining. These players would propose a
socially unaccepted policy x ∈ X \ A.
Each player’s continuation value is computed as defined in equation 4.7 and saved
to the vector contvalue of length n. The estimated continuation value is rounded to
round.digits decimal places and added to the cviterations list.
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contvalue <- (sumrhoPcs * disc_Usq +
colSums(rbind(rep(rho/PIicolsums,PIicolsums) *
Ux[which(PIi==1,arr.ind=T)[,1],]))) / (1 - discount * sumrhoPcs)
cviterations <- rbind(cviterations, round(contvalue,round.digits))
If the estimated (rounded) continuation values are identical to the estimates at the pre-
vious iteration stage, they are returned and the procedure ends. If the rounded estimates
are identical to a previous set of estimates at any previous iteration stage, mean contin-
uation values over all iteration stages following that previous duplication are computed
and returned. The estimation procedure ends.
Otherwise, a new iteration stage starts with yet another set of relevant policies, accep-













A.2. Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information
The function bargainingsim returns a list on all relevant input parameters and predicted
features of the simulated bargaining process. The input parameters are the number of
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players n (n.players), the majority threshold m (n.majority), the number of dimen-
sions d = 2 (n.dim), the discount factor δ (discount), a d × n matrix of prior positions
µ (priors), the status quo position q (sq), the vector of recognition probabilities ρ with
a standard setting of equal recognition probabilities (rho), the square root of the de-
gree of uncertainty s =
√
s2 (sd.pos), the standard deviation of the normal distribution
from which potential proposals are drawn from (sd.proposals), the number of poten-
tial proposals xP ∈ XP to be drawn (n.proposals), the number k = 500 of presumed
ideal points to be drawn for each player (n.presumed), the number l = 50 of estimated
complete information continuation values per presumed ideal point (n.cvsims), the de-
gree of estimated continuation value precision to be passed to the complete information
procedure (round.digits). sd.proposals is set to
√
sd.latent2 + sd.pos2 so that the
















The bargainingsim procedure is nested and called for every bargaining period. Thus,
further variables are defined in the command line that are not supposed to be user’s input.
A d × n × k array of presumed ideal points is generated in the first round (Xpos_subj).






A. Simulation Source Code
Further initially generated variables are a period count variable t that is set to t =
1 for the first period (period), a t × d matrix to document the history of proposals
(prophistory), a t × n matrix to document voting history (votehistory), a vector of
length t to document the history of proposers p (proposer), an n × k matrix indicating
vote consistency ω (voteasexpected), a vector of length n that indicates the current
number of consistent presumed ideal points for each player (n_expvotes), and a vector of
length t to document periods where no majority is expected to be reached for any proposal
(no_maj_exp). In the first period, no vote has been observed yet, so no presumed ideal









At the beginning of each period’s procedure, expected continuation values Eυ(σ) are
estimated and saved as n × k matrix contvalues_subj. In preparation to do so, a
d × n × k × l array is created. Xpos_subj_sim[,,,1] is equal to Xpos_subj. Each of
these n × k ideal positions also exists in each of the l − 1 following elements of the 4th
dimension, but in different order. So for each presumed ideal point in Xθ (Xpos_subj), the
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For each of these k × l complete information preference constellations, continuation






sq=sq, discount=discount, rho=rho, round.digits=round.digits)
}
}
For all presumed ideal positions xθ, the expected continuation value is computed by
the mean estimate over all respective complete information procedures and saved as n×
k matrix contvalues_subj. For subsequent period t > 1, the source code is slightly
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}
}






A proposer is selected based on recognition probabilities rho. The identity of the current
proposer is saved as proposer.id and documented in proposer.
proposer.id <- sample(n.players,size=1,prob=rho)
proposer[period] <- proposer.id
The set of potential proposals XP is generated.
proposals <- matrix(rnorm(n.dim * n.proposals, 0, sd.proposals),
n.proposals, n.dim)
proposals[sample(n.proposals,2),] <- rbind(sq, Xpos[,proposer.id])
Expected voting strategies Evti(xP ) are generated for all players i on all potential pro-
posals xP . The estimated probabilities of player i’s agreement to policy xP is saved as
n × |XP | matrix agreementprobs. Since the proposer is fully informed about her own









round(c((1 - discount) * -colSums((sq-Xpos_subj)^2)
+ discount * t(contvalues_subj)),2)
), c(2,1,3)), na.rm=T)
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agreementprobs_as <- agreementprobs
agreementprobs_as[proposer.id,] <- round(-colSums((t(proposals)
- Xpos[,proposer.id])^2), 2) >= round((1 - discount) * -sum((sq -
Xpos[,proposer.id])^2) + discount * contvalues_Xpos[proposer.id],2)
Based on these expected voting strategies, the estimate of the social acceptance set
EAtj(xP ) as expected by proposer j is derived. The array combmat lists all combinations
of majority coalitions for each potential proposal. It is needed for efficient computation
only. majorityprobs_as is a vector that indicates the probability of gaining a majority
for each potential proposal as expected by the proposer.
if(n.players==n.majority){




combmat <- aperm(array(unique(1 - combn(c(1:(n.players+n.majority)),




majorityprobs_as <- rowSums(apply(combmat * c(agreementprobs_as)
+ (1 - combmat) * (1 - c(agreementprobs_as)),c(2,3),prod))
If the proposer expects no proposal to have any chance to find a majority, this is
documented in no_maj_exp and he randomly chooses the first proposal that makes him
better off. Otherwise, the proposer’s expected utility is computed for all xP and saved as
vector exputil_as. The first proposal with maximum expected utility is selected with
a marginal preference of 10−8 for immediate agreement. exputil_as is removed and
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exputil_as <- (-colSums((t(proposals)-Xpos[,proposer.id])^2) + 10^-8)
* majorityprobs_as + ((1-discount)*-sum((sq-Xpos[,proposer.id])^2)





Each player’s voting decision on proposal prop is calculated and saved as vector votes
of length n.
votes <- round(-colSums((prop-Xpos)^2),2) >= round((1 - discount) *
-colSums((sq - Xpos)^2) + discount * contvalues_Xpos,2)
Variables that are no more needed are removed from working space in order to save
memory for computations in subsequent periods.
rm(m,n,agreementprobs,agreementprobs_as,majorityprobs_as,combmat,
contvalues_subj_sim,Xpos_subj_sim,sample,proposer.id,contvalues_Xpos)








If the proposal is accepted, the procedure ends with the last proposal being the outcome.
A list results of variables relevant for further analysis is generated.
if (sum(votes)>=n.majority){
outcome <- prop
results <- list(periods=period, outcome=outcome, n.players=n.players,
n.majority=n.majority, n.dim=n.dim, discount=discount, rho=rho,
priors=priors, Xpos=Xpos, sq=sq, sd.pos=sd.pos,
sd.proposals=sd.proposals, n.proposals=n.proposals,
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Otherwise, player’s expectations are updated. For each presumed ideal point xiθ, the
consistency with i’s just observed vote is determined and saved as matrix voteasexpected.
The variable contvalues_subj is not further needed and removed.
} else {
voteasexpected <- (votes == (round(-colSums((prop-Xpos_subj)^2),2)
>= round((1-discount) * -colSums((sq - Xpos_subj)^2) + discount *
t(contvalues_subj),2)))
rm(contvalues_subj)
Inconsistent presumed ideal points are removed from Xpos_subj. Presumed ideal points
in Xpos_subj are reordered so that consistent entries are listed at the beginning for each
player and the remaining cells are filled up with missing values NA. The voteasexpected
matrix is adjusted accordingly. Columns that consist of missing values for all players, are
dropped from both variables. For the upcoming period, k corresponds to the maximum
number of consistent presumed ideal points over all players. So if there are updates on all
players’ ideal points, there will be less complete information estimations to be conducted
in the next period.
With regard to next period’s estimations, missing values in voteasexpected are set
to FALSE in the remaining colums. Missing values in Xpos_subj are filled up with the



















All these parameters are passed to the bargainingsim function for a downstream simu-
lation of the next period t+1. Accordingly, the period count variable period is increased
by 1. The outset conditions of the game (number of players, status quo, etc.) remain
unchanged. k (n.presumed) is set to the maximum number of so far consistent presumed
ideal positions per player. The number of consistent presumed ideal positions per player
is documented in n_expvotes.
results <- bargainingsim(n.players=n.players, n.majority=n.majority,










The procedure ends with returning the list results to the upstream procedure on the




B. Supplementary Graphs on
Simulation Results
The following figures illustrate more detailed simulation results as discussed in section
5.3. Robustness checks are conducted for duration effects of relative status quo positions,
majority thresholds, the number of players, levels of uncertainty, and discount factors.
Each association is reviewed for various subsets of the simulation dataset, based on values
of other independent variables. The results are illustrated in the following figures.
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Relative SQ location and Duration II





































































































8/8, uncertainty < 30







5/8, uncertainty < 30
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8/8, uncertainty > 70







5/8, uncertainty > 70













8/8, discount < 0.3







5/8, discount < 0.3







































8/8, discount > 0.7








5/8, discount > 0.7
Figure B.1.: Relative SQ location and Duration II: Preference heterogeneity de-
creases duration, when the status quo is very central. It increases duration,
when the status quo is distant. As the majority threshold decreases, the
positive preference heterogeneity effect becomes prevalent.
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Majority Threshold and Duration





































































































































rel. SQ position < 0.3







rel. SQ position 0.3−0.7





















rel. SQ position > 0.7
Figure B.2.: Majority Threshold and Duration II: Eight-player games. Higher ma-
jority thresholds are typically associated with longer bargaining duration.
Exceptions occur with central status quo positions and high degrees of
uncertainty.
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rel. SQ pos. < 0.3







rel. SQ pos. 0.3−0.7





















rel. SQ pos. > 0.7
Figure B.3.: Number of Players and Duration II: Unanimity voting is assumed
throughout. If the relative SQ position is low, more players will decrease
bargaining duration. The opposite is true for outlying SQ positions.
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Uncertainty and Duration





































































































8/8, discount < 0.3







5/8, discount < 0.3
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8/8, discount > 0.7







5/8, discount > 0.7













8/8, rel. SQ < 0.3







5/8, rel. SQ < 0.3














8/8, rel. SQ 0.3−0.7








5/8, rel. SQ 0.3−0.7
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8/8, rel. SQ > 0.7








5/8, rel. SQ > 0.7
Figure B.4.: Uncertainty and Duration II: Duration increases with the level of prefer-
ence uncertainty. This effect is robust for all simulated majority thresholds,
numbers of players, discount factors, and relative SQ positions.
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Discount Factor and Duration





































































































8/8, uncertainty < 30







5/8, uncertainty < 30
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8/8, uncertainty > 70








5/8, uncertainty > 70













8/8, rel. SQ < 0.3







5/8, rel. SQ < 0.3














8/8, rel. SQ 0.3−0.7








5/8, rel. SQ 0.3−0.7
200














8/8, rel. SQ > 0.7








5/8, rel. SQ > 0.7
Figure B.5.: Discount Factor and Duration II: The discount factor will prolong bar-
gaining if the SQ is distant. Under simple majority voting, the discount
factor will decrease bargaining duration if the SQ is centrally located.
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